

SQUATTERS
HUMAN RESOURCE DIMENSION

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Human Resource Dimension

*The Case of Faridabad—A 'Ringtown' of
National Capital Region*

RAJ NANDY

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FOREWORD

Urbanisation and its consequences are a worldwide phenomena and the increasing size and scale of urban settlement is a characteristic of the contemporary era. Four out of every ten of the world's population now live in an urban setting and the expectation is that by the year 2000 A.D. half of the world inhabitants will be urban dwellers.

The phenomenon of rapid urbanisation has brought with it an even more rapid increase in the number of dwellings in areas generally regarded as slums. The existence of slums is essentially a problem of poverty. Alongwith the economic growth and emergence of industrial towns, slums will continue to exist. The Task Force on Housing and Urban Development, set up by the Planning Commission, has aptly pointed out "one of the key challenges for urban policy over the next couple of decades will be search for means to provide adequate shelter to the poor. If it is not possible to provide anyone with housing of high standard, it should at least be possible to make provision for a healthy environment on areas which are normally called slums".

It is a coincidence that Raj Nandy's 'study on Squatters' is appearing in the International Year of Shelter for Homeless (IYSH). The Study is an evidence of the fact that settlement of squatters poses a formidable problem in the Third World Countries.

His description of the living conditions of squatters in Faridabad indeed makes one depressed. It is appalling that there exists a slum in Faridabad, lining a 15 feet wide 'canal' which is really a trench, full of black stagnant water utterly

corrupted by almost 25 years of putrefying human and animal waste that has flowed into it. The squatters there not only experience increasing difficulty in getting basic requirement like clean drinking water but toilet facilities also. That human beings live around this valley of dirt and squalor is a sad commentary on our existing political and social structure. The sense of helplessness and defeatism has so much crept into our minds that we merely remain a silent spectator—at best we give vent to our feelings in seminars and conferences and thus the matter remains only of academic interest.

Rehabilitation of slum dwellers is a gigantic task. The houses built so far over a period of 30 years are a miniscule of the country's total effort and a fraction of the requirement. The cheapest houses built by public agencies are way beyond the means of the economically weaker sections and low income groups. There is little evidence that urban poor have benefited from the schemes launched to provide shelter to the homeless persons.

Permanent existence of slums is a grim reality of our time and perhaps a way of life. It is now a *fait accompli* that slums are accepted as providing a substantial component of urban housing stock and as the best way of providing shelter to the squatters. This view is further substantiated when the Task Force points out that the government sponsored housing construction agencies are incapable of providing affordable houses for the poor, as they find it lucrative to go in for development of land and construction of houses, the marketing of which could help them to build their own resources and organisational image.

Settlement of squatters is a human problem and human problems need human solutions. Removing them by force from public land is no solution to the problem. The mushroom growth of slums is the result of skyhigh prices of land and building material. To have one's own house is even out of reach of middle income group, leave aside the slum dwellers. The solution lies in more rational urban planning.

and development policy to meet the requirements of squatters and improving the environmental conditions in the existing slums by providing them basic amenities and services.

Raj Nandy's study brings to fore the problems of squatters in their true light. His pen at times becomes sharp—this may be due to his deep concern and sympathy for the squatters who live on day-to-day basis and on flickering hope for better days to come. I join with him for viewing the squatters as a 'human resource'. I do hope the study would throw open a wide area for search and introspection for dealing with the problems of squatters effectively.

S. Ramanathan

(S. RAMANATHAN)

Director

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NEW DELHI

“REAL ESTATE”—A CRIMINALLY PUNISHABLE ACTIVITY

“... Just as some people accept that we need some demilitarized zones, we should begin to demonetize values. Let me give an example of a demonetized culture in which I lived for a few months recently with great joy: Nagaland. Among the Nagas, food (rice) is not monetizable, not marketable; you cannot buy it or sell it in any way; it is simply distributed to each household by a very sophisticated system. As a result there is no anxiety since there is rice for everybody. Similarly houses are not marketable or monetizable; there is no real estate. To deal in real estate would be a criminally punishable activity. Houses are not negotiable, as human bodies are not—the house being a prolongation of the human body You don't need to pay for breathing, but in Nagaland also not for eating and dwelling. You can live without such burden and anxiety.”

R. PANIKKAR, *Negation*, Trivandrum, Spring 1984
(quoted in Jeremy Seabrook, *Landscapes of Poverty*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp. 5-6.

PREFACE

One finds the poor amongst squatters in India in a curious position. The top leadership in the country, the major policy documents (be it the national Five-Year Plan, or a regional plan like that of the NCR) refer to them, alongwith the other segments of the Indian population, as 'human resource'. In fact, there is now even a full-fledged ministry at the Centre to deal with the subject. On the contrary, for a typical local body bureaucrat (as also some academic urbanists) the word 'squatter' communicates an image of 'land-grabbers' and this image, in turn, forces him to think of their settlements as 'illegal eyesores', packed with 'parasites' and so on. I am afraid, such a view of squatters suffers from a lack of objectivity because, for no fault of theirs, these poor people, first, get pushed out of their villages by a faltering rural economy and when they arrive in the city for survival, the treatment they get is no better. They find imposed upon themselves the added strain of seeking some shelter (if they are lucky to locate work) which the city refuses to provide. Inevitably, they build huts or shacks on vacant plots that are nearest to their jobs. So viewed dispassionately, isn't their behaviour a reaction to a stress they, first, experience in the rural India and, latter, in the urban India. In circumstances such as these, can they really be labelled as 'grabbers'? In any case, not according to the value system of Nagas, as described in the quotation on the *facing page*, and which makes a mockery of the whole idea of treating housing as a 'marketable' commodity. It may also be of interest to the reader to know that the values of the American Indians, too (the original inhabitants of the United States), have traditionally emphasized on keeping all lands in common, *i.e.*, 'tribally', not 'individually' or 'privately'.

Perhaps what makes the position of squatters in India look all the more bizarre when one comes across in the minds of local bodies' officials feelings of scorn and prejudice against the urban poor. Apparently, these negative feelings influence their attitudes and behaviour-patterns in a manner that they hardly seem to think of squatters/slum dwellers as part of the broader human resource in the country. To illustrate this point, consider the impressive 'official' figures on page 48 that suggest as if the EIUS has massively benefited lakh of slum dwellers in the country. The fact is that evidence about the cavalier attitude of the official machinery and its laxness in the implementation of this nationally-important scheme is writ large in most urban slums (disgusting insanitary conditions and other forms of insufferable deprivation) ever since its initiation in 1972. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear reports that sometimes officials just cook these figures on 'improvements' in the living conditions of slum people in their respective towns/cities.

The picture is not bright for families moved into one-room EWS houses, either—because shovelling a 5 to 9 member family into a single room is certainly not 'healthful housing'. It does not quite mingle with the concept of "human resource development", for over-crowding and other stresses of bad housing often result in, *inter alia*, 'sickness' of the inmates, with heavy costs for the people concerned and the society at large. It would not be surprising if these one-room houses degenerate into 'new slums' in due course of time.

It is also worth pausing to remember yet another aspect of this problem. Children growing up in such a physical landscape are likely to perceive themselves as lesser beings, compared to their counterparts in decent houses—thereby, giving rise to feelings of social divisiveness or what writers like J. Rex and P. Moore (*Race, Community and Conflict*, 1967) and Gill Burke (*Housing and Social Justice*, 1981) refer to as 'housing class struggle'. Perhaps that is what led R. Tawney (*Equality*, 1931) to argue—and rightly so—that, in ultimate analysis, inequality was wasteful.

I suspect that the 'official' apathy towards the slum dwellers in our country betrays ignorance of certain socio-economic realities of the present-day Indian society and the power relations within it. Such a perspective, may I submit, must change if we are to ever realize the dream of a squatter-free society. And, that is the theme that evolves through this study, the specific analysis in it of a given town (Faridabad) notwithstanding.

Turning to the large number of individuals who have been helpful to me in the production of this volume, let me, first, express my special thanks to Mr. Naresh Gulati, the then Chief Administrator of the Faridabad Complex Administration, who very readily agreed to let me undertake this piece of research when I talked to him about the IIPA's continued quest for empirical data on urban problems in order to put our training programmes on firm foundations. Mr. R.P. Singh, at that time the Senior Town Planner and Head of the Planning Department, and Mr. A.S. Pundalik, Divisional Town Planner, aided me greatly in many ways—in the collection of data, in arranging visits to squatter-settlements in the town, their personal courtesies and attention and, above all, intellectual discussions during my numerous interviews with them. Their very energetic Assistant Town Planner, Mr. S.C. Kush, was always quick to produce the requisite information smilingly and unfailingly. Mr. S.P. Chowdhary, Architect in the Department, explained to me the structural style of the EWS houses built for squatters by the FCA. I owe all of them—as also the administrative staff, headed by Shri Hans Raj—my profound gratitude. It is no exaggeration to say that but for their unstinted cooperation the appearance of this book could not have been possible.

I also wish to acknowledge the help of two other senior officials of the FCA: Mr. S.N. Somastamb, Establishment Officer, and Mr. S.B. Aggarwal, Financial Adviser. While Mr. Aggarwal was kind enough to freely make available all the information I sought from his unit, Mr. Somastamb gave me many hours of his precious time to educate me on a variety of issues, ranging from the past/present problems of

the Faridabad Complex, in particular, and the crisis in which the local bodies like the FCA find themselves in today, in general.

My thanks also go to the ex-HUDA Administrator at Faridabad, Mrs. Urvashi Gulati, whose comments helped me to know the role that HUDA played in mitigating the housing problems of the economically-weaker sections in the town.

I was fortunate to get the opportunity to talk to some of the top administrators of the Government of Haryana at Chandigarh: Mr. L.C. Gupta, Financial adviser-cum-Secretary, Revenue Department; Mr. R.S. Mann, Secretary, Town and Country Planning Department; and, Mr. K.R. Punia, Secretary, Local Government Department. I greatly benefited from the discussions I have had with them.

I am also grateful to the Joshi-Adhikari Institute of Social Studies, New Delhi, for permission to reproduce extracts from the Charter of Demands made in its "National Seminar on Urbanisation, Growth of Slums, Social Conflict and Environmental Hazards", held on January 17-19, 1987.

At the Institute I must express my appreciation to Dr. P.R. Dubhashi, former IIPA Director, who promptly allocated funds to enable me to carry out this study. However, by the time the manuscript was ready, Mr. S. Ramanathan (until recently, Secretary, Coordination, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India) had taken over as Director of the Institute and was good enough to show interest in it. It was this interest—I am glad to say—that, finally, led to the book's publication, thus, making it possible for me to share the findings of the study more widely. I am greatly indebted to him.

Mr. R.K. Kaushik, Office Superintendent, helped through most of the sketches and drawings in this book. Mr. K.K. Chawla typed the first five chapters and Mr. V.K. Sharma the final one. The Assistant Editor, Mr. M.K. Gaur, and

his colleagues in the Publication Division, were of considerable help in processing it through the press in a few week's time. I should like to record my sincere thanks to all of them. I must hasten to add, however, that the contents of the book do not necessarily reflect the views of the IIPA and that I am individually responsible for all errors of facts and judgement found in it.

NEW DELHI
JUNE 30TH, 1987

RAJ NANDY

ABBREVIATIONS

IYSH	International Year of Shelter for Homeless
NCR	National Capital Region
EIUS	Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
FCA	Faridabad Complex Administration
NIT	New Industrial Township
HUDA	Haryana Urban Development Authority
ATP	Assistant Town Planner
STP	Senior Town Planner
CA	Chief Administrator
B&R	Buildings and Roads
PH	Public Health
MOH	Medical Officer of Health
SSI	Senior Sanitary Inspector
DTP	Divisional Town Planner
HUDCO	Housing and Urban Development Corporation
UCD	Urban Community Development
HDFC	Housing Development and Finance Corporation
DDA	Delhi Development Authority
EWS	Economically Weaker Sections
LIC	Life Insurance Corporation of India
CPWD	Central Public Works Department

THE ARGUMENT ABOUT THIS STUDY

'Squatters' and their 'settlements in Faridabad' caught my imagination when I happened to read a couple of documents on the NCR plan—now a familiar acronym for urban planners/administrators, at least in this part of the country.

NCR stands for "National Capital Region". Its earliest conception was in 1959 when the draft Delhi Master Plan recommended the establishment of a statutory National Capital Region Board with a view to initiating regional planning in an area of roughly 50 miles around Delhi. A major objective of the plan was to prevent further haphazard growth of the national capital by strengthening 14 towns in the neighbouring States of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and in the Delhi Metropolitan Area. Of course, in a larger sense, the plan envisaged something much beyond that when it referred to certain lofty ideals like exploitation of the region's endowments to their maximum potential, such as, 'human resource', 'agriculture', 'forests', 'irrigation', 'cattle wealth', 'household/manufacturing industries', and so on.

The plan also emphasized the need for development of three types of centrally located 'growth centres' in different parts of the region: small villages or clusters of village communities at the bottom, larger villages/towns at the middle, and bigger towns/the metropolis at the top of the hierarchy. All these centres shall have the civic and infrastructural facilities, linking each with the others in such a way that their total functioning will lead to balanced development of the entire region, as a 'whole'.

Attempts to see things/problems "as a whole" is relatively a new thinking. 'Systems' approach is the outstanding example of this recent trend in management literature. Naturally, as a student of management, I got curious to know how

a small 'part' (squatters in Faridabad) of the 'whole' (region) had been perceived, and dealt with all these 40 long years—especially because it happened to be no ordinary part but a fraction (no matter however tiny) of what in the management literature is known as the 'most precious resource', namely, the 'human resource'. After all, in ultimate analysis, 'human resource' is the actual instrument through which all development—be that of a village, town, city or the entire nation—could be attained and which was also the very 'object' of such a development.

The National Capital Regional Plan recognized this ideal in the following words:

The endowments of the Region have to be exploited to their maximal potential. These are *human resources*, material resources, mainly agricultural, and social and physical resources...¹

Why did I single out 'Faridabad' from the other NCR towns as the focus of my study? There are several mutually-reinforcing reasons. The first is obvious: Faridabad is different from other NCR towns because being an industrial town right from the start, it has been a natural attraction for the rural migrant. Thus, apart from being a big "factory town", it has been a big "squatter town". Second, it still retains its image of being a centre of employment (the planners envisage a population of more than ten lakh by 2001 A.D.) and, hence, the strong possibility of more people moving into its squatter slums. Third, it already has as many as 62 squatter settlements—apart from other slum 'situations'—and, therefore, offers a sufficiently wide view of the problem (squattling) we need to know in a town of the NCR. Finally, two senior officials of the 'planning division' of the local administration happened to be my old acquaintances. This factor was also crucial, in a way, for it assured me of easy accessibility to data.

¹Town and Country Planning Organisation: Regional Plan, National Capital Region (undated), Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, p. iv.

Objective of the Study

When I made my first trip to Faridabad in February 1985, to talk to the local officials about the study and the format it should take, my discussions with them indicated that while the root cause of the problem lay in the early history of the town (see Chapter 2), there were three other major constraints that had prevented the Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA) from launching a full-scale programme for the squatters problem there. These were: (1) Organisational, (2) Legal, and (3) Financial. That set the ambitions of my study. To put it more explicitly, the basic purpose of the study was to dissect the FCA's capabilities *vis-a-vis* the challenges it faced in handling the squatters' problem. The intention was to examine how the FCA had gone about achieving its task, and how well or badly its resources matched up to the size of the problem in Faridabad.

Methodology

Information used in the study was pulled out from the 'files and records' of the FCA. But, it mainly came from the 'interviews'. Says Newman:

The process of examining an organization is largely 'verbal' rather than 'visual'.²

Amongst my interviewees were ten senior officials of the FCA, two of the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA), and 50-odd residents of the squatter slums—including some of the 'medical doctors' operating there. While interviewing the squatters I particularly sought out evidence from those who had stayed in the settlements longer in order to trace the origin of the given settlement and the 'interest' or 'lack of concern' of the local authorities towards the inhabitants over the years.

'Direct observation' during these visits helped me gain a lucid picture of the existing physical conditions within these settlements.

²Newman Derek, *Organisational Design: An Analytical Approach to Structuring Organisation*, Edward Arnold, London, 1973, p. 3.

I have also attempted 'event analysis' and 'case study method' in order to illustrate certain issues bearing on the theme of the study.

Significance

Though the focus—as already stated above—is only on one town of the NCR region, it is a premise of this study that, despite the variation in circumstances, both past and present, amongst the various NCR towns, there must be sufficient similarity in their urban problems and the experiences and experiments of one of them could be of considerable significance to others if only the concerned officials there would care to study and extract them. That explains the potential importance of the study from the point of view of the NCR project.

The study has yet another demonstrative value. NCR is the first such project to be initiated in the country. Once problems of a project of this kind have been investigated in one region, the findings could be of great help to the concerned agencies in other regions in avoiding the 'pitfalls' that have marked the growth of the NCR, as also encourage them to give right treatment at right time to similar urban problems that keep cropping up with distressing frequency all over.

Chapter Scheme

Chapter 1, titled "Squatter Settlements: An Interpretive Framework", is both descriptive and analytical. It deals with questions, such as, origin/meaning of slum/squatter settlements, condenses two rival theories in the field and their implications for problems like poverty and squatter-slums in Third World Countries and, finally, steers through a critical appraisal of the macro-level attempts made in India to deal with the problem. If the chapter is somewhat long, it is chiefly because of its wide scope.

The second chapter is a narrative of the growth history of Faridabad town, unfolded against a background of the major forces in the past. It also indicates, as it goes along, how

those forces had contributed to the present-day gloomy squatter situation in the town, and what are its current major tensions.

An outline of the administrative set-up of the FCA is contained in Chapter 3. It has its value, for it tells us about the broad division of work within the FCA, and other structural features, such as, inter-departmental interface, as also organizational culture and behaviour.

Chapter 4 provides a peep into the 'squatter-scape' of Faridabad. It brings us face to face with the sad reality and the challenges it poses to the local administration there, and the NCR. It also takes a look at the FCA's commitments and achievement in the area.

Addressing itself to the central theme of this study, namely, the 'three major constraints' of the FCA in dealing with the squatters problem is Chapter 5. Apart from showing the seamy side of 'organizational' deficiencies in the system (how for example, the Planning Unit strove to strengthen itself to meet with its responsibilities but failed), the Chapter also offers a wider understanding of the FCA's problems in the two related areas, namely, 'legal' and 'financial'. It is here that we find confirmation of the feeble attempts made by the FCA, from time to time, to solve some of the squatters problems or avoid them.

Chapter 6 is concerned with 'conclusions' and, as is obvious, it attempts to summarize and synthesize the various issues stemming from the discussion in earlier chapters. It also relates them to the key features of the local squatters problem as well as to the contemporary socio-economic conditions in the society at large.

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
FOREWORD	v
PREFACE	ix
THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THIS STUDY	xv
1 SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK	1
Slums in the West—A Flashback—Meaning—Classification—Squatter Settlements—Crisis and Meaning—Location—The Problem: A Framework for Analysis—Western Approach to Development—Theory of 'Dependancy': The New Approach—Types of Squatters—Strategies for Housing Squatters—Magnitude of Problem—Centre's Moves against Slums—Re-structured 20-Point Programme.	
2 RISE OF FARIDABAD COMPLEX: ADMINISTRATION (FCA): SOME BASIC FACTS AND TRENDS	55
Faridabad Development Board—The 'Central' Control—Notified Area Committee—From 'Centre' to 'State Government'—Birth of Municipality—Dispute Over Vital 'Public Lands'—Nature of Dispute: The Case of Municipality—Search for a Solution—Court Battle—Establishment of Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA)—The Final Agreement—Faridabad: Some Basic Facts and Trends—Area—Total Popula-	

tion—Squatter Population and Area Under its Occupation—Physical Characteristics of Land—Cost of Land Acquisition—Land Utilization—Developed Land and its Price—Housing for the Upper/Middle Classes—Housing for Urban Poor (Excluding Squatters)—Unauthorised Colonies—Water Supply—Street Lighting—Population Density—Medical Care—Trends—Running out of Water—Mounting Traffic/Congestion on Highway between Delhi-Ballabhgarh—Inadequate Local Transport—Transport Nagar—Insufficient Sewerage System—Mushroom Growth of Unauthorized Colonies—Illegal Construction—Housing Shortage—Power Crisis—Environmental Pollution—Hospitals Facilities—Maze of Authorities—Lack of Coordination—Politics and Planning.

3 FARIDABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP 86

Old System—Old Faridabad—Ballabhgarh—NIT—New System—Unique Feature—Leading Officials—Chief Administrator—First Division of Activities—Departmental Interfaces—Sequence of Operations and Interface Origins—FCA 'Culture'—'Cultural' Interface between FCA and Squatters—Decision-Making—Traditional Approach.

4 SLUM-SCAPE IN FARIDABAD: FCA'S COMMITMENTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 101

Background—Anti-Slum Phase: Getting Information—A Grim Situation—Close-ups of two Squatter Slum—Neelum Bata Squatters Slum—'C-2' Cluster (Harijan Basti)—FCA's Commitments Towards Squatters—Old Faridabad—Ballabhgarh Zone—NIT Zone—Implementation—FCA: The Achie-

vements—Environmental Improvement—Housing for Squatters.

5 MAJOR CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR PROFILES 125

Planning Unit—Historical Sketch—Analysis—Legal Resources—Available Legal Tools to Deal with Squatter Problems—The Punjab Slum Areas (Improvement) Act, 1961—The Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977—The Haryana (Punjab) Public Permisses and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972—The Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971—The Faridabad Complex (Regulation and Development) Act, 1971—Analysis—Financial Resources—Resource Suppliers for Slum Improvement/Housing for Squatters—Central Government Channelled through State Government)—HUDCO (Funds for Squatters' Housings)—Analysis.

6 CONCLUSIONS 167

Why Gone Critical?—Central Government—State Government—Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA)—“Better-off” Faridabad—Poor Faridabad—Genuine Development and Glaring Contradictions—A Footnote.

APPENDICES 203

- I Estimated Urban Population and Slum Population at the end of the Seventh Plan (State-wise)
- II Estimated Urban Population and Slum Population in 1990 in Metropolitan Cities
- III Estimated Urban Population and Slum Population in 1990 in Cities with Population 5 to 10 Lakh
- IV Incidence of Slums and Squatter Areas in Selected Cities of Developing Countries

- V Faridabad Complex—Shape of the Town (Showing, amongst others, location of major slum clusters)
- VI Charter of Demands made in the National Seminar on “Urbanization, Growth of Slums, Social Conflict and Environmental Hazards” (17-19 January, 1987), organized by the Joshi-Adhikari Institute of Social Studies, New Delhi

1

SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK

Broadly, squatter settlements are a trademark of the Third World countries. By contrast, 'slums' as an urban malady, first, originated in the industrial cities of the West. This is not to say that 'squatting' never took place in that part of the world. The problem did arise there at different points of time in different Western Countries¹ but, in view of the early establishment of the capitalist system and enshrinement of private property as absolute right there, it was checkmated in time. Charles Abrams, a noted writer on the subject, explains:

The old frontier areas of the more developed nations were once also the scenes of squatting, but in time titles were established, the land was often granted or sold to the squatters, and the law of force was supplanted by the force of law. Squatting, however, was rarely carried over into the cities of America or Europe because law and property rights in cities were too firmly rooted. Members of the British privileged classes who had acquiesced in rural squatting until the time of the enclosures would not long allow the same indulgences for urban property.²

It can reasonably be stated that a variant of the same malady of 'slums' in the West is now being repeated in the Third World countries which have adopted the Western economic model (industrialisation, urbanization and high-mass consumption societies). The only difference is that if in the

¹For an account of squatting in British society since the 17th century, see Gill Burke, *Housing and Social Justice*, Lorgman, London and New York, 1981, Chapter 7.

²Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1964, p. 12.

West it was the crowded, dark, brick-built 'tenements', together with their rubbish that had become the mark of slums, here in the contemporary Third World cities it is largely the squatters 'thatched huts/shacks' in the midst of mud and exposed human waste that symbolize the slums and slum conditions.

The theme has also been subjected to considerable analysis and has, apparently, given rise to a sizable literature. However, before an attempt is made to explore it, a flash-back on the emergence of slums in the West should be in order.

SLUMS IN THE WEST

A Flash-back

Essentially, the industrial town and the modern slum sprang up and thrived side by side. Calling these early factory towns as 'coke towns', Mumford notes:

The main elements in the urban complex were the factory, the railroad, and the slum. By themselves, they constituted the industrial town...³

By the first 100-odd years of the industrial revolution in England, for example, a single factory employed about 250 hands and a dozen such units were already the nucleus of an industrial town. The elementary municipal services were non-existent. Thousands of workers' dwellings, built back to back, had no direct daylight or ventilation. Old one-family units were converted into rent-barracks, with each room enclosing a whole family—a norm which held for a long time to come. There were no open streets, only narrow passages and rubbish thrown in them remained there, no matter how vile and filthy. It was a common practice to have pigsties under houses and the pigs roamed about freely. There was also a dire lack of toilets in these localities—only one toilet to every 212 people. Lack of water was even more sinister. On occasions, the poor would go from house to house in the middle class sections, begging for water as they might beg for bread during a famine. With this lack of water

³Mumford Lewis, *The City in History*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1961, p. 459.

for drinking and washing it is no wonder that the filth accumulated.⁴

Friedrich Engels, whose name is indissolubly associated with that of Karl Marx, also recorded the all-pervading poverty and the degrading living conditions of slum-dwellers in the British towns in the 19th century.⁵

In terms of depressed living quarters for the poor, and the ugly environment in them, cities like New York, Pittsburgh, Paris and Hamburg (to name a few in the US and Western Europe)—came quite close to London, or Manchester. Furthermore in the then prevailing *laissez-faire* milieu, the financial/managerial functions and interests were often located in the same families and, therefore, merciless pursuit of private profit and exploitation of workers were considered primary and everything else as secondary. To cap it all, there was no State authority to prevent concentration of factories in a particular area or to enforce segregation of industrial, commercial and domestic activities in these towns.

Summing up such 'sense-blunting' conditions in the slums of the Western cities of those days, Mumford remarks:

..., it is plain that never before in recorded history had such vast masses of people lived in such a savagely deteriorated environment ugly in form, debased in content....⁶

By the end of the 19th century, every urban society in the West had its slums. The gap between the rich and the poor was very wide and the rich generally tended to dismiss the slum people as 'undersirables' and victims of 'God's will'. The illness, the starvation, the suffering of the poor hardly aroused any sympathetic feeling. If some groups took a compassionate view, they did so as a 'Christian duty'.

As time passed, because of a combination of factors, particularly historical as well as the advent of new technological advances—these industrial centres witnessed not only phenomenal increase in their populations but also became a

⁴Mumford Lewis, *The City in History*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1961, p. 462.

⁵Friedrich Engels, *The Conditions of Working Classes in England*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1973.

⁶Lewis Mumford, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

4 *Squatters: Human Resource Dimension*

sort of 'potpourri of different occupations, social classes, cultural backgrounds and interests'. The cities in the United States, for example, came to acquire a definite hierarchy of social classes. A six-class stratification of these social classes in America has been developed by Warner and his associates and this has almost been accepted as the standard classification elsewhere. He spells it out as follows:

1. Upper upper classes, or old aristocracy,
2. Lower upper classes, or new rich but not as socially important as the old aristocracy,
3. Upper middle classes,
4. Lower middle classes,
5. Upper lower classes, and
6. Lower lower classes.

Describing the features of the 'Upper lower classes', he says that these are the people who have factory jobs or other semiskilled jobs and work for 'wages' rather than 'salary'. Union contracts often determine the pace of their economic advancement. As for the 'Lower lower', this class consists of people with irregular work histories and the poorest-paying jobs, and, by and large, these are the people who are frequently found living in urban slums.⁷

Since the dawn of the 20th century the Western nations have, by and large, experienced rapid economic growth and their cities grown in number and wealth. But, the living conditions of the urban poor in them have progressively deteriorated. As estimated by Harrington, by the 1960s somewhere between 20 and 25 per cent of the American people were poor (of course, not as extremely as the poor in India or Indonesia). They had inadequate housing, medicine, food and opportunity.⁸

Perhaps it would be no exaggeration to say that the 'golden years' of the 'affluent society' appear to be over and increasing poverty and slum-conditions are once again threatening.

⁷Lloyd W. Warner (ed.), *Yankee City*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1963.

⁸Mic ael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1962, p. 182; see also Walter B. Miller, *Cultural Features of an Urban Lower Class Community*, Washington, D.C., National Institute of Health, 1959.

to create serious social problems in the cities of these nations. For example, in a report titled 'Faith in the City' an 18-member commission of academics, social workers and churchmen in UK have pinpointed depressing realities of unemployment, decayed housing and widespread poverty in 32 British cities and towns.⁹ Similarly, a recent report published in a leading American weekly gave disturbing accounts of the despair of an increasing number of the urban homeless in cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia. Rough estimates put their number around three million; 22 per cent of them are children.¹⁰ There are today some 10,000 homeless people in the French capital, Paris; even the middle class is said to be joining their ranks. The total figure for the homeless in Europe is nearly one million.

Meaning

Early writers in the West started by viewing the slum only in terms of its 'physical' aspects. Even Partridge who claims to provide us the ancestry of the term itself suggests such an emphasis, for in his view it probably came from word 'slumber' since slums were originally "to the majority—unknown, back streets or alleys, wrongly presumed to be sleepy and quiet".¹¹

The 1931-edition of the Webster dictionary, too, went along the same interpretation when it described a slum as a "foul, back street of a city...a low, squalid neighbourhood".

Again, there were academics who took the same stance. For example, one of the first monumental studies on slums in the city of New York by James Ford (1936), did not go further than such a view when it said:

Any area of old, neglected and deteriorated housing or of new markedly substandard housing is a slum as soon as it becomes insanitary or otherwise injurious to its occupants... The slum is thus characterized by age, neglect, and low standards or practices in sanitation.¹²

⁹ *Newsweek*, New York, December 16, 1985, p. 22.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; also March 9, 1987, pp. 46-7.

¹¹ Eric, Partridge, *Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1958.

¹² James Ford, *Slums and Housing: History, Conditions, Policy*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936.

The basic objective of Britain's first statutory authority (1851)—a body concerned with the problem of deterioration of physical property—was also to condemn 'unfit housing'.

Similarly, a pamphlet called 'A Primer About Slums', produced by the New York State Division of Housing, in 1958, gave them a meaning which came pretty close to the definitions above. It said: "A slum is an ugly name for a place in which to live. It is the final phase of a neighbourhood sickness that attacks our towns and cities."¹³

Even the definition given to us by the United Nations seems to carry—to quote Laquian—"certain unstated values and pre-conceptions that are uniquely Western"¹⁴. It defines a slum as:

...a building, group of buildings, or area characterized by overcrowding, deterioration, unsanitary conditions or absence of facilities or amenities which, because of these conditions or any of them, endanger the health, safety or morals of the inhabitants or the community.¹⁵

The Indian policy-makers, too, seem to have settled for a similar definition of the term.¹⁶ But, Harrington—like Laquian—prefers to venture beyond such a definition when he says:

A sum is not merely an area of decrepit buildings. It is a social fact.¹⁷

To slum up, we may say that for quite some time it is the *physical conditions* of a slum that had been emphasized by writers in the West. While referring to a slum, they banded about expressions, such as, 'deteriorated neighbourhood', 'derelict building', and so on.

¹³New York State Division of Housing, *A Primer About Slums*, Albany, 1958.

¹⁴A.A. Laquian, *Slums for People*, Honolulu, East-West Centre Press, 1977, p. 16.

¹⁵United Nations, *Urban Land Policies*, Document ST/SCA/9, New York, UN Secretariat, 1952, p. 200.

¹⁶Section 3 of the *Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act*, Government of India, 1956.

¹⁷Michael Harrington, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

This also explains why there was in the 1930s so much concern about 'slum clearance' and an extraordinary enthusiasm for 'urban renewal' in the 1950s in the United States. But, the two strategies failed to accomplish the official objective set for them and 'did not make a dent on the problem of slum diminution that any one could really be proud of'¹⁸—largely because they took a partial and lopsided view of what, in reality, is a complex problem.

While defining a slum in physical terms cannot be avoided, a serious limitation of this approach, however, is that it conditions most planners and policy-makers to think of a slum problem merely in terms of 'housing standards' or 'real estate' or 'finance'. It also turns their attention away from the complexity of the various forces in the society (social, economic, physical, and cultural) that produce poverty, slums and the related social evils. By the 1960s, as researcher after researcher explored this theme deeper, new and subtle characteristics of slums and slum life not realized earlier—began to surface. Hunter, the author of an authoritative volume on slums, does justice to these complex characteristics and their inter-play by using the phrase the 'feel' of a slum. He elaborates:

...This refers to the feel when a non-resident is in a slum, or the feel of things when one lives in a slum. The attitude of the slum dweller toward the slum itself, toward the city of which the slum is a part, toward his own chances of getting out, toward the people who control things, toward the 'system'—this is the element which as much as anything else will determine whether or not it is possible to 'do something about slums'. This is what makes slums a human problem rather than a problem of finance and real estate. This is what made a real estate man in Oakland, California, say that the problem is not how to take the people out of the slums. But to take the slums out of the people.¹⁹

¹⁸David R. Hunter, *The Slums: Challenge and Response*, London, The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1964, p. 208.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 18.

There are now available detailed studies that provide the reader with an intense 'feel' of this highly complex human problem. Some of them point to: (a) the 'culture of slum/poverty' and its effects on virtually every facet of the lives of most of the slums dwellers.²⁰ (b) social isolation of the slum-dwellers and their exclusion from power and participation in an urban society,²¹ (c) their feeling of futility and a fatalistic outlook on life²², and (d) patterns of social organization within the slums that bind them in community life.²³

Classification

Slums can be classified almost 'along a continuum' (even within a country, let alone across the globe). However, Charles Stokes and John Seeley have attempted classifications which—despite their Western flavour—are inclusive enough to comprehend the cross-cultural realities (including Indian).

Stokes divides slums into what he calls as the 'slums of hope' and the 'slums of despair'. The first type, he says is a kind of 'way-station' where a person/family may stay for a fairly long time but they view it all along as a transitory camp. Most of the people living in them have migrated to the city for a better life and 'hope' to make it one day—though may not always succeed. The other type, *i.e.*, 'slum of despair', is the one that is inhabited by people of longer residence in the city. Most of them are 'at the end of line' and are unlikely to escape the clutches of poverty and, hence, from slums. To rise above poverty one needs education and a skill in a competitive society. Even if in some cases the income-levels rise, it is not necessary that their skill-levels too would improve. Hence they have nowhere to go from the

²⁰Lewis Oscar, *The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family*, New York, Random House Inc., 1961; Elizabeth, Herzog, "Some Assumptions about the Poor", *Social Service Review*, XXXVII, December, 1963.

²¹Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Groups and Class in the Life of Indian Americans*, The Free Press, 1962.

²²Leo Strole, *Mental Health and the Metropolis: The Midtown Manhattan Study*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1962.

²³W.B. Miller, "Implications of Lower-class Culture", *Social Service Review*, 33, September 1959, pp. 219-36.

slum.²⁴

It may be noted that the terms, 'hope' and 'despair', used by Stokes refer to the 'people' who live in these slums and not to the 'locations' of the slums.

Taking a somewhat different perspective, Seeley divides slums into four types: (1) permanent necessitarians, (2) temporary necessitarians, (3) permanent opportunists, and (4) temporary opportunists. Amongst the permanent necessitarians are the 'adjusted poor' who live in a slum because of necessity and have adapted themselves to its ways. They are the destitutes/nearly destitutes, drug addicts, peddlers/pushers, prostitutes/pimps and others of marginal or shady activities. The temporary necessitarians are the 'respectable poor' the 'trapped' who may live in a slum for a short while or most of their lives but never become adjusted to its ways of life. He lists the fugitives (who have had a brush with the law) and the unfindables (floating population, seldom counted in a census), etc., as the 'permanent opportunists'. As for the 'temporary opportunists', they are the beginners (trying to improve their position), climbers and entrepreneurs.²⁵

SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Crisis and Meaning

The numerous debates²⁶ on the impending urban crisis in the Third World countries that started off in the late 1950s and have since continued down the 1960s and 1970s no longer appear to be scaremongering. The crisis—reminds one commentator on the scene—"has arrived".

While the arguments on this crisis in the Third World countries range over many complex issues, the crunchpoint

²⁴Charles Stokes, "A Theory of Slums", *Land Economics*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, August 1962, pp. 187-97.

²⁵John R. Seely, "The Slum: Its Nature, Use and Users", *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. XXV, No. 1, February 1959.

²⁶World Bank: *Urbanization* sector paper, Washington, DC, 1972; HABITAT: UN Conference on Human Settlements, 1976 (950 documents on building, housing, city planning, are reported to have been published by the United Nations before the HABITAT Conference was held).

is their 'burgeoning cities and miserable squatters'. Indeed, the situation in some of these cities is so desperate that there does not appear to be left much room even on the pavements in some of these cities. Oxfam Director, Brian Walker, recently spoke movingly of a woman-squatter on a Dacca pavement whose burning desire was to acquire 'a paving stone' which she could call her own, to live and cook and sleep on and eventually to die on.²⁷

According to one estimate, in the Third World countries half the inhabitants have to live in squatter-slums and the rate of such settlements was increasing four times faster than world population growth. Charles Correa's conclusion is:

With the flow of migrants into the existing centres, the slum and uncontrolled settlements contain an even larger portion of the urban population: 33 per cent in Karachi and Calcutta, 31 per cent in Brasilia, more than 45 per cent in Bombay, as high as 80 per cent in Bureanaventure (Columbia)²⁸

Thus, unless something is urgently done in the next few years, these cities shall be facing, by the year 2000, a new generation of squatters and squatter settlements or, in other words, a new wave of human degradation and misery. While about half of these squatters are expected to be born into urban life, the other half is likely to migrate to it²⁹ 'like the cheap fuel for the industrial engine that cannot take them'.

Lerner makes a very telling point about these migrant-squatters whom he prefers to call as the 'displaced persons' or the 'DPs' of the so-called developmental process:

The point that must be stressed in referring to this suffering mass of humanity displaced from the rural areas to the

²⁷*Town and Country Planning*, London, June 1985, p. 203.

²⁸Charles Correa, *The New Landscape*, The Book Society of India, 1985, p. 116.

²⁹There is wide agreement that though European cities during the industrial revolution grew mainly by in-migration the Third World cities are growing as much by 'natural' increase as by 'rural to urban migration'. See N. Keyfitz, "Do Cities Grow by Natural Increase or Migration", *Geographical Analysis*, Vol. XII, 1980, pp. 142-56.

filthy peripheries of the great cities is that few of them experience the 'transition from agricultural to urban-industrial labour called for by the mechanism of development and the model of modernization. They are neither housed, nor trained, nor employed, nor serviced. They languish on the urban periphery without entering into any productive relationship with its industrial operators. These are the 'displaced persons', the DPs of the developmental process as it now typically occurs in most of the world. . .³⁰

A dimension of the debate that has already been emphasized above is that the squatter settlement problem is somewhat different from what we have understood by the term 'slum'—even though many of the forces that cause the two and the effects they produce on the people who live in them are similar and overlap each other. For example, in the West a slum is the place where the poor (or 'lower-lower', to use Warner's term) live, but that is not a squat. Likewise, a squat in India, Lima or Ghana is also a place where the poor live but, as a settlement, it is different in the sense it is raised on land that was lying unoccupied and was later 'illegally' occupied by people who neither owned it nor rented it out from its 'legal' owners.

According to Abrams, there are at least three distinct types of urban poor in developing countries. First, the homeless and the street-sleeper. Secondly, those living in slums and tenements, frequently paying relatively higher rents, and thirdly, the squatters and occupants of shanty towns.

Potter draws our attention to what he calls a 'frequently overlooked distinction' between squatter settlements and shanty towns: *i.e.*, if the former are characterised by their 'illegality', the latter are identified by virtue of their poor physical fibre'.³¹

Some of the other terms used for such settlements are 'spontaneous settlements', 'uncontrolled settlements',

³⁰D. Lerner, "Comparative Analysis of Processes of Modernization", in H. Miner (ed.), *The City in Modern Africa*, London, Pall Mall, 1967.

³¹Robert B. Potter, *Urbanisation and Planning in Third World*, London & Sydney, Groom Helm, 1985, pp. 86-7.

'makeshift', 'irregular', 'unplanned', 'marginal', and 'peripheral settlements'. Potter prefers the term 'low-income housing' to cover all types of housing for the poor in Third World countries.

One also comes across a variety of local names for them: 'Attap kampongs' in Singapore, 'Bidouilles' in Algeria, 'bustees' in India. Geoffrey Lean gives us an interesting insight into the meanings of some them:

In the Argentine they are dubbed 'villas miserias', which speaks for itself. In Chile, they are 'callampas'—'mushroom cities'. In Turkey they call them 'gecekundu'—meaning that they are built between sunset and sunrise in a single night. In Brazil they have a number of names, including the most famous of them all—the 'favelas' of Rio. And in return their people, the 'favelades', have their own eloquent name for those who are better off; they call them 'asphaltos', the people who live on the asphalt.³²

As for the definition of a squatter, there is almost complete agreement whether one looks up the word in Webster dictionary or goes by the perspectives of the various writers on this problem. For example, Webster defines a squatters as 'one who. . . squats on new land or on government land'. . . 'without right or title'.

In countries like England where a growing number of houses have often been found vacant all over the country but especially in London (the 1971 Census showed that there were 675,000 empty dwellings in England and Wales) and homeless families have forcibly occupied them to draw attention to the problem of homelessness, a squatter has come to be seen as:

. . . one who without any colour of right enters an unoccupied house or land intending to stay there as long as he can. He may seek to justify or excuse his conduct. He may say that he was homeless and that this house or land was

³²Geoffrey Lean, *Rich World, Poor World*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1978, p. 290.

standing empty doing nothing. . . .³³

As measured by these definitions, we may say that a squatter is a person who squats on a piece of land (or in a house) without lawful authority, and may refuse to move on.

Referring to the factors that cause squatting, Abrams sums up his observations as follows:

Squatting is triggered by many factors—enforced migration of refugees because of fear, hunger or rural depression, the quest for subsistence in burgeoning urban areas and simple opportunism. Usually, it is the by-product of urban landlessness and housing famine.³⁴

Location

Though no generally accepted theory of squatter settlements location has emerged so far (for lack of comparative data), Dwyer³⁵ has come out with a tentative explanation. He suggests: (1) the largest amongst these settlements are almost always 'peripheral', (2) the city centre with its job opportunities—formal as well as informal—can reasonably be regarded as the main magnetic force for such settlements, (3) as the urban area expands, the 'ideal' location may come to be moved outward by the normal processes of invasion and succession. He adds that other major locative factors are good water supplies, *etc.* However, with growth the settlements may also proceed away from the centre toward difficult topographical sites and those which lack water. In the same manner, basically 'agricultural' settlements on the urban fringe may eventually be replaced by urban-oriented squatter settlements/shanty towns.

Potter points out some policy implications from Dwyer's locational model:

. . .there are diverse paths of migratory movements of low-

³³Lord Denning, *McPhail v. Persons Unknown*, 3WLR at P73, The Incorporated Council for Law Reporting for England & Wales, London, 1973.

³⁴Charles, Abrams, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³⁵D.J. Dwyer, (ed.), *The City in the Third World*, London, Macmillan, 1975.

income populations into spontaneous settlements. The commonly-held view that spontaneous settlements are populated by migrants who have moved directly to them from small towns and the countryside is indeed true of many African cities. However, for most Asian, Latin American and Caribbean cities, the evidence suggests that spontaneous settlements are not settling areas for new arrivals from the rural areas. More typically, new urban arrivals go directly to the city centre in order to be close to the job opportunities. Thus, inner city tenements often act as the reception areas for new migrants, who only later move to spontaneous settlements, often after establishing themselves in the urban environment.³⁶

Typical sites for squatter settlements are: Old walled sections of the city (Philippines), steep hillsides (Caracas, Hong Kong), swampy land (Singapore), along railway lines (Malaysia, India), trenches (India), and so on.

The Problem: A Framework for Analysis

If in the affluent West, it was largely the 'pull' of the industrial town (promise of employment opportunities and its 'apparent glamour') that triggered the slum, the principal causes of the mushrooming squatters settlements in the Third World countries—as pointed out by a bulk of writers on the subject—are both the 'pull', as well as the 'push' factors operating in the stagnant rural economies (forcing the rural poor to leave their homes and hearths for better life chances in the industrial centres) or what some other analysts describe as 'distress migration'.

What is the rate of the migratory flow from rural to urban areas in the Third World countries (based mostly on census data), types of mobility involved, the path taken by the migrant to reach the city, *etc.*, are some of the questions that have engaged the attention of scholars for quite some time in these very countries as well as in the West (for a neat summary and critique of the 'migratory process', see Peter

³⁶Robert B. Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 91

Lloyd, 1979).³⁷ The fact remains, however, that in countries like India, economic growth has been an uneven process both during the colonial days and the post-Independence era, resulting in certain imbalances whereby certain regions developed faster than others, leading to economic inequalities between 'regions', 'cities' as well as 'population groups' within them. For example, the Bombay megalopolis (like Calcutta and Madras) has not only emerged over time as one of the major centres of industrial development but also continues to lure rural people till this day. So much so, it is reported to back within itself today about six per cent of the total urban population of India and also accounts for nearly 20 per cent of industrial production and about one-tenth of the industrial jobs in the country—thanks to the extraordinary concentration of industry, trade and commerce in the city. The impact of such an unrelenting pressure on land and housing in an already overcrowded city pushes rents upwards, apart from causing speculation. These developments obviously have their effect on all the houseless people there, more so on the poor immigrants who are faced with the twin problem of finding a roof overhead as also some work. Hence, they are forced to either live in one of the already existing squatter-slums or look around to seize a patch of vacant land (public or private) in the core areas or on the periphery to build their huts or shacks, without water-supply, street light, sanitation and other elementary amenities.

Whatever be the sum-total impact of the 'pull' and 'push' factors (some researchers have tended to underplay the former) there is no denying the fact that both are manifestations of some kind of deprivation in rural areas, ultimately related to the problem of 'poverty' amongst a large section of the people in Third World countries.

It would be worthwhile getting here some insight from a few 'popular' as well as 'academic' approaches to the problem of poverty and its causes in these societies.

To take up the 'popular' approaches, first, it is rather well-known that in traditional societies most poor people think of

³⁷Peter Lloyd, *Slums of Hope: Shanty Towns of the Third World*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1979, Chapter 5.

poverty as God-given punishment for bad deeds done in the past. As per this belief, the people who find themselves condemned to slum-dwelling in their present lives can hope to free themselves from this squalor only if they started, henceforth, leading a virtuous life (whatever that means), wash out their past sins and, then, on the basis of their accumulated good deeds, shall be rewarded in the form of a decent house—be it a flat or otherwise). This belief also stands reflected in the old adage: 'As you sow, so shall you reap'.

If the poor in these nations blame their past sins for their present-day suffering, the Western-educated/oriented dominant-group in some of these societies (*i.e.*, those who control political and economic power) also exhibit negative attitudes towards the poor. Lloyd tries to capture these attitudes as follows:

The *reactionary* believes in repression and punitive measures; he must emphasize deviancy from the norms of society—a deviancy which cannot be corrected by education. The *paternalist* emphasizes the incapacity of the poor—they can do no better. The *liberal* believes that with his help the poor can better themselves and succeed in attaining some of the values which he himself holds...³⁸

A 'popular' view, largely commended in the Capitalistic West, however, is that poverty is a product of a social order created by man himself and, hence, can be eradicated only by man. Implicit in this view is the idea that in the given socio-economic system in these countries, success and rewards in life go to those who are hard-working and enterprising, and if some people lag behind, they are to be blamed themselves for their lack of initiative and laziness. The argument, however, begs several questions. Do the same opportunities exist for the poor as are available to the better-off? Or, is it that the right opportunities do not exist for them? Are they really a lazy lot? If so, is it because they happen to be too apathetic to be achievement-oriented or they seem to be held back by an invisible force called the 'culture of

³⁸Peter Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

poverty'—the cradle of squatter slums or shanty towns in the Third World.

The focus of the 'academic' approaches, however, range from the effect of the 'culture of poverty' on the poor and its repercussions down the generations, to theories that help to explain disparities between the rich and the poor countries, on the one hand, and amongst the people within in a country, on the other.

As acknowledged widely, the most graphic description of culture of poverty and its effects on the poor has come from Oscar Lewis:

The culture of poverty...is an adaptation to a set of objective conditions of the larger society. Once it comes into existence, it tends to perpetuate itself for generation to generation because of its effect on the children. By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime.³⁹

Even though the studies he conducted were restricted to the shanty-town dwellers of two Latin American 'situations' (Mexico and Puerto Rico); a scholar⁴⁰ has suggested that Lewis' description of the traits of the poor (which together create what he calls as 'culture of poverty') is so convincing that these could almost fit the poor in lower-class settlements in the Western Europe/USA as well as squatter slums in Asia/Africa. Here is a listing of many of the traits that Lewis discovered:

1. Provincial and locally oriented.
2. Only partially integrated into national institutions.
3. Marginal people even though in the heart of a big city.
4. Low level of education and literacy.
5. Isolated from labour unions.

³⁹Lewis Oscar, *La Vida: A Puerto Rico Family in the Culture of Poverty*, San Juan and New York, Panther, 1967, p. 50.

⁴⁰David R. Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

6. Devoid of old-age benefits, maternity care, and little use by them of the city's hospitals, banks, department stores, museums, art galleries, and airports.
7. Unemployment and underemployment.
8. Low wages.
9. Unskilled.
10. Child labour.
11. No savings.
12. Chronic shortage of cash.
13. No food reserves in the home.
14. Pawning of personal goods.
15. Use of second-hand clothing and furniture.
16. Crowded living quarters.
17. Lack of privacy.
18. Much alcoholism.
19. Frequent resort to violence.
20. Violence in the training of children.
21. Wife-beating.
22. Early sex experience.
23. Free unions or 'consensual' marriage.
24. High incidence of desertion of wives and children.
25. Mother-centered families.
26. Authoritarianism.
27. Present-time orientation (live for the present).
28. A sense of resignation and fatalism based on the realities of the difficult real life situation.
29. A belief in male superiority.
30. Martyr complex among women.
31. A high tolerance for psychological pathology of all kinds.
32. Hatred of the police.
33. Mistrust of government.
34. A cynicism which gives the culture of poverty a potential for being used in political movements aimed against the existing social order.

Most scholars accept the view that the 'culture of poverty', once set into motion, takes the character of a vicious circle and the great majority of children who get trapped into it find very difficult to break out of it. They drift and go through

the early stages of life aimlessly, not knowing what to do.

Given these compulsions of the 'poverty' stricken people and the disabilities its 'culture' imposes upon them, it goes without saying that the problem they face is not merely of 'housing' (as most urban administrators and planners seem to think) but a plurality of them, inter-twined, in a complex manner, with the process of economic development in a country like inequitable distribution of wealth, wrong investment priorities, and improper location of industries. So, if we wish to look for an enduring solution to the problem of poverty and squatter settlements, we got to address ourselves to the underlying causes in the wider development process in these countries. In other words, the key word here is the 'model of development' chosen by these countries in the Third World to raise the material standards of their people.

To set the stage for an understanding of such a model, we might, first, recognize the existing politico-economic division of the world order into three distinct categories:

1. *First World* (capitalist market economies or the advanced Western nations plus, of course, the Asian latecomer, Japan);
2. *Second World* (socialist countries like the Soviet Union, Cuba, Poland, East Germany, China, North Korea, Vietnam, etc.); and,
3. *Third World* (poorer or low-income countries of the world or those which had per capita incomes of less than \$ US 3,000 per annum in 1978).

The Third World has been further subdivided by some scholars (B. Ward, *The Economist*, May 18, 1980) to point out the existence of yet another entity, namely, *Fourth World*, consisting of the 'poorest of the poor' countries (notably those of South Asia, tropical Africa, the Caribbean, and parts of Latin America) and the newly industrialising countries, such as, Brazil and Mexico.

Western Approach to Development

About 30 years ago, literature on the question of economic development and urbanization in the First World was domi-

nated by academics who suggested that the Western model of development was indispensable to the Third World countries, too, if these were to prosper like the industrialised countries. One of the most eloquent advocate of the view (which, according to Gunnar Myrdal, has a long ancestry there)⁴¹ in the recent past was the American economist, W.W. Rostow⁴² who conceived 'development' in terms of a series of 'stages of economic growth' and concluded that these stages can very well fit into the economies of the 'traditional societies', following the Western model of development. He also subtitled his book as *A Non-Communist Manifesto* in an attempt to offer what he called 'an alternative to Karl Marx's theory of modern history'.

Most writers of this persuasion saw 'development' as a linear process. They tended to accept the growth features of the Western society as applicable to the Third World countries as well. Janet Abu-Lughod and Richard Hay, Jr., sum up their line of thinking as follows:

Third world countries were backward because they were chiefly agricultural and rural. . . . Development would occur with industrialization. . . . Since industries were associated with urban centres, this would involve a massive physical redistribution of population from rural to urban areas. . . . Industrial development requires high capital investment. . . . a population with higher scholars, literacy, and inventiveness and therefore, one of the major requirements for economic growth is universal education and a system of values supportive of industrial growth (say, values like a disciplined labour force, and an entrepreneurial class). Since these characteristics are associated with 'urbanism as a way of life', in contrast to the 'folk culture' of illiterate, traditional agricultural communities, urbanization would not only accompany industrialization but it would indeed assist in bringing about the latter. . . . Just as the causes of underdevelopment lie within the underdeve-

⁴¹Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama—An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. III, London, The Penguin Press, 1968 p. 1848.

⁴²W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, The University Press, 1960.

developed country itself, so the major solutions to the problems lie with internal economic, social and cultural transformations...The role of the development countries is to extend help to the underdeveloped countries in the form of (a) loans and credit to help capital accumulation, and (b) training of local entrepreneurs, technicians and industrial workers...Innovations and advances are generated in the developed world and diffuse to the lesser developed countries; these innovations are introduced into the cities of the underdeveloped countries and from there diffuse, in turn, to the countryside. In this model the cities of the less developed countries play an important creative role in integrating the country and in stimulating its parallel transformation.⁴³

Some important conclusions can be derived from the foregoing description:

(1) In order to modernize, agricultural/traditional societies of the Third World must industrialize themselves; (2) Industrialized and urbanization are interlinked, and so move together, each supporting and facilitating the other; (3) Some major requirements for economic growth are universal education, a disciplined labour force, and competitive free enterprise; (4) If these countries were poor and backward, they were themselves responsible for it because causes of their underdevelopment lay within; (5) They can turn to the Western societies for help in finance, technological innovations, manpower training; and (6) In the spread of this progress the cities will play an elitist role.

But, despite this promise:

the scenario of development—predicted by these theories so prevalent for the past few decades has not occurred...And, in all of this, the role of city as a generator of change and as a fertile source of ideas and innovations exported to the countryside has failed to materialize. Indeed, the most frequently observed scenario is an almost complete reversal

⁴³ Abu Lughod, Janet and Hay, Jr. Richard (ed.), *Third World Urbanization*, New York, London, Toronto, Methuen, 1977, pp. 104-5.

of this role: the major cities serve chiefly to drain the sources of the country-side, as the Metropole economy drains the resources of the underdeveloped country in a chain of exploitation which increases discrepancies rather than bridging and equalizing them.⁴⁴

A growing disillusionment with the Western model of development slowly crept in when even after some of the Third World countries had managed to achieve some growth, it was discovered that fruit of development were getting concentrated only in the hands of the rich; in fact, as time passed, the rich got richer and the poor got relatively poorer. Only some cities/areas registered rapid economic growth, leading to increased regional inequalities, migration of rural poor to the already choked cities and squatter settlements; there was expansion of educational facilities but the educated could not be absorbed by the economy. In the name of 'market economy' the private business chose locations for its investments with an eye on 'profit' than on 'spread effects' of development to peripheral areas. Thus, in addition to the high rates of unemployment amongst the young and relatively educated in urban areas,⁴⁵ there was a swelling reserve army of skilled/semi-skilled/unskilled workers in rural areas—a massive waste of precious human resource. In other words, these countries became 'victims' of urbanization without the expected economic growth which lagged behind.⁴⁶ It is this 'dual economy' of rapidly-growing cities and impoverished hinterland that caused Schumacher, author of the well-known book *Small is Beautiful* question the applicability of the Western model to the Third World countries in the following words:

The ruling philosophy of development over the last 20 years has been: 'what is best for the rich must be best for the poor'. This belief has been carried to truly astonishing lengths.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Abu Lughod, Janet and Hay, Jr. Richard (ed.), *Third World Urbanization*, New York, London, Toronto, Methuen, 1977, pp. 105-6.

⁴⁵Nikhil Lakshman, "Despair, Frustration, Anger", *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, Bombay, November 30, 1986, pp. 9-17.

⁴⁶Arvind Das, "Bihar—New Wine in Broken Bottles", *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, December 12, 1986, p. 9.

⁴⁷E.F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as If People Mattered*, London, Blond & Briggs, 1973, p. 156.

The same position is taken—though in a somewhat stronger form—by Seabrook:

The model of development that has evolved in the West is now widely acknowledged to be inappropriate for the culture and experience of much of the Third World. What is less widely conceded is that it may be inappropriate for the tendentiously named First World, too....⁴⁸

The Western approach to the role and place of the 'city' in the development process has also been differentiated by its conception of "the city being an engine of development pulling along behind it the entire convoy of economic and social development." Probing such themes put forth in a section of the Western urban literature.⁴⁹ Qadeer comments:

Whatever the development issue, the urban centre of one size or the other is the answer. The city as the instrument of development is one of the most common themes of contemporary urban literature. In this formulation, the city becomes the independent variable and the society a dependent system. This is a contradiction of the historical experience.⁵⁰

Mao also characterized it as a 'contradiction' which subsumes underneath it three major differences: (i) between urban and rural areas, (ii) industry and agriculture, and (iii) intellectual and manual labour.⁵¹ Earlier, this antagonism between the 'urban' and 'rural' was described as an anathema both by

⁴⁸Jeremy Seabrook, *Landscapes of Poverty*, Oxford, Basic Blackwell, 1985.

⁴⁹John, Friedman, "A General Theory of Polarized Development", and Berry, Brian J.L. 'Hierarchical Diffusion: The Basis of Developmental Filtering and Spread in a System of Growth Centres' in M. Niles Hansen, (ed.), *Growth Centres in Regional Economic Development*, New York, The Free Press, 1972; A.O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958.

⁵⁰Mohammad A. Qadeer, *Urban Development in the Third World*, New York, Praeger, 1983, p. 13.

⁵¹David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City*, London, Edward Arnold, 1973, p. 236.

Marx and Engles in their Manifesto of the Communist Party (pp. 47-8).

Gandhi, too, had come down heavily on this Western approach of favoured treatment to cities *vis-a-vis* village and rural industries:

I regard the growth of cities as an evil thing, unfortunate for mankind and for the world. Unfortunate for England and certainly unfortunate for India. . . The blood of the villages is the cement with which the edifices of the cities is built. I want the blood that is today inflating the arteries of the cities to run once again in the blood vessels of the villages.⁵²

Theory of 'Dependency': The New Approach

If the Western theory of development has gone wrong, is there any other theory that might help explain the phenomenon of poverty in Third World countries and their urban problems, and also offer more promising leads for researchers interested in urbanization in the 'Third World'? One such theory is the 'Theory of Dependency' which looks at the process of development, not from the standpoint of the First World countries, but from the standpoint of the Third World countries. It is a product of a group of scholars,⁵³ primarily from Latin America, and has since gained acceptance from a "wide audience ranging from the conservative rationalist to the socialists."

Drawing heavily on historical analysis and elements of nationalism and Marxism, the theory first attempts to establish a relationship of the Third World 'subordination' (dependency) to the First World nations—both in the 'past' and the

⁵²Quoted in Geoffrey Lean, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁵³See: Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" in James D. Cockcroft, (ed.) *Dependence and Underdevelopment*, New York, Anchor Book, 1972; Santos, Dos, 'The Structure of Dependence, *American Economic Review*, LV, May, 1970; T.G. McGee, *The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Research of a Theory*, London, G. Bell, 1971. For a study of underdevelopment and dependency in Africa, see Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa—Origins and Contemporary Forms", *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, X4, 1972.

'present'. The past dependency refers to the colonial days when the economies of the poor nations and those of the industrial powers stood tied up for centuries, with distinct advantages to the latter. For example, the colonial powers (referred to as the 'Metropolis' by these theorists) obtained their raw materials at throw-away prices, hired or enslaved their labour from the colonies (called the 'hinterland') and, later, dumped their manufactured goods into the markets of this very 'hinterland' which they controlled both politically and economically. Thus, in this way when the wealth of the world flowed for nearly three hundred years only in one direction, the foundations of the 'development' of the First World and the 'underdevelopment' of the Third World countries were gradually laid.

The present or post-Independence 'subordination' of the Third World countries has been explained in terms of the heavy dependency on the capitalist system of the Western nations in a number of ways. Take, for instance, the activities of the multinational companies. These companies have been said to maintain and expand the economic dependency of the poor nations in two ways: External and Internal. 'External' dependency comprises use and export of complex technology, its costly inputs, and subsequent profit remittances and constant drain of scarce foreign exchange resources, etc. The consequences of the 'internal' dependency, as created by these multi-nationals, are of a much complex character: (a) the already existing national enterprises become out-of-date; those who survive have to play a secondary role to these 'foreign subsidiaries' and their 'metropolitan offices'; (b) the capital-intensive technology fails to absorb labour surpluses and, in some areas, even increases them. They also give rise to social and economic inequalities in the poorer countries. A typical spin-off is the new 'labour aristocracy' (highly-paid skilled workers) of those associated with the multinational, while the masses continue to struggle for a living and other bare essentials of life.

Das Santos calls it as a 'technological-industrial dependence'; there are other writers as well who have documented the locking together of forms of 'over-development' in the North (First World) with 'underdevelopment' in the South (Third World).

An interesting feature of the Dependency Theory is its terminology which pairs off the 'dominant' actors (First World countries) with the 'dependent' ones (Third World countries) within the framework of a world economy and, then, places the 'two' actors within the context of the internal economy of a Third World country as well. Given below is a picture of this categorization:

FIRST WORLD

(Dominant)

Metropolis

Centre

Periphery

THIRD WORLD

(Dependent)

Hinterland

Periphery

Periphery of the periphery

THIRD WORLD

Urban (Dominant)

Metropolis

Centre

Periphery

Rural (Dependent)

Hinterland

Periphery

Periphery of the periphery

('Dependency' can take many forms: for example, just as the economies of the poor countries are tied to those of the rich world, there can also be a similar exploitative relationship between two countries in the 'same' world, or two areas within a country, say, between its large cities and smaller cities/countryside in the urban hierarchy).

The proponents of this theory argue that just as the rapid economic growth of the First World could not have taken place without draining out the economic and human resources of the Third World. The same is true, they say, of the dual economy of a typical Third World country in which the 'big cities' (Metropolis/Centre) would not have prospered without extracting the resources of the 'rural areas' (Hinterland/Periphery). So, the existence and proliferation of the squatter settlements/shanty towns in the Third World countries is 'but one expression of this dichotomy', they assert. For, in these capitalistically-structured cities where capital always seeks 'cheap labour' but does not provide 'cheap housing' to the urban poor and where they—because of their

poverty—also find themselves squeezed out from the housing market by the economically more powerful middle and upper-income groups, they got only one way of solving their shelter problem: that is, by squatting on public/private land and by building themselves small huts in the existing clusters or forming new ones.

What is likely to be the future shape of things for the squatter settlements/shanty towns in the Third World? McGee tries to answer this question without mincing words:

In these countries, if they are to push ahead with development goals formulated on the assumptions of the development of capitalism then the planners will accentuate the processes dislocating population from the countryside. On the other hand, if they try to restrict these processes, they will retard economic growth and while the involuntary capacity of these societies to absorb rural and urban labour is considerable, it is not infinite.

In the face of the situation it appears highly likely that the experience of socialist Asian countries, notably China, may offer an alternative. For China has been very successful in both limiting the growth of urban population and creating rural employment. But this, of course, has been accomplished within the structural setting of a socialist society. Whether these same measures can be accomplished within a capitalist or ever mixed economic system is doubtful.⁵⁴

In other words, if the problem of poverty and squatter settlements is to be taken seriously by the policymakers in the capitalism-oriented Third World countries:

... an organic link must be forged between the structure of production and the structure of needs of the society as a whole. One of the achievements of countries, such as, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and China is that their previous spatial disintegration has been replaced by a system of

⁵⁴T.G. McGee, "Rural-Urban Mobility in South and Southeast Asia: Different Formulation... Different Answers" in Janet-Abu Lughod, and Richard Hay Jr., *Third World Urbanization*, p. 212.

spatial organization which utilizes to the full the resources of all the various zones of their territories so as to satisfy internal needs. And as a result, inter-regional interdependencies and exchanges have evolved and matured as an important solidifying agent of national economic integration. So long as a space-economy is internally atomized, and externally tied, such development is not possible.⁵⁵

Perhaps that is the reason why the demise of the squatter-slums in socialist societies has been so quick and total, even though some of them joined the race for economic development much later than those which went in for the Western model.

In any case, the options for the Third World nations to free themselves from their 'dependency' on the West or to switch to the socialist approach appear to be nearly closed,—mainly for two reasons: (1) 'history has linked them so firmly with the West', and (2) 'the people who run most poor countries would themselves find it extremely hard to break Western consumer habits'.⁵⁶

Thus, as they are likely to follow the Western path of development in the foreseeable future, we might return to the researches/strategies, carried out to deal with the problem of squatter settlements or shanty towns within the capitalistic framework.

Types of Squatters

Charles Abrams has come out with an interesting, general classification of the types of squatters found across the globe:

1. *Owner squatter*: owns the shack (not the land, like others). This is the most common variety. He prefers public lands and those of absentee owners;
2. *Squatter tenant*: is the poorest class, and pays rent to a fellow-squatter. Many new in-migrants start as

⁵⁵D. Slater, 'Colonialism and the Spatial Structure of Under development: Outlines of an Alternative Approach, with Special Reference to Tanzania, in Janet-Abu Lughod, and Richard Hay Jr., *op cit.*, p. 175.

⁵⁶Geoffrey Jean, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

- tenants, hoping to become an 'owner' later;
3. *Squatter holdover*: is a former tenant who has ceased paying rent and whom the landlord fears to evict;
4. *Squatter landlord*: is usually a squatter of long-standing who has rooms or huts to rent, often at exorbitant profit;
5. *Speculator squatter*: usually a professional to whom squatting is a sound business venture. He squats for some kind of 'offering' (allotment or payment) he expects the government or the private owner to grant him sooner or later. He is often the most eloquent in his protests and the most stubborn in resisting eviction;
6. *Store squatter or occupational squatter*: establishes his small business (a store or a clinic by a quack physician/surgeon/dentist). In some cases the family sleeps in the shop;
7. *Semi-squatter*: has secretly built his hut on private land and subsequently comes to terms with the owner. The semi-squatter, strictly speaking, has ceased to be a squatter and has become a tenant. In constructing his house, he is usually flouting the building codes;
8. *Floating squatter*: lives in an old cargo boat ship floated or sailed into the city's harbour. It often serves both as the family home and the workshop. It may be owned or rented and the stay may be temporary or permanent. In Hong Kong there are so many of them in an area that one is no longer aware of the water on which they rest;
9. *Squatter 'cooperator'*: is part of the group that shares the common foothold and protects it against intruders—public or private. The members of the group may be from the same village, family, or tribe or may share a common trade, as in the case of groups of weavers on evacuee land in Pakistan.⁵⁷

The description above gives us an insight into the behaviour-patterns and motivations of squatters in a typical Third World society which divides its population in two sections: those who 'legally' own the land, and those who do not. And, how

⁵⁷Charles Abrams, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-2.

those who do not own it, then, go about adopting a variety of ways (manipulative as well as exploitative) to get a foothold on it—illegally, of course, because they stand bypassed by the development process in a typical poor nation and, therefore, see no immediate hope of earning and saving sufficient cash to 'legally' acquire some land—at least for a 'shelter', if not a 'house or flat'.

But, 'shelter' is only part of their problem. Not only they need drinking water, sewage disposal, education, health care, they also need a share in good things of life and better opportunities for their children. That is what marks the 'central point of their urban dreams'. But, the local body officials do not see their problem that way and, instead, view them as outlaws and tax-evaders and, hence, deny or only grudgingly provide them some services. Abrams does not approve of such an attitude:

To look upon all the squatters, or even the majority of them, as law-breakers, is to misjudge the problem completely. Had land been made available to him, the squatter would not have appropriated.⁵⁸

Or, to put it differently, the 'illegality' of the squatters' behaviour does not lie in the 'character' of these people, but is built into the unjust economic structure and land policies of the Third World countries which, in turn, make them act that way.

Strategies for Housing Squatters

A number of strategies for housing the squatters have been devised and acted upon in different countries at different times. Let us examine some of the most widely canvassed ones:

1. *Slum Clearance*: It has had a long history both in England and USA under the 'urban renewal' formula.

⁵⁸Charles Abrams, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

It influenced the policymakers in the developing countries also, to begin with, and was seen as the only answer to not only 'squatting' but also 'overcrowding' in the cities. However, in many Third World cities this mechanism has unfortunately, been used by authorities at times, to sell the cleared site to private builders for high-rise commercial buildings in order to 'elevate the character of the old slum neighbourhood' (such underhand plans were graphically depicted in two episodes of the popular TV serial 'Nukkad' on 23rd and 30th June, 1986).⁵⁹

2. *Self-help or Mutual-aid Projects*: According to this approach, when construction standards are simple, fewer skilled craftsmen are required. The workers (*i.e.*, the future owners of houses) are taught certain skills, like plumbing, wiring, and masonry, loans made for purchase of sites/materials, and in some cases preassembled roofs also supplied. The workers move from house to house but they are not told which house they will own, or else they may show more care with their own house and less on others'.

The inspiration for this approach came largely from the writings of two academics, William Mangin⁶⁰ (an American anthropologist) and John Turner (a British architect). Both had worked in Peru for long years and their researches had shown that the poor were not 'indolent, dishonest and disorganised but rather quite the reverse', and therefore advocated strongly self-help housing in the Third World countries. Turner suggested that all that had to be done to help these self-builders was to 'approve simple sketch plans, and

⁵⁹The serial attempted to depict very realistically the life-style of a group of low-income people living in a 'street corner' of the contemporary urban India. It would be remembered for its revolutionary idealism *vis-a-vis* some of the burning problems of the day such as, oppression and intimidation of the urban poor by the unscrupulous rich/manipulative politician/insensitive bureaucracy, and decadent moral values.

⁶⁰W. Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A problem and a Solution", *Latin American Research Review*, 2, 1967, pp. 65-98 (quoted in David B. Potter, *Urbanization and Planning in the Third World*, 1985).

distribute cash in appropriate stages'.⁶¹

3. *Roof-loan Scheme*: Ghana tried out this UN plan under which loans were made for roofs, doors and windows, payable over a fixed period. The loans were granted to people who built their houses to wall plate level, according to specifications.
4. *Multi-storey Apartment Buildings*: Though quite a few countries in Third World countries have taken a leading role in building such apartment buildings for housing their poor, the examples of two city-States, namely, Hong Kong and Singapore, merit special attention. Since 1954 Hong Kong government has built over 400,000 such residences, accommodating over 2 million people or nearly 44.5 per cent of the total city population. In the first round of this high-density housing scheme, all facilities were provided on communal basis, including water taps, bathrooms and toilets. The standards adopted were low and caused problems for the residents. The second building programme was upgraded and individual units provided their own facilities.
5. *Publicly-Financed Cheap Housing Programme*: Government-sponsored bodies, at the national or state level, undertake financing or building of housing for the urban poor. Considering the wide gap between their incomes and the high shelter-costs, cheaper formulas are offered to induce the slum dwellers or economically-weaker people to own houses.
6. *Slum Environment Improvement*: Faced with financial constraints and the worsening housing situation, an approach that is currently popular amongst Third World countries is: to retain the squatters in their present places (slums) and bring about environmental improvements by providing basic needs, such as paved streets, garbage disposal, water, sanitation, community latrines, street light, etc. Besides, it was also argued that the costs of displacement, rehabilitation, and rebuilding would be much greater than improving.

⁶¹J.F.C., Turner, "Issues in Self-help and Self-managed Housing", Chap. 4 in P.M. Ward (ed.), *Self-Help Housing: A Critique*, London, Mansell, 1982, pp. 99-113.

living conditions on the existing sites.

7. *Site and Services*: This UN sponsored scheme is under way in a number of poor countries. It focuses on developing a site by providing amenities like water supply, drainage, paved streets, etc. Only plots are given to allottees and housing is left to them as their earnings/savings allow.
8. *Relocation to Fringe-sites/Resettlement Scheme*: Under it, small plots are given to squatters at locations outside the city. They are also handed the legal title to the land.
9. *Urban Community Development (UCD)*: One of the latest strategies (presumably more enlightened than the others) is UCD, designed not merely to improve 'physical environment' of a slum but—more important—the 'human element' in it. The basic idea is to activate the human spirit so that the slum people, once motivated, can—through 'self-help'—take care of the physical amenities/structures as well as undertake a variety of social welfare projects aimed at relief, skill-development, training, etc. The underlying assumption is that by inculcating self-pride and sense of belonging in the inhabitants the whole place would cease to be just a 'slum area' but, instead, become yet another 'livable and responsive urban community'. Such programmes are being tried out in countries like the Philippines and India.

However, the experiences in regard to these various strategies have not been happier in most developed countries. Take the 'slum clearance' approach, first. No one in the Third World countries today regards it as the right solution because of the enormous human costs in terms of the confusions and miseries suffered by the slum dwellers. The 'self-help' projects have had mixed results. While remarkable improvements have been reported from the US and Britain, it failed to make headway in Barbados and Costa Rica. Pakistan, too, had a go at it. But, it ended up with the sponsors (American religious group) themselves doing all the work, with little or no participation by the beneficiaries. The 'roof-loan' plan had a short spell of life in Ghana but rejected by countries

like Bolivia. 'Public housing' in countries like India has run into trouble. Even the so-called 'cheapest houses' are beyond the means of the urban poor.

The 'slum improvement' schemes may have been helpful in certain cases but conditions in most slums continue to be shocking, notwithstanding large sums of money supposedly poured into these settlements. The services provided are either too few and subjected to enormous stress (one tap for over 500 persons or six lavatory seats for 300 of them), or if sufficient in number in the selected few, they do not work, say, water pumps or street lights—to give two examples.

Schemes like 'Site and services/Resettlement on fringe areas' have not fully responded to all the conditions created by the squatter problem, either. The settlers point out their accusing fingers at the tiresome long journeys to work in the city every-day, non-availability of viable work for other members of the family, higher expenditure, broken-up communal life, and a host of other related hardships that have come in as part of the package. The 'urban community development' programme is said to have become a symbol of hope for some urban planners, but one is not sure if it can neutralize the marginality and poverty that a run-away urbanization has heaped upon the squatters and their children. And, if at all it does, how long will it take? For example, what are the chances of a child born to a rickshaw-puller in one of these UCD settlements becoming a computer expert or a space scientist, in his life time? Thus, the most serious criticism directed at these schemes is that these have not been able to reach out to the *lowest segments* of the urban poor, much less effectively meet all the challenges of the squatters' problem.

As for the long-term strategies of developing 'satellite' or 'small and medium towns', at least in countries like India if the former is still on paper (NCR, for example, despite the plethora of pious announcements from time to time), the latter has largely served the interests of the dominant elite in the small and medium towns and done precious little to change the lifestyles of the squatters.⁶²

⁶²Raj Nandy, *Developing Small and Medium Towns*, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1982.

'Transit camps' for the rural migrants—is yet another novel idea that has often been talked about by the planners. The aim is to set up temporary barrack-like accommodation right at the boundary of a city, hold up the new arrivals there (as they do with the illegal immigrants at the Heathrow Airport at London) and, thereby slow the rush of these people into the city and make—as far as possible—the influx more manageable.

In the Philippines they once thought of transport-subsidy for the squatters (free one-way tickets) to enable them to go back to their native places. Earlier, there had been suggestions about distribution of registration cards amongst the squatters in cities to check the influx of new ones.

But, as is clear from the analysis above, none of these strategies really goes to the root of the problem, *i.e.*, 'poverty and its underlying causes'. These are merely half-hearted attempts designed to deal with the symptoms. That brings us to the basic question: What is the solution?

The answer to this question would, of course vary from country to country, depending upon the values of the people who: (a) wield power in the corridors of government and take decisions on what and when the nation chooses to spend its money on, (b) implement these decisions and act as 'economic conduits' for weaker sections like the squatters, and (c) undertake research in urban problems and, thereby, hope to influence official policies.

It seems to me, however, that in countries essentially committed to 'market forces approach'—despite loud protestations in favour of a socialistic pattern of society—one can 'hear' only two view-points: *first*, bull-doze these 'festering sores'/'urban fungi' (squatter-slums) and throw out all the anti-socials living in them; *second*, introduce assistance measures for somewhat better health, housing, education so as to make the lives of squatters bearable. These two viewpoints roughly correspond to what Lloyd called as 'reactionary' and 'liberal' while discussing perceptions and approaches to poverty (p. 16).

Incidentally, these are the kind of people in the Third World countries who also subscribe to the concepts of 'private property' and their own ideal of a comfortable dwelling is a large private house with at least three bed-rooms (if

possible, two such houses so that the second one can be rented out to accumulate wealth by exploiting the helplessness of a 'houseless' family). Inder Mohan⁶² calls them 'professional seminarians'. . . . Any unbiased observer can find them in seminars/training programmes vigorously supporting the idea of only one-room 'shelter' (in good old days, the word was used to refer to a small structure built outside a house to accommodate cattle, etc.) for the urban poor while talking of 'greater equity and social justice' for them in the same breath. Their superficial compassion for the urban poor can roughly be compared to the 'life boat ethic', advanced by the biologist, Garrett Hardin of the University of California. Such an ethic, says he, comes alive when a group of 'wealthy' people crowded in a lifeboat, find a large number of 'have-nots' drowning in a sea of starvation, and then try to prevent them from boarding the boat, lest it should sink and threaten their own 'chances' in life.⁶⁴ Many of them shall have managed titles to some property (land, housing, etc.) either as a matter of inherent right or acquired it by means of tax evasion/black money, etc. It would, of course be unfair to imply that no one acquires it through 'honest' means (by taking a loan from one's provident fund or a bank) but once he becomes a property owner, he automatically throws his lot with the 'boat' people. As cities expand, swallowing up the cheaply-acquired land from poor villagers and turning them into flats or developed plots for sale at exorbitant prices to the 'haves', the process enables some to make their piles of money but leaving the 'immigrants', the 'original owners of

⁶²Inder Mohan exposed the activities of such 'professional seminarians' in an article in the daily *The Hindustan Times*, October 29, 1984. He explained how some of these people have turned the act of organizing seminars (in the name of the poor) into a fine act of furthering their career interests:

They hop from one State to another within India and to several countries abroad. Seminars are usually held at comfortable venues with sumptuous meals served in between—all in the name of the poor. But, the poor themselves hardly ever get an opportunity to participate. They even remain ignorant of what is discussed in their behalf. The seminarians always manage to acquire funds from certain agencies. In fact, quite a few seminars are organized mainly to justify financial aid.

⁶⁴Quoted in Geoffrey Lean, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

land' and many others as land-less. In this manner, the cities are slowly dividing themselves into two distinct sections of population: the 'propertied' and the 'propertyless'.

Small wonder, there are radical writers in whose view the institution of private property itself is a determining factor in condemning large sections of people to the status of squatters in Third World cities. Though it might come as a surprise to conventional thinking in academic and government circles in countries like India, a clearer message on this could not have come from an organization that knows better (namely, the United Nations):

in many developing countries, coping with problems arising from squatting and slumdwelling is hampered by the fact that the legal system has not kept pace with the rapid rate of urbanization. Slum and squatter areas are denied basic urban services because they have no status in law. A strict adherence to the concept of private property tends to make the legal system a punitive instrument rather than a means for the ordering of human relationships and behaviour to achieve the development potentials inherent in all segments of the urban community. . . .⁶⁵

Hellnsteiner takes this argument further when she argues:

Clearly some serious rethinking is needed. For, when a large sector of society finds itself automatically characterized as law-breakers, then one should wonder whether something is wrong, not with the people designated as law violators, but with the law itself. . . .⁶⁶

To put it another way, that means that certain socio-economic structural reforms in these countries are essential

⁶⁵United Nations, "Improvement of Slums and Controlled Settlements", Report of the Inter-regional Seminar, Medellin, Columbia, New York, 1971.

⁶⁶Mary Racelis, Hollnsteiner, "The Case of the People Versus Mr. Urbano Planner Y Administrator", in Janet Abu-Lughod and Richard Hay, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 316.

if the concept of distributive justice for the poor in them has to have any chance of succeeding. Potter puts his weight behind this argument as follows:

The real problem is that generally there has been too much spatial planning and too little of accompanying structural reforms. Both sets of changes are needed in unison for the promotion of genuine planning and development.⁶⁷

David Harvey, too, seems to make sense when he decries such a tunnel vision and urges a re-assessment of the social system, as a whole:

We discuss everything except the basic characteristics of a market economy. We devise all manner of solutions except these which might challenge the continuance of that economy. Such discussions and solutions serve only to make us look foolish, since they eventually lead us to discover what Engels was only too aware in 1872—that capitalist solutions provide no foundations for dealing with deteriorated social conditions.⁶⁸

Dealing with this very weakness of the Western approach to contemporary urban analysis, Castells, a French scholar, furnishes us with arguments to show how researchers identified with the 'bourgeois' urban sociology,—under the influence of American social science—had largely accepted the social and economic order in which they and their subjects were set. They had taken for granted the dominant ideas and the formulations of 'problems' by the most powerful groups in contemporary western societies. This, he said, was no 'theory' but only 'ideology'.⁶⁹

⁶⁷Robert B. Potter, *Urbanisation and Planning in the Third World*, London & Sydney, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 237.

⁶⁸David Harvey, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁶⁹M. Castells, "Theory and Ideology in Urban Sociology" in C. Pickvance (ed.), *Urban Sociology: Critical Essays*, London, Tavistock, 1976, pp. 60-84; See Brian Elliott, and David McCrone, *The City: Patterns of Domination and Conflict*, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982, pp. 7-20.

SCENE IN INDIA : UTOPIA AND MYOPIA

Before we held our attention narrowly to slum situation in India, we might take a quick look at the complexities and confusions in the field of urbanization.

It ranks fourth in the world in terms of absolute size of the urban population, the first three being China, USSR, and USA. Though the overall level of urbanization has risen rather slowly (from 11 per cent in 1901 to 23 per cent in 1981), the population in urban areas during this period has multiplied six-fold (from about 26 million to 160 million). It is projected that by the year 2001 it is expected to be around 326 million, accounting for nearly one third of the country's estimated total population of 926 million at that time.

The first ferment of the new development forces after Independence in 1947 was biased in favour of the 'modern sector', i.e., heavy investments in the new industries and big cities (see the Second Five Year Plan,⁷⁰ 1956-61; the First Plan,⁷¹ 1951-56, was hardly promising from that angle). The assumption was that once the industrial output picked up, the resultant prosperity would automatically trickle down from the cities to the backward areas as also to the urban and rural poor. A high level of industrialisation in the subsequent years did occur, but the expected 'trickle-down' did not, for the fruits of development accumulated in the cities and in the hands of those who were already rich. The reason was that the economic of these 'generative'⁷² cities operated in such a manner that the 'surplus social product' that they produced remained spatially concentrated, instead of getting spatially dispersed for the welfare of the economically-weaker population of the country (as it happens mostly in a socialist society: see Harvey,⁷³ 1973, where he cites the example of Cuba in which conscious attempts have been made by the government to disperse medical facilities away from the

⁷⁰Second Five Year Plan, 1956-61, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.

⁷¹First Five Year Plan, 1951-56, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi.

⁷²B F. Hoselitz, "Generative and Parasitic Cities", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, 1955, pp. 278-94.

⁷³David Harvey, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

city, Havana).

Then followed the well-known 'green revolution' in the Sixties. But, this breakthrough was an 'exception' (few areas) rather than the 'rule' (all areas). Besides, in its spread-effects, it tilted towards the rich farmers than the vast majority of the marginal farmers and hundreds and thousands of unorganized agricultural labourers. Thus, once again, the 'trickle-down' theory failed—this time in the rural areas.

Of the two 'poverty' situations—the urban and the rural—the latter was worse because of the increasing unemployment and underemployment and the prospect of an average landless worker there facing starvation. This desperate situation triggered off the city trek (or what Dandekar⁷⁴ called as 'overflow of rural poverty') and, thereby, the Western-type cycle of urbanization, based upon huge urban centres.⁷⁵ Statistical studies of migration in India⁷⁶—'step' and or 'direct'—tell us that while between 1961 and 1971 the metro cities grew at the rate of 58.72 per cent, the increase in the population of Class I cities was 51-52 per cent (of course, Ashish Bose estimated that about half of it was due to natural increase). Another frightening fact to emerge recently is that the cities that grew between 1961-1971 also continued to grow fast between 1971-81 as well⁷⁷—which means that it is largely this set of cities that today bear the brunt of the urban deluge in India—apart from experiencing an acute scarcity of financial/organizational resources to cope with the complex

⁷⁴U.M. Dandekar, and Nilakantha Rath, "Poverty In India", *Economic and Political Weekly*, VI, January 2, 1971.

⁷⁵W.S.K. Phillips, "Processes, Trends and Consequences of Urbanization in the Developed and Developing Countries", *Research Journal (Humanities)*, Vol. 4:1, 1975, pp. 31-60.

⁷⁶A. Bose, *Studies in Indian Urbanization, 1901-1971*, Bombay-New Delhi, Tata McGraw-Hill, 1973; Town & Country Planning Organization: *Jhuggi-Jhopri Settlements in Delhi: A Sociological Study of low-income Migrant Communities*, Part II (mimeo) Town & Country Planning, Ministry of Works & Housing, 1975; Biplb Das Gupta, and Roy Laisley, 'Migration from Villages', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 10 (24) 1975; K. Ranga Rao and M.S.A. Rao, and *Cities and Slums: A Study of Squatter Settlements in the City of Vijaywada*, New Delhi, Concept Publishing Co., 1984.

⁷⁷Arun K. Sharma, "Cities in India: A Census Analysis", *Nagarloak*, Vol. XV, 1983, pp. 73-81.

problems of shelter, services, etc., for millions who sleep inside/outside shops, on footpaths, under bridges, or live in run-down tenement houses, squats, and shanty-towns. In all there are 222 Class I cities in the country with more than one lakh population and these account for about 60 per cent of the total urban population. Amongst these Class I cities are 12 bigger cities called the metro cities (like Greater Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi) each of which has more than a million population.

Magnitude of Problem

What is the scale of the slum problem in the country in specific terms? This scale is best exemplified by the facts culled from two authoritative documents: (1) Report of the Task Force on 'Shelter for the Urban Poor and Slum Improvement',⁷⁸ set up by the Planning Commission, Government of India, in June 1982; and (2) A Compendium on Indian Slums, brought out by the Town & Country Planning Organization (TCPO), Government of India, in September 1985.⁷⁹ While the former attempted to determine the slum population in the year 1985, the latter did for 1990.

Task Force Report: As of 1985, we had about 32 to 40 million people (based upon low to higher estimates) living in slums in the country—say, 20 per cent or 40 per cent of the total urban population in the country (selected States/Union territories). About 40 per cent of this total slum population lived in the metro cities, 18-25 per cent in the Class I cities (other than metro), and 15 per cent in cities/towns below 1 lakh of population.

TCPO Compendium: By the year 1990, the country shall have an estimated slum population of 51.2 million. It would be markedly concentrated in 12 metro cities (38.8 per cent), and 210 cities with 1-10 lakh population (35.4

⁷⁸Task Force No. IV on *Shelter for the Urban Poor and Slum Improvement*, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, September 1983.

⁷⁹Town and Country Planning Organization, *A Compendium on Indian Slums*, Economic Planning Division, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, September 1985.

per cent); the remaining 275 Class II cities (50,000 to 1 lakh population) and 2,874 smaller towns (less than 50,000) shall be burdened down with 11.4 and 14.4 per cent slum dwellers respectively.

Reproduced below is Table that projects the figures worked out by the TCPO:

TABLE 1 ESTIMATED URBAN POPULATION AND SLUM POPULATION AT THE END OF THE SEVENTH PLAN AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION IN DIFFERENT SIZE CLASS OF TOWNS (ALL INDIA)

(Population figures in lakh)

<i>Size-class of cities/Towns</i>	<i>1981 urban population</i>	<i>Estimated urban population 1990</i>	<i>Estimated slum population 1990</i>	<i>Percentage slum population to total slum population</i>	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. All India	1,597.27	2,415.44	512.28	100.0	
(i) States	1,526.30	2,298.71	477.24	93.25	
(ii) Union Territories	70.97	116.73	35.04	6.75	
B. Cities According to Size-Class.					
(i) Population 10 lakh or more (12 cities)	421.18 (26.36)	618.65	198.73	38.8	
(ii) Population 5 to 10 lakh (31 cities)	203.78 (12.75)	313.35	69.79	13.6	
(iii) Population 3 to 5 lakh (28 cities)	101.29 (6.34)	156.17	34.75	6.8	
(iv) Population 1 to 3 lakh (151 cities)	235.14 (14.72)	339.97	76.71	15.0	
Sub-Total of Class I Cities (222 Cities)	961.39 (60.18)	1,425.94	379.98	74.2	
(v) Population 50,001 to 99,999 (275 towns)	184.25 (11.5)	278.39	58.24	11.4	
(vi) Population less than 50,000 (2874 towns)	451.63 (28.27%)	711.11	74.06	14.4	

NOTE: Figures in brackets are percentage to the total urban population.

The TCPO claims that their data is much more reliable than that of the Task Force because the latter not only lacked 'comprehensiveness' but also 'related to different periods of time'. Whatever be the merit of their claim, one conclusion from their estimates appears to be significant; by the year 1990, over 74 per cent of the total slum population in the country would be resident in Class I cities. What this boils down to is that battle against the spreading slums shall be a losing one and, despite millions of rupees already spent on their clearance/improvement, more people shall be living in them in the years to come, (by the time the TCPO collected its data and published it, the movement of people across the country must have resulted in many more new slums). Another tragedy of this situation is the totally-inadequate infrastructure in these cities (originally built to take only a limited population). Sewerage systems are silting up, water supply pipes often burst out because of the cracks, etc. How would these cities be able to put up with such enormous strain—is a question which only time will answer?

That the problem would be somewhat less troublesome for the cities with over 5 lakh or 3 to 5 lakh population is no consolation because it is arguable whether most of these intermediate cities would have, at their disposal, sizable financial outlays to service their existing slum populations—assuming, of course, they shall not be struck by the same size of the slum-blight as is the case with some of the lower-order Class I cities. Judging by the past history of how slums have slowly strangled our bigger cities, it won't be surprising if these cities, too, are caught, by then or a little later, in the same vicious round of poverty and squalor. Faridabad city—the subject of this study—can be said to be inching towards that direction already.

Centre's Moves Against Slums

Over the past 38 years, the Government of India's policy⁸⁰

⁸⁰Source: Report of the Task Force on *Shelter for the Urban Poor and Slum Improvement*, Planning Commission September 1983. The Report, however, noted:

The problem of squatter settlements, unlike the slum problem, is not
(Continued on next page)

on urban poor/slums/squatters since Independence has passed through several stages. In brief:

1. 'Clearance of slums' to be an essential part of national housing policy; amendment of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to facilitate speedy acquisition of slum areas for new housing; strict enforcement of municipal byelaws and preparation of master plans for every town to ensure phased abolition of existing slums;
2. Introduction of schemes like 'social housing', 'integrated subsidised housing' (1952) and (low income group housing' (1954);
3. Adoption of "The Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act No. 96 in 1956 (originally for Delhi)—later on passed with minor changes by several State Governments;⁸¹ the intention was to rehouse slum-dwellers in newly-built tenements and charge them nominal rents; the financial pattern included 50 per cent loan and 37½ per cent subsidy from the Centre (the programme administered by the States, with HUDCO also helping as finance agency); Madras city undertook an ambitious programme involving construction of 40,000 units in multistoreyed buildings;
4. Toward the end of 1970s, re-thinking on 'slum clearance' in view of: (a) high costs involved—both economic and social—and (b) acceptance of the notion of slums

(Continued from previous page)

that wide-spread; it is confined mainly to the big cities. The policy towards squatters' relocation was that of removing squatter settlements and their relocation at earmarked sites. But, of late this policy has been replaced by one making provision for the regularization of squatter colonies through the provision of common public services under programmes such as the 'site and services'. There is also a move to consider the possibilities of granting tenurial right to slum dwellers so as to encourage them to undertake improvement in their structures at their own cost. On the other hand, measures to prevent squatting on government land area are also being considered. (page 44).

⁸¹Andhra Pradesh (1956), Madhya Pradesh (1956), Mysore (1958, 1960, and 1973), Assam (1959 and 1961), Punjab (1961), Uttar Pradesh (1962), Tamil Nadu (1971), Maharashtra (1971), West Bengal (1972), Gujarat (1973), Karnatka (1974) and Kerala.

as an 'urban housing stock'. Emphasis shifted, instead, to 'environmental improvement of slums'. First introduced in April, 1972, in 20 cities, the scheme aimed at providing amenities like water supply, sewerage, storm water drains, community baths and latrines, street light, widening and paving of lanes; the initial per capita Central investment of Rs. 120 later revised to Rs. 150 in 1978; since 1974 the scheme passed on to the State sector; more vigorous work done in Madras, Calcutta and Kanpur with assistance from IDA and World Bank where additional amenities like title of land, loans for home improvement, creches, community halls, work-sheds, generation of employment opportunities have been provided.

5. Central assistance to State Governments in the Fifth Plan period under the Integrated Urban Development Programme (IUDP), to support projects of 'national importance' in all towns with a population of three lakh and above and all capital cities of States, irrespective of their size. It was meant to provide *inter alia* seed capital for purpose of land acquisition, development and disposal, for urban renewal and redevelopment projects, and for provision of urban infrastructure including civic services in critical areas. The State Governments were to assure: preparation of integrated plans based on long-term Master Plans, introduction of suitable town planning legislation, and creation of development authorities for implementation of the programme. The need for an appropriate urban land policy was also emphasized. About 32 towns were assisted between 1974-75 and 1978-79.
6. 'Integrated Development of Small & Medium Towns' (IDSMT), Scheme, begun in 1979 (Sixth Plan)—also embracing 'site-and-services'—sought to take up the development of towns with population of less than 1 lakh with a view to strengthening facilities and services in them so that they could sub-serve development of the rural hinterland and also act as counter-magnets to the large metro cities.

That broadly sums up the 'Central blueprint for the shelter

problem of slum-dwellers'. However, the role of the following agencies also deserve mention:

1. *State Housing Boards*: primarily set up to promote housing for both higher and lower income groups; by the end of early 1970s, a large number of these boards had come into operation;
2. *Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO)*: Established in 1971 in order to lend financial weight to housing agencies in the country for long-term finance. Until then these agencies depended entirely on Government Loans and grants and to a limited extent on self-financing. Amongst other projects, it uses its money also to support squatter upgrading and LIG/EWS housing. HUDCO lends money only to housing agencies and not to individuals.
3. *Housing Cooperatives*: Most of these societies are formed by middle-income people but there are a few LIG societies also. The Task Force recommended that cooperatives of EWS should be actively encouraged,—though, it said, 'a variety of problems faced by cooperatives have not really been tackled in an organized manner'.

Brief mention may also be made of what the Task Force called as "some innovative and successful programmes to shelter the urban poor and to improve the conditions of existing slums, in different parts of the country. . .". It found them 'innovative' "at least in one respect: All of them represent a departure from the conventional answer to the slum problem: medium-rise, pucca, heavily-subsidized tenements built year after year by the slum clearance boards, municipal authorities and public housing agencies.'

The eight 'innovative programmes on shelter and slum improvement'—each different from the other in philosophy, size, focus, organization, approach, impact and per capita cost—are:

1. The Urban Community Development Projects in general and the Hyderabad Urban Community Development Project in particular;

2. 'Habitat' Housing programme of the Hyderabad Urban Community Development Project;
3. Weaker Section Housing and Shelter Improvement Programme of the Visakhapatnam Urban Community Development Project;
4. Sulabh International of Patna;
5. Bustee Improvement programme of Calcutta;
6. Arumbakham Sites and Services project of Madras;
7. Resettlement Colonies Project of Delhi; and
8. Slum Rehabilitation Project at Vesna, Ahmedabad.⁸²

However, of all the above said programme and projects, the two most jubilantly-publicised programmes today are:

- (a) the Hyderabad Urban Community Development Project, introduced in 1967 in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad; and
- (b) the Environmental Improvement of Slums, introduced in 1972 (also mentioned as items no. 10a in the '20-Point Programme').

Until 1967 the experience of Hyderabad on slum problems was much the same as that of most of the metro cities in India. But, the story changed after that, and the reason given is the vigorous implementation of the UCD programme which is aimed at the entire slum population of twin cities. Of course, this programme was initiated much earlier in cities like Delhi (1958), Ahmedabad (1962), Baroda (1965), and Calcutta (1966), but it is the experience of Hyderabad that is being offered as the most illuminating example of the success of this strategy. Its greatest potential is said to be its emphasis on the philosophy that a project for slum-dwellers need not be merely a housing scheme. Indeed, a housing scheme has better chances of success if it is implemented as an integral part of the other welfare developmental activities involving the urban poor.

The accomplishments (in terms of number of people claimed to be covered so far), attained under the 'Environmental Im-

⁸²Task Force No. IV of Planning Commission, Government of India, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

provement of Urban Slums' (EIUS) programmes also make a long list (see Table 2).

TABLE 2 PROGRESS OF ESI SCHEME* (ALL INDIA)

	(Population in lakh)
1972-74	33
1974-78	17
1978-80	18
1980-81	11
1981-82	16
1982-83	15
1983-84 (upto December 1983)	12
1984-85 (upto December 1984)	15.60
1985-85 (upto December 1985)	12.41

*According to the Sixth Plan, the problem of slums in the country has to be tackled over a period of 10 years. The Plan provided for a sum of Rs. 151.45 crore for the Scheme and fixed a target of 10 million people to be covered under it. In addition, the Central Government has also been making 'incentives for States-allocations' in its annual budgets. Since its introduction in 1972, the scope of the Scheme has been constantly extending to cover a larger number of cities and towns in the country. In 1978 it became applicable to all the urban areas, irrespective of their population size. Four years later (1982), it was incorporated as an important component in the Prime Minister's 20-Point Programme. Prior to its inclusion as an important component, there was no systematic monitoring of the progress of the scheme.

But, despite all these impressive statistics, the outcome is not really that promising. Let us take a look at the inadequacies noted by the Task Force itself:

- (1) No thorough evaluation of the programme during its 14 long years of operation, (2) Only 'minimum' amenities made available on 'collective' basis with the additional application of cost constraints—Rs. 150 per capita, raised to Rs. 250 in April, 1984, (3) Scheme not linked to the felt-needs of the different slum pockets, (4) Emphasis on spending the allocated amount, rather than on 'performance' of the amenities; (5) complete absence of 'financial participation' of local bodies in the scheme, (6) smaller scale of

amenities, (7) need to raise the cost ceiling—now revised to Rs. 300 in the 7th Plan—and to reduce the norm, and (8) diversion of EIS funds from 'basic amenities' to 'high cost' services like open air theatres, bridges, community centres, etc.

All said and done (including the 'illuminating example' namely, the UCD at Hyderabad), the vital question is whether the present socio-economic structure in our society will facilitate or deny millions of slum-children in the country their chances in life (equality of opportunity *vis-a-vis* the children of well-to-do families) before they step into the hi-tech world of the 21st century or will they be gradually swallowed up by malnutrition ('slow death' in medical parlance) and the various deadly diseases associated with it (according to a UNICEF study, a child's mental development depends on how he or she is fed from the very start of life. If he does not get nourishment in his first two years, the brain will not develop properly).

A very perceptive observer of the current Indian scene has remarked:

Given the depth, pervasiveness and intensity of the crisis our nation and society is passing through, even the total implementation of the 20-point Programme will not solve. At best, the crisis might ease to some extent.⁸³

The UCD in Hyderabad may be an improvement over the EIU scheme but, to view it as some sort of a 'panacea' for all the problems of the urban poor would amount to taking too simplistic a view of a reality which is too complex. Apart from the more serious problems, like the millions of malnourished children in the slums (referred to above), continued skewed distribution of the gains of development amongst the rich and the poor, and stratification of society, there is also the question of change in the imagination and attitude of bureaucracies at the state/local levels (behaving like the 'colonial' bureaucracy) which treat the slums and slum-dwellers

⁸³Mohit Sen, "The 20-Point Programme and the Left", New Delhi, *The Patriot*, January 10, 1985.

as 'evil eyesores' for themselves and the foreign guests (when the NAM and CHOGUM meetings took place in New Delhi in 1983 and 1984 respectively, all the slum pockets along the route from Palam airport to the city were fenced off out of sight of the visiting dignitaries).

The problem of slums and squatter settlements has also become a sensitive, politically-contentious issue in India and ideology of a political party in power can influence official policy towards slum-dwellers. A regional party like the Shiv Sena, for example (now controlling the Bombay Municipal Corporation) may not be friendly towards them. Left-wing parties, on the other hand, are known to be sympathetic to their hardships. Other parties follow a 'reformist' approach, making marginal improvements in the lot of the slum people, from time to time. Some citizens' action-groups have also been making their presence felt by organizing demonstrations in support of the urban poor in cities like Bombay and Delhi.

The problem has also received the attention of the highest court of justice in the country. Giving its judgment on July 7, 1985 on the right of the Bombay Municipal Corporation to remove encroachments by poor on public streets/roads/pavements, the Supreme Court of India put the whole issue in its Constitutional perspective by declaring: The right to livelihood is a fundamental right. It forms an inherent part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. Citizens can be deprived of this right by anyone *only* by a law and a procedure that is fair, just, and reasonable.

Meanwhile, the tragedy continues: migration from rural areas, the overcrowded cities carrying an intolerable burden, and the urban poor being defended or disparaged by different groups in the country. And, so does the debate on the issue, consuming, in the process, an enormous amount of nation's energies.

More serious still, most officials in urban bodies when thinking of slum/squatter people and their problems continue to imagine 'shelter' as the solution. That is a tragic myth. The heart of the problem is 'poverty' and the answer to it is the spread of the wealth created in the country amongst *many*, not *few*. 'Money like knowledge, also has power.' Presently, some people have both. Once money gets distributed, this

would automatically lead to distribution of power, and other significant changes in the society. Many writers who have studied the process of urbanization and strategies for squatter settlements in Third World countries have said this *ad nauseam*. But, Perlman makes this point forcefully:

...we must be absolutely clear that it is not lack of technical know-how or innovation that has limited the ability to solve the problems of the urban poor. Clearly what is needed is a redistribution of power and resources from the powerful and wealthy to the powerless and poor. But that is a political, not a technical, question. It is a question of priorities and commitment.⁸⁴

Note her emphasis on the 'priorities and commitment':

In China and Cuba, for example, there are no squatter settlements. This is not because these countries are richer in resources but because of national commitment to the universal rights to jobs and housing, and to equalizing the differences between the countryside and the city.⁸⁵

As already noted, our own solution to this complex problem in India has been a variety of measures since Independence. But, unfortunately, most of these have either been defensive or corrective steps, taken from time to time, with a lot of fanfare, and then given up in favour of a new one or carried out in a dis-interested manner—be it the 'resettlement colonies scheme', the 'environmental improvement' or the 'IDSMT'. There also seems to be a certain amount of ambivalence in the thinking of some of our urban planners. For instance, while on the one hand, the Constitution grants our people the freedom to move (and to move freely) from one place to another, on the other hand, these planners would like to prevent the rural poor from entering the big cities. Again, while we keep repeating, every now and then, our

⁸⁴Janice E. Perlman, "Strategies for Squatter Settlements: The State of the Art as of 1971" in U.N. Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT): "The Residential Circumstances of the Urban Poor in Developing Countries", Praeger, New York, 1981, p. 184.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

resolve to banish poverty but, at the same time, we fight shy of taking the more basic step in this direction, namely, that of changing the property relations in our society. So, we always seem to seek the temporary expedients, and then try to reconcile these antithetical 'ideals', sometimes by 're-structuring' old programmes, like the 20-Point Programme.

Re-structured 20-Point Programme

On August 20, 1986, the Government of India announced the re-structured 20-Point Programme which laid special emphasis on removal of poverty, fuller employment, reduction of disparities, housing sites to the rural poor, basic facilities to the slum-dwellers, and development of low-cost building materials.

But, the question that concerns us here is: will this new 'poverty-oriented' programme take India nearer to the goal of a squatter-free society by the end of this century? At least, one of India's leading dailies, *The Tribune*, published from Chandigarh, was quick to point out certain inconsistencies in an editorially-made comment:

Even for 'Government that works faster', the birth of the 're-structured' 20-Point Programme sets a record for speed that will take some beating. It was conceived on Independence Day, given shape to during the next four days and its arrival was announced in Parliament with appropriate fanfare on Wednesday. The Union Cabinet spent only three hours and a half on deliberating and endorsing the list aimed at 'eradicating poverty, raising productivity, reducing income inequalities, removing social and economic disparities and improving quality of life'...That the 20-point are hastily assembled comes out rather strikingly. There is no coherent overall thrust, the claim about making a decisive impact on poverty alleviation seems to be a hesitant after-thought.

One effect of this is to arbitrarily divide rural development schemes into two categories—those enshrined in the 20-Point Programme (and hence enjoying a higher status) and those outside it (hence denied this exalted position). This is further complicated by the sudden promotion of a number

of until-now inferior programmes to the exclusive list. For example, the attack on poverty (the first item in the new programme) is already the basic aim of a number of rural development plans implemented with varying degrees of success and commitment. The 'special programme for rural labour' (item six) is another name for being implemented for quite some years now.

A few points are plainly woolly in conception and incapable of implementation. Among them are the pledge to ensure justice to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (the only Justice they cry out for is an end to this wretched nomenclature), equality of women and new opportunities for youth. The talk of 'housing for the poor' sits awkwardly with the very next item 'improvement of slums'.... What should startle many is the omission of some of the vitally important objectives contained in the old 20-Point Programme.⁸⁶

If the 're-structured' programme has been drawn up in haste and at short notice to the concerned ministries (as suggested above) and, on top of it, is not pursued with the seriousness it deserves, this strategy against 'rural poverty'—like its numerous predecessors—might also prove to be yet another stopgap. Removal of rural poverty is the key to the squatters problems in cities and if it is not dealt with determination during the 7th Plan period, there would be nothing to stop the population movement towards the big cities in the 9th and 10th decade of this century. And an immediate and negative effect of this phenomenon would be that many a 'satellite' or 'ring towns' (like Faridabad) that today are being conceived as 'counter-magnets' to take the pressures off the bigger cities may themselves become the new 'slum capitals' of tomorrow (the only factor that stands in favour of India in this regard is that its size is too big and it takes some time even for a crisis situation to come to a head).

⁸⁶Editorial Comment titled '20-Point Plan: Face Three', *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, August 26, 1986. Cartoonist Abu Abraham portrayed the new programme as a box of detergent—'power-packed, economy size, with a fresh new perfume'. Other commentators dubbed it as a 'rehash job'.

What stimulates the above-said fear is our own enough experience in the past to know that in India there is always a wide gap between what is 'planned' and what, finally, 'gets implemented'. This does not apply merely to the 'national' plans but also to 'master plans' in the small and medium-level towns—formulated, revised, again revised but never executed energetically—with the result that none of them has managed to reduce the size of the big cities in favour of smaller or medium ones. Remember what Gunnar Myrdal said: All countries of South and South-east Asia are 'soft states', i.e., they often do not implement the policies they proclaim. India is one of them.*

*Take, for instance, the instrumentality called the 'NCR Board'. First, it took more than ten years to find a 'statutory' identity for itself. And, now for the past several months—despite all its labours—it has not been able to break itself loose from 'uncertainties' of the Seventh Plan allocation: the Board demanded Rs. 3,040 crore but the Planning Commission sanctioned only Rs. 35 crores. When the last reports came in, the Union Urban Development Ministry was reported to have appealed to the Prime Minister for intervention (as per indication available at the time of going to press, the outlay for the NCR might be raised after the mid-term appraisal of the Seventh Plan). Traumatic times may be ahead for the Board when each 'member' of the Board (three States and the Union Territory of Delhi) tries to grab a lion's share of the allocation made, and once that is over, who knows what type of disillusionment and cynicism might set in if some 'members' get less than what they expect. As for the implementation of the NCR projects/schemes by the respective States, the Indian researcher is well familiar with the problem of multiplicity of authorities in towns/cities and other irritants that often delay the decision-making processes at the higher levels and the speed of works on sites.


RISE OF FARIDABAD COMPLEX: SOME BASIC FACTS AND TRENDS

It is unlikely that the 'Faridabad Industrial Township' would have been built and acquired its present form and character to become a leading industrial centre¹ in northern India, were it not perhaps for the partition of the country, the influx of refugees from Pakistan into many towns and cities of the then composite Punjab, and the vigorous efforts of the Central Ministry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation to deal with multiple problems of their settlement in different locations, particularly in and around the then composite Punjab (say, Nilokheri, a town now in Haryana).

Faridabad Industrial Township, some 30 kms. south of Delhi on the National Highway No. 1, was one such location chosen by the Central Ministry to provide shelter and an economic base to 5,000 refugee families from Pakistan. About 45 minutes run from Delhi by bus, this location between two small, tranquil towns, namely 'Faridabad' (now called Old Faridabad) and 'Ballabhgarh'. For decades, these towns looked just like two small dots, compared to many other larger towns on the National Highway. Of course, each had its own distinct entity. For example, both were served by IIInd class municipalities—though Ballabhgarh was a bit superior of the two, for it was a subdivision (tehsil Headquarter) which Faridabad was not. The map of this strip of land between the

¹It boasts of 170 large and medium-sized and 5000 small-scale industrial units today. Employment in these factories, having a yearly turnover of about Rs. 2,000 crore, absorbs nearly 1,50,000 workers and 20,000 managerial/clerical staff.


two (about 8 kilometers) looked as follows in the pre-partition days:



Back in 1947, the task of acquiring land for settlement of these 5,000 families was assigned to the State Government of Punjab by the Central Ministry. It did not take much time for the Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon (on behalf of Punjab Government) to get through the acquisition process. By 1950, land measuring about 3,168 acres was acquired and passed on to the Central Ministry. The land was sliced up into three major categories, 1,268 acres for housing divided into five neighbourhoods, 1408 acres for industrial development to provide jobs to the displaced families, and a reserve of 500 acres earmarked as 'public streets'. A population of 25,000 was contemplated for the township. Most of the dwellings built for the refugee families consisted of two rooms with a kitchen and a bathroom (total areas: 233 sq. yards). These were offered to the new settlers on as low a monthly rental as Rs. 18, to begin with, but subsequently reduced to a blushingly-low amount of Rs. 6 p.m. These monthly payments were to be considered as contributions towards the total cost (Rs. 5,000) of the tenement which, when paid in full, would entitle the occupants to be the owners.

While the construction of tenements for the refugee families had surged forward with speed, few factories came up in the area designated for them. Worse still, during the next few years, the rate of factory-building continued to be depres-

singly slow. There was a sort of economic crisis in the newly set-up township—a fairly large labour force, but not enough jobs. The typical ticklish problems of water supply, sewerage, electricity, etc., also came to the fore. Though a new industrial town had been raised and many years elapsed but it failed to serve its originally-envisioned industrial expectations. However, the map of the area given below now looked differently, with the springing up of this new settlement in between the two ancient small townships, namely, 'Old Faridabad' and 'Ballabhgarh':



Faridabad Development Board—The 'Central' Control

To build the town and to manage the municipal functions within it, the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation established an administrative instrument, called the 'Faridabad Development Board'. It consisted of, among others Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of India as Chairman, and two non-official members who were also nominated by the government. The Administrator of Faridabad was the Member-Secretary.

Many changes occurred during the 1955 and 1958, however. The then dynamic Chief Minister of the Composite Punjab State was successful in attracting some industrial firms to the

²A.S. Pundalik, *Problems of Industrial Towns within large Metropolitan Agglomerations* (Delhi-Faridabad Case), a Paper submitted to the Technical University of Szczecin, Poland, in partial fulfilment of the completion of a post-graduate training programme in Town and Country Planning, held in June 1981.

town. A series of incentives were offered to them, like almost free water supply, and low taxes. Such facilities naturally tempted these industrial organizations, both with abundant and limited capital. Indeed, the government even showed them exceptional goodwill by offering cheap, subsidized living quarters for their workers which are reported to have been sold by industrialists to the occupants at considerably higher prices later, pocketing, thereby, a neat profit. No wonder, with a bonanza of this kind served to them almost on a platter, most hoped to reap handsome returns on their investments.

The town had new 160 factories which included several large units: principal amongst them were: Bata Shoe Company, Hardware Factory, Kelvinator, Hindustan Electric, Hitkari Potteries, East India Cotton Mills, etc. Population of the town had swelled to about 35,000. It was now expanding far more rapidly than in the past. Open spaces still abounded. Density was low, and so were rents.

The town was however only partially developed by now. The Development Board, being a body loaded with only administrators, paid little attention to its 'planning' aspects for future expansion. Many unauthorized colonies, privately developed, had grown haphazardly. Migrants from rural areas had begun to pour in for industrial jobs, giving rise to the menace of squatters settlements and slums. The meagre provision of water and other amenities were becoming troublesome. Housing was totally inadequate. The policy of the Board was to add only a bare minimum of amenities to meet the needs of increasing population.

Notified Area Committee—From 'Centre' to 'State Government'

On January 1, 1961, the State Government announced the creation of a Notified Area Committee to correct the growing urban disorder in the township and the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation readily agreed (following an Agreement reached with the Government in December 1960) to wind up its 'Development Board' and transfer the 'municipal functions' to the newly-constituted Area Committee. Three months later, the reserve of 500 acres for 'public Streets' was also transferred to the Committee. In its letter No. 4 (1)8/57-H&T dated April 21, 1961, the Ministry of Rehabilitation noted:

With effect from January 1, 1961, *i.e.*, the date of transfer of municipal functions of new Industrial Township, Faridabad, to the Notified Area Committee set up there, all public streets left as such in the plan of the Township shall be deemed to vest in and be under the control of the Notified Area Committee in terms of Sections 3 and 56 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911.

Birth of Municipality—Dispute Over Vital 'Public Lands'

Three years later, the Notified Area Committee was converted into a Class II municipal committee for the town. Its status was further upgraded in 1967 when it was turned into a Class I municipality.

However, to the utter surprise and dismay of the then Secretary of the Committee, the plans received by him from the Central Ministry (via the State Government) in February, 1962, showed certain vacant lands in the town as *not transferred*.

This *volte face* by the Ministry incensed and agitated the Committee because it felt that there was no reason or justification—legal or otherwise—on the part of the Central Ministry to retain a part of lands that were acquired for the specific purpose of constructing/developing the town and once the municipal functions stood transferred to the committee, the remaining lands rendered surplus in that process also came under the control of the Committee.

Aggrieved by this development, the enthusiastic Secretary promptly took up the matter with his higher-ups, both at the local and the Headquarters level. He had also come to know that the Central Ministry was openly selling some of the vacant land to private parties and, thereby behaving like a 'profiteer' by taking advantage of land values in the open market which had soared many times since the Ministry acquired it for 'public purpose' (the Ministry had paid as little as 55 paise per sq. yard to the farmer but was now selling the land at Rs. 60 per sq. yard).

A small office of the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation, headed by a middle-level official, still operated from Faridabad; indeed, it was located in the same premises as was the Municipal Committee. The Committee Secretary held several

meetings with the local representative of the Ministry in this connection but all his gentle persuasions were of no avail.

Nature of Dispute: The Case of Municipality

The Municipal Secretary was, however, undaunted. He set himself to the task of preparing a comprehensive Note for submission to his superiors. His principal arguments were:

- (i) It was clear from the language used in the Acquisition Notices that the land was specifically acquired by the State Government for 'construction of Faridabad Industrial township';
- (ii) Once the 'Municipal functions' of the town stood transferred from the development board to the then Notified Area Committee, all Public streets left as such in the plan of the Township also stood vested in and come under the control of the Committee; this was only not conceded by the Ministry in its communication dated April 21, 1961, but had also the legal backing of sections 3 and 5 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911;
- (iii) When the Ministry built the town and its infrastructure, the population was only 25,000; the present weight of the population is one lakh. No further development of the town was therefore, possible unless the Municipality had at its disposal all the lands rendered surplus in the initial construction of the town;
- (iv) The town was desperately in need of bus stands, new marketing centres, parks, reading rooms, etc.; the Municipality could provide these facilities only if it was given possession of the vacant lands and additional funds; incidently the Ministry had also failed to live up to its commitment to pay to the Municipality a sum of Rs. 3.68 lakh.
- (v) The Central Ministry appeared to feel no qualms about the commitment it made in the Agreement (para ix) with regard to constant development of the undeveloped areas in the town *at their own cost*; on the contrary, they seemed to have turned 'profit-hungry';

- (vi) Instead of defending 'public interest', the Central Ministry had clearly betrayed it; and
- (vii) On learning about the on-going friction between the local body and the Ministry, the local land speculators and migrants, were taking it as free for all, with the result unauthorized encroachments on public lands are mushrooming all over.

Sadly, the problems continued to cumulate and get complicated. The Municipality got disturbed every time some vacant land was sold by the Central Ministry. As per its claim, the Ministry was even disposing of certain lands transferred to it already. For example, a plot of land in 'Tikona Park', shown as 'park' and transferred to the Municipality in the plans was disposed of for the purpose of setting up an ESI dispensary. A road in Market No. 2 was said to have been similarly disposed of.

In the meantime, unrelenting pressures on the well located public lands in the inner parts of the town continued; while squatting on some of them by low-income families reached a high level of consolidation, new such settlements also continued to take shape. That no government agency seemed to be bothered about this on-going encroachments on public lands had a determining influence on the behaviour of new migrants to the town as well. They either moved into the old settlements or set up new ones on the somewhat distant sites from the inner parts or on the peripheral locations. Menaced by this continuous 'invasion' by squatters and stung by the negative attitude of the Central Ministry (despite a time-consuming correspondence that had gone on already), the Municipality decided, ultimately, to take things into its own hands and went ahead to adopt a resolution declaring the 'vacant lands' as transferred to it under Section 171 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911....The resolution passed on October 18, 1968, read as follows:

Resolved that except the area shown as vacant lands in white colour not transferred to the Municipal Committee, Industrial Township, Faridabad, in each of the neighbourhood plans and Master Plan showing the transfer of lands

to the Municipal Committee, the area/lands which are not vacant land not transferred left as such in the plans are hereby declared public streets under section 171 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911 as this section has been extended to this Committee by the State Government of Haryana. The Municipal Committee is already spending money on the sanitation of these areas where slums are developing due to private encroachments. These as per schedule should be suitably developed to serve the growing cultural, social and civic needs of the town which was planned for 25,000 people and has increased to 1,00,000.

The proposal is unanimously approved'.

Search for a Solution

The Ministry, however, continued to cling to its view that it had the power to hold and dispose of its properties as it wished. In a letter [No. 4 (63) 68-CSGF, January 1, 1969], written to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon (under whose jurisdiction the Municipality operated), the Settlement Commissioner in the Central Ministry termed the Committee's challenge to its stand as 'irregular' and 'illegal' and urged the former to shelve action on Committee's resolution:

... It is now understood that the Municipal Committee has passed a Resolution for the acquisition of all these pieces of land in utter disregard of legal and constitutional position of the properties belonging to the Central Government. An attempt to acquire such land will not only be irregular but also illegal. It is understood that the Municipal Committee has approached your office for finalizing the acquisition proceeding. It so, we shall be grateful if you kindly stay action on the State Government request till the matter is settled between the Central Government and Municipal Committee.

The simmering dispute was brought to the notice of the then Central Minister for Rehabilitation. He desired the issues to be sorted out at a meeting at the secretaries level. Accordingly a meeting held on February 7, 1969, and discussed

the following proposals from the Municipality as the basis of a proposed package deal:

1. Let the Ministry concede transfer of the said lands to the municipality free of charge; or, failing that,
2. Let it pass on the lands on easy terms, say, on payment of the actual acquisition costs borne by it,

Or

at the most, charge interest on the acquisition amount (about Rs. 2.45 lakh) from the date the municipal functions in Faridabad stood transferred from the Ministry-supported Development Board to the Municipality.

The Municipal officials also pointed out certain snags in the commitments made by the Ministry earlier with regard to provision of underground drainage, street light, water supply, roads, etc., in the town or in lieu thereof, payment to the Municipality a sum of Rs. 3.98 lakh. It was argued by them that the Municipality had already incurred a heavy expenditure on some of these development activities since the Development Board packed up and the Ministry, therefore, owed it to the Municipality.

The Central Ministry however took the stand that before any package deal could be finalized, a joint inspection of all these lands be carried out. The inspection was accordingly conducted on February 19, 1969 and a report submitted to the Ministry for its consideration.

Court Battle

However, before any package deal could be talked about and settled, the Central Ministry published an auction notice on October 10, 1969 and gave wide publicity to its intended auction of certain vacant lands in November 1969. Concluding that the Ministry was not serious about any deal, the Municipal officials began to think in terms of a legal solution to the problem. Consultations were held at the Headquarters level and the expert advice given was that while it would be embarrassing for a State Government to drag the Central Government in a court of law (the same political party was

in power both at the Centre and the State), the Municipality might, therefore, challenge the legality of the Ministry's claim on public lands on its own. The Central Ministry thus was soon confronted with a writ petition, filed by the Municipality in the High Court at Chandigarh. The hearings continued for about a year and a half and, finally, the Municipality succeeded in obtaining a Stay Order, restraining the Central Ministry from selling the land in Faridabad.

The Ministry moved promptly this time and felt obliged to return to the negotiation tables once again. The discussions started at the senior level in right earnest. A list of all properties was prepared and bargaining for exchange of lands began. The Ministry wanted to sell them at the prevailing market rates and demanded about Rs. 4 crore. The Municipality however sought a settlement on the conditions it offered earlier, *i.e.*, actual acquisition costs plus interest. But this was not acceptable to the Ministry. Directly resulting from these negotiations, many more meetings took place. Also a lot of correspondence. But, nothing worthwhile came out of it.

*Establishment of Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA)—
The Final Agreement*

On January 1, 1971, the three municipalities in the New Industrial Township (NIT) zone and in the two adjoining towns, namely, Ballabhgarh and Old-Faridabad, were merged by the State Government to form 'Faridabad Complex Administration'. The central role that was earlier played by the NIT municipality with regard to Central Ministry's lands in Faridabad now passed on to the new Administration and the Local Self-Government Department at the Headquarters. In a way, this change exemplified the transition of decision-making power from an 'autonomous' local body to the administration at the State level. In the circumstances, the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation had no longer to contend with an elected local body which had its own legal standing and competence and could back up its claims independently with coherent arguments. Its new 'detractor' was the 'State Government', a sort of 'junior partner' *vis-a-vis* the Central Government in the Indian scheme of things. Because, no matter

what the law says on paper, if the same political party is in power in a State and at the Centre at a given moment of time, the latter can always—if it so wishes—veto the claims/decisions of the former. The characteristics of the changed situation at Faridabad/Chandigarh almost accorded with this scenario. Though the inevitable irritants and squabbles about the transfer of lands were still in existence, the issue was eventually solved through a contractual agreement arrived at between the Government of Haryana and the Central Ministry of Supply and Rehabilitation. The outcome of this agreement, spelt out in a communication No. 18 (2)/73-Spl. Cell/55 II, dated March 31, 1981 from the Central Ministry concerns, *inter alia*:

- (a) about 1,329 acres of undisposed land which includes residential/green belt/quarry/agricultural land;
- (b) commercial plots (measuring 5,620 sq. yds); industrial plots (measuring 4,578 sq. yds plus another 12 acres); small-scale industries plots and some shop plots; bungalow plots, and residential plots; and,
- (c) central government-built properties and plots.

According to the FCA officials, the lands have so far been transferred from the 'Central Government' to the 'State Government'. This has taken well over 20 years. No one here knows when these lands would be passed on to the FCA itself. Once again, there is a vacuum, and the same old dilemmas facing the FCA.

FARIDABAD: SOME BASIC FACTS AND TRENDS

Area

The total area of Faridabad Complex is about 173 sq. km. Included in it are the areas controlled until 1971 by the three contiguous local Class II municipalities of Ballabhgarh, Old Faridabad and New Industrial Town (NIT) and the area under the adjoining 17 gram panchayats, namely, Lakarpur, Itmadpur, Palla, Sarai Khwaja, Wazirpur, Mewla Maharajpur, Fatehpur-Chandela, Budena, Daultabad, Ajronda, Saran, Mujessar, Ranhera, Uehagaon, Jharsaintly, and Sihi. Sub-

sequently, some more 'sabha' areas of Ankhir, Badkahl, Gaunchi, Nawada-Koh, Dahua and part of sabha area of Baroli were included in the Complex area, making a total of 36 villages.

Total Population

The 1971 census returns showed 1,22,817 people living within the boundaries of the Faridabad Complex. Distribution of population between the three zones in the Complex was as follows: Ballabhgarh 17,411; Old Faridabad 19,644 and NIT 85,762; this means considerable disparity between the NIT zone, on the one hand, and the Ballbhgarh and Old Faridabad zones, on the other.

The population figure furnished by the 1981 census was: 3,30,864. That shows that in a period of ten years the population of the Complex has more than doubled. The variation in terms of the three zones was: Ballabhgarh 46,905, Old Faridabad 53,920, and NIT 2,31,039. Clearly, the NIT zone has maintained its wide difference with respect to the other two zones, and, hence, is the most populous of the three.

Basing their estimates on the past trends in the increase of population, the Planning Unit of the FCA looks forward to a population of about five lakh in the year 1987, and an expected income of Rs. one crore, the criterion according to which Faridabad would stand qualified for the status of a full-fledged corporation.

The population changes in the town may be summarized as follows:

1971	1,22,817
1981	3,25,992

Squatter Population and Area Under its Occupation

Towards the end of the year 1980, the total squatter population in the town stood at 70,430. This was revealed in a survey (see p. 105) covering all the three zones, namely, NIT, Ballabhgarh and Old Faridabad. The survey also showed that there was rapid increase in the squatter population in the town, because an earlier survey carried out in 1973-75 in the NIT zone alone, had identified only 10 squatter settlements

whereas their number, as per the 1980 survey, had grown to as many as 36 in this zone itself.

The local Planning officials expect the 1980 squatters population (70,430) to increase to 1,80,000 by the year 1987, indicating its expansion by 39 per cent during the period 1980-87 as against 65 per cent in the total population (3,25,992 to estimated 5,00,000) for the same period.

Initially, the squatters settled mostly in the NIT zone but, later, they ventured across to the vacant public lands in the other two zones. The total area under their possession is as follows:

	<i>Acre</i>
NIT	150
Ballabhgarh	60
Old Faridabad	60
	<hr/>
	270
	<hr/>

Physical Characteristics of Land

Much of the land in Faridabad Complex area is a wide plain and is devoted to agriculture. The only exceptions are the sandstone and rock ridges near Delhi-Faridabad border where a large number of stone-crushing factories are located (*incidentally, the labourers working in these factories and living closeby are the most under-privileged squatters in the town*). A canal, called the Agra Canal, drains the town through Sector 13. Despite a very large built-up area, the town still enjoys rural openness on certain fringes. About 50 per cent of the total area can be classified as 'urban'.

Cost of Land Acquisition

Thirtyfive years prior, Faridabad presented a picture of abundant agricultural land on the edge of the town and on the outskirts, with ample opportunities for easy and bulk purchase of land. But, with increase in population and spread of industrial/residential development over the years, that initial advantage of open spaces is nearly gone. Besides, the

cost of acquisition has been gradually rising and this factor has made a big difference to the financial freedom of the concerned government agency to go in for acquisition of land—in large blocks or small ones.

The following figures are suggestive of this difference:

Cost of acquisition in 1950-60	Rs. 10,000 per acre
Cost of acquisition in 1970-80	Rs. 1,50,000 per acre

Land Utilization

A substantial proportion of land along the Highway extending from the sandstone ridges near the Delhi border right up to Ballabhgarh was pre-empted by the factories in the 1950s and 1960s. With the location of industry on the either side of the Highway stretch passing through the Faridabad Complex (roughly 21 kms.), the public authorities—first, the Urban Estate Department of the Haryana Government, and later, the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA)—were obliged to plan residential development behind the two industrial belts running parallel to each other; the two belts, between themselves, now occupy an enormous area.

Table 1 on p. 69 presents a picture of the proposed land-use in the town as envisaged in the Development Plan amended in 1974.

Developed Land and its Price

One effect of increase in the acquisition cost of land (plus, of course, the cost of management of its development) has been the shadow it has cast over the price of developed land in the town over the years. The prices given below offer us an idea of the rates at which land developed and sold by HUDA has been changing hands in the private market:

<i>Year</i>	<i>As government-product (HUDA)</i>	<i>As quoted in private market</i>
1965	Rs. 17 per sq. yd.	Rs. 17-20
1985	Rs. 280 per sq. yd.	Rs. 280-700

While examining the seemingly low differential between the

TABLE 1 PROPOSED LAND-USE IN DEVELOPMENT
PLAN, 1974

<i>Land-Use</i>	<i>Area (in acres)</i>
1. Residential	8,500 (Besides 1,300 acres in New Township)
2. (a) Industrial (light)	1,955 (Besides the Industrial area of 348 acres in the New Township)
(b) Industrial (Medium)	1,330 (Under non-conforming use on the Delhi Mathura Road)
SUB TOTAL	3,285
3. General civic-cum-business centra = 225 } District Centre = 75 }	330
4. Major Institutional zone	110
5. Wholesale Marketing and Warehousing	140
6. Town parks	100 (Besides 350 acres of Central Green in New Township).
7. Green Belt along Delhi-Mathura Railway line	375
8. Railway	125
9. Roads	630
10. Existing Faridabad township, exclusive of the Green between railway line and Delhi- Mathura Road	2,250
11. Old Faridabad Town	120
12. Ballabhgarh Town	150
GRAND TOTAL	16,085

HUDA price and the 'market' price, it is important to remember that most of the plots being offered for sale in the 'private market' are those bought earlier from HUDA at lower rates. For example, if a HUDA developed plot bought for, say, Rs. 17 per sq. yd. in 1965 is offered for sale today through,

a property dealer, the amount of profit made would range from Rs. 263 to Rs. 687 per sq. yd. (see the following section also).

Housing for the Upper/Middle Classes

Taken together, the Urban Estate Department (1966 to 1977) and the HUDA (1977 onwards) have so far developed 26,761 plots in the 21 residential sectors. Taken as a whole, these plots constitute a fairly big land area in the town and a principal factor in the overall housing stock there. Approximately 93 per cent of these plots (25,109) have been sold to the upper and middle-level households. Of course, if the size of the plot is any indication of the economic level of the buyer-family, it can reasonably be concluded that of the two groups—i.e., upper and middle level—the proportion of the latter (plot sizes ranging from 160 to 250 sq. yds) is somewhat higher than that of the former (ranging from 350 to 1000 sq. yds).

Judged in this context (93 per cent of plots for upper and middle-level families), it is clear that HUDA has largely been developing plots for the well-to-do (the additions made by the Haryana Housing Board in the town's housing stock also fall in the same pattern).

It must, however, be pointed out that not all of these plots have been purchased for house building and self-occupation by the buyers. Many of these have been bought for speculative purposes. In the town there is a sizeable number of property brokers/builders, operating in the residential sectors for whom buying/selling land or built-up houses from their original buyers/builders is a kind of principal business. As stated by an operator specializing in this business, transactions between the sellers and buyers are taking place all the time in consideration for a higher price and part-payment in 'black' money.

Housing for Urban Poor (Excluding Squatters)

In a situation where the private real estate groups do not show any interest in housing for the poor (because these groups build only for profit and not to meet a 'social need'), it is evident that the housing needs of the poor in Faridabad

had to be met through what we might call a mosaic of efforts by three public agencies, namely, the Haryana Housing Board (the largest builder), the FCA (the medium-sized builder) and, the Haryana Urban Development Authority (the small builder). Their contributions in this regard (not very significant, though) are as follows:

Haryana Housing Board (HHB)

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Units</i>
Sector 18	875
Sector 23	742
Sector 7	500
Sector 22	468
Sector 10	415
	<hr/> 3,000 <hr/>

Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA)

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Units</i>
Old Faridabad	244
Janta Colony (Sector 22)	216
Janta Colony (NH-II)	184
	<hr/> 644 <hr/>

Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA)

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Number of Plots</i>	
	<i>50 sq. yds.</i>	<i>100 sq. yds.</i>
Sector 3	357	275
Sector 4-R	—	59
Sector 30-31	190	523
Sector 29	—	68
	<hr/> 547 <hr/>	<hr/> 925 <hr/>

However, what needs to be noted about the abovesaid efforts is that none of these projects were, strictly speaking,

aimed at squatters in the town. For instance, the main concern of HUDA in allotting their plots was with an affidavit which declared the income of an applicant as not more than Rs. 300 p.m. Anybody who produced such a document had his application form stamped with 'allotted'. Haryana Housing Board was similarly oblivious to this important distinction between a 'squatter' and an 'affidavit-holder'.

Housing for Squatters

FCA's first attempt in this direction was in the form of a site-and-services scheme—though not successful—for a group of squatters, displaced by slum-clearance in the year 1974-75 (see pp. 150-51). The small colony, called 'Bapu Nagar' is located in Ballabgarh zone.

In recent years (1981-86) the FCA made its second attempt and this time by acting both as a builder and supplier of 1640 EWS houses of which 500 have already been allotted (for details see pp. 122-23).

Unauthorised Colonies

The town almost bristles with unauthorised colonies—43 in all, covering an area of about 440 acres.

Of these, 11 have since been pulled out of this status and regularised (largely by the grace of politicians). Their break-up is as follows:

Old Faridabad	5
NIT	4
Ballabgarh	2
	<hr/>
	11
	<hr/>

(It may, however, be stated in passing that a mere declaration of their 'regularisation' does not end the unhealthy conditions within these colonies or those imposed by them on the total town. For, once these colonies get built up in Indian towns/cities, it is not easy to relate them to the overall plan of the town).

However, there are still 32 such colonies awaiting regularisa-

tion by the FCA. These can be spotted in all the three zones of the town: Ballabgarh (25), Old Faridabad (4), and NIT (3).

Water Supply

A central water supply system, comprising 42 tubewells (32 in NIT, and five each in Ballabgarh and Old Faridabad) was built way back in 1950s, but today it is no longer adequate to meet all the needs of the entire population of the town. Indeed, the grim fact is that pure drinking water is a problem for nearly 40 per cent of the town's population, especially in squatter areas where the efficiency of the supply service in summer months drops so low that many families can't get enough water to even cook their morning meals.

Street Lighting

Though sporadic efforts have been made to provide some basic amenities to the squatter areas under the Environmental Improvement Scheme, these have however contributed very little to the varied and complex problems faced by them. One of these amenities is: street light. The figures below emphasize the disparity that exists between the squatter areas, on the one hand, and the rest of the town, in respect of this important amenity:

Number of light-points in squatter areas	153
Number of light-points in rest of the town	24,543

Population Density

The kind of development that has taken place in Faridabad so far bears no relation to what is known as the necessary balance between concentration and dispersion of people in different areas/localities of a town/city. The end-result is that while the density in a squatter settlement may run very high, in a posh colony it may be quite low. The prevailing density standards in Faridabad Complex are:

- Highest: 1,092 persons per acre in Neelum-Bata slum
- Lowest: 30 persons per acre in HUDA Sectors 15 and 21

In the two other zones, namely, Ballabgarh and Old

Faridabad, the average is 300 persons per acre.

Medical Care

As universally acknowledged, town/city is the primary instrument available to the society for protecting the public health of its citizens (assuring all of them an adequate supply of pure water/air, healthful housing, a reasonable standard of cleanliness, etc.). But Faridabad is lagging behind this expectation to a very great extent. What is worse is that the quantity and quality of medical services, which are of central importance in the context of public health care, are no better. There are three general hospitals here (two large, and a small one) run by state government and 12 dispensaries operated by the Employment Insurance Scheme organization but the facilities offered by them are said to be hopelessly outstripped by the number of patients always seeking them.

In addition, there are four Immunization Centres, administering immunization and vaccination to infants and pre-school children. Two of these centres are parts of large hospitals and, as such, are located within the hospital buildings. The other two centres, however, are mobile and are designed to cater to the needs of children living in squatter slums. Each of these units consists of four vaccinators; their only means of transport, while on duty, are their own private bicycles for which they are paid a monthly maintenance allowance of Rs. 10. Balancing precariously all the equipment they have to carry (an ice-box, stove, syringes, needles, immunization records, etc.) at the rear of their bicycles, they move from one slum to another, identifying the huts and shacks of children needing immunization against various diseases, such as, polio, cholera, measles, etc. The eight vaccinators are hardly a motivated lot not only because of low salaries (only a lower division clerk's payscale, despite the considerable skills and professional knowledge they are called upon to demonstrate) but also for total absence of any promotional opportunities (once a vaccinator, always a vaccinator till retirement). Of course, even if their individual efficiency is high, it stands to reason as to how far immunization alone as a public health measure can be effective in view of the highly unfavourable

—nay, inimical—environmental conditions prevailing in the squatter-slums of Faridabad. Moreover, considering the large-children population to be served in the town, the number of immunization centres needs to be raised at least to 15.

TRENDS

Running out of Water

Supply of water for all households and industry in Faridabad is a serious problem even now. A drastic fall in supply every summer is almost a permanent feature. The present number of tube-wells have increasingly come to play only a limited role to play as the water-table in the land mass of the town is reported to be going down. The rainfall is not very heavy, either. Besides, the town is not well endowed by nature in yet another respect: that is, it has no lake, or river-flowing nearby. Meanwhile, with the increase in population and greater use of water in industry the demand has been steadily rising. Ironically, however, while the water supply problem might enter an appalling phase over the coming years, hardly anyone amongst the powers that be appears to be seized of the urgency of the problem.

The purity of water in some of the areas, like the NIT is also being questioned. Apart from a variety of pollutants arising out of chemical substances used in the factories and other wastes that get soaked in the area because of the concentration of industries here, there is also the risk of night soil (emanating from the pit-hole lavatories provided to every refugee household in 1947-48) contaminating the subsoil water. The fear that is haunting a large number of people is that the subsoil water in the NIT area is turning blackish.

Mounting Traffic/Congestion on Highway Between Delhi-Ballabgarh

Placement of factories on the either side of the Highway (Delhi-Mathura road) right from the beginning has resulted in a unique traffic pattern between Delhi-Ballabgarh all through the day. Both in the morning and in the evening one meets large currents and counter-currents of traffic of all kinds (buses, cars, trucks, scooters/motor cycles, bullock-

carts, bicycles, etc.), bringing in or carrying out people who commute to the town from a radius of about 25 kms., from the two opposite directions—Delhi and Mathura. Besides, the rural hinterland of the town sends every morning a very large workforce on cycles, on foot which goes back to their rural homesteads in the evening, to be back in the town next morning. Even during the so-called slack period—10 a.m. to 4 p.m.—the 30-odd kms. stretch of the highway is overstuffed with traffic, with a succession of buses, trucks, tempos, and other vehicles making their way to the either side. For those who use the State-run buses to come to the town, the hardships are very real: first, the cost of travel itself (Rs. 8 to and fro), and, second, the physical and mental strain imposed by the effort to get into the buses (because of tremendous rush at times) and, then, of standing in jampacked buses all the way to Faridabad or Delhi.

With the passage of time, the problems are getting further accentuated. Apart from the traffic glut and the related hazards and complexities on the highway itself, the earlier advantage of the 1960s and 70s to the daily commuter (from Delhi or Faridabad resident), of easy accessibility to transport to go to work or for shopping plus a low bus fare, has already disappeared; this, in a way, can be said to be a rebuttal of the symbiotic relationship between a 'town' and its 'region' (the NCR).

Inadequate Local Transport

It is also amazing but true that a 'Complex' spread over an area of 170 sq. kms., with a total length of 320 kms. metalled roads and inhabited by over 3 lakh of people is being served by a grossly inadequate local transport system. The work places and residences in most cases are wide apart, but only 2/3 buses, running every 2 hours in the mornings/evenings on a couple of long routes is all that is available.

The disadvantage of this lack of important facility in the town is once again borne more by the poorest (the better-offs have their cars, motorbikes and scooters) who must travel the furthest and spend more time (walking or cycling) and money (if hired transport) to have access to hospitals, shopping amenities or even work-places.

Transport Nagar

The town has still to attack yet another perplexing problem concerning transportation system, namely, the establishment of a 'transport nagar', capable of handling the needs/interests of not only an industrial agglomeration but of this part of the region.

Insufficient Sewerage System

The limited sewerage carried out in the town in the year 1965-66 covered only some parts of it. Other parts (roughly two-third of the total population) are still without it. This has resulted in all the waste and dirty water in these areas slowly percolating in the soil and making the drinking water unfit for a section of the population.

The sewerage effort has not been a success, either. Its operational and maintenance costs are too high: Rs. 49 lakh per annum) as compared to the revenue of only Rs. 3.45 lakh it generates from about 11 thousand house-holds. Meanwhile, the problem of the extension of the existing system to entire town still remains and no one seems to know when would that happen and who will bear the high costs involved.

Besides, the present practice of disposing of sewage is by emptying it into open space drain is dangerous. For, while the raw wastes may have moved from the town itself but when there is no proper treatment for their scientific disposal, these can cause serious problems (illness, epidemics, pollution) for people living in areas where it is being emptied.

Mushroom Growth of Unauthorized Colonies

A monstrosity that has nearly assumed epidemic proportions in the town is the large number of unauthorized colonies. Ballabgarh is almost littered with them (25—and their number is fast growing). According to the planning officials, this is one problem that needs most urgent attention or else the damage would be beyond repair. They argue that while a whole lot of obstructions/problems shall have to be overcome at the implementation stage of their development (after all of them have been regularized), the primary issue that demands an intensive study is that of a thorough examination of all the aspects of the problem at the higher levels so as to for-

ulate appropriate standards of improvements in these colonies on the lines suggested in 1977 by the then Union Ministry of Works and Housing (now Urban Development) for adoption in Delhi. The guidelines issued by the Haryana Government in this connection appear to be somewhat unrealistic and can cause moderate to serious planning problems while making these colonies 'livable'.

Illegal Constructions

Another cancerous growth that has gone unchecked and still continues to spread in certain areas of the town (more particularly in the NIT Zone) is the evil of illegal constructions and conversion of residential areas into commercial establishments. The effects of this blight are many-sided: apart from destroying the original character of a residential area, it makes the neighbourhood noisy, brings in hazardous heavy traffic, creates overcrowding and congestion, and above all, affects the life-styles of the residents.

Will this acute problem of gradual decay of such residential areas ever stop? Can the local administration come up with an aggressive plan to make a frontal attack on the problem? A clear-cut answer to these questions seems difficult because the problem has already gone to far and, in addition, there are powerful vested interests. In any case, if no steps are taken, the prospects of the problem simply appear terrifying.

Housing Shortage

The activities of the HUDA and the Haryana Housing Board, in particular, and those of the FCA, in general, were supposed to have provided housing for the expected population of over 3 lakh, but this aim still awaits fulfilment. There is already a very wide gap existing between the supply and the demand and over the years it is bound to increase. Apart from the elitist policies of bodies like the HUDA and the fiscal problems of the Housing Board, there are also other local factors like an increasing number of dwelling units converted into commercial uses and, thereby, taking a sizable chunk of residences off the housing stock in the town. The end result is: more speculation, higher rents, greater congestion and slum conditions in even such areas which, to begin

with, were planned—however haphazardly.

The present housing needs of the town can be divided into three categories: (a) removal of the existing shortage, (b) replacement of the present substandard housing in the two old zones, namely, Old Faridabad, and Ballabhgarh, and (c) future population needs (natural as well as by 'in-migration').

Power Crisis

The town has been facing a serious power crisis for the past many years. The minimum requirements of the town have been placed around 1.75 lakh units per day. However, on an average, it receives not more than 1.25 lakh units a day (that too, in an erratic fashion all through the year).

Environmental Pollution

Like other industrial towns in India, Faridabad, too, faces the problems of environmental pollution. The two major areas of concern are: (a) the overall air pollution of the town, and (b) workers' health and the various occupational diseases they come to suffer from by working in industries making use of poisonous gases or chemicals.

Hospital Facilities

As the growth of the town's population has continued unceasingly over the years, the public health problem, too, has grown in magnitude. The number of beds in these hospitals as also the number of dispensaries in the town has only marginally increased. Much the same situation exists for physicians and nurses. The end-result is that these hospitals/dispensaries are not only overcrowded but also understaffed.

But, what really gives the whole issue an ironic twist is that almost three-fourth of the medicines prescribed by the doctors in these hospitals have to be purchased by the patients from the open market. The medicines that are normally handed to the patients are the ones that are cheaper and they can themselves afford to buy. But, the costly medicines are never given, let alone the life-saving drugs. Beds are in such a short supply (315 in all) that there have been reports about the patients being asked to make their own arrangements. "Scavenging staff would not clean up the area around the beds

unless their palms are greased. Para-medical staff are also not helpful."

Maze of Authorities—Lack of Coordination

Though as an urban agglomeration, the Complex area is supposed to be a 'unity' in itself, and, as such, all the concerned public agencies are expected to fall in that line to accomplish the overall objective of an 'integrated development of Faridabad', the fact is that most of them are generally working at cross purposes with each other. This has resulted in a kind of functional disintegration amongst them, and 'effective planning' of the town reduced to impotence. Each agency with its own budget, bureaucracy, and set of rules/precedures pursues its own interests, and pet schemes/projects, without caring to fit them into a unified whole. Outraged and badly shaken, the Planning Unit of the FCA remains merely an idle spectator to Faridabad 'going down the hill. Perhaps no better example of the 'diversity in unity' could be given than the utter helplessness of Planning Unit to do anything to stop the local office of the Haryana Electricity Board from granting electricity connections to illegal industrial units in residential areas in many parts of the town.

Given below are the names of the agencies that are, directly or indirectly, responsible for the development of the town:

1. Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA),
2. Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA),
3. Haryana Housing Board,
4. Haryana State Electricity Board, and
5. District Industries Centre.

Politics and Planning

There are times when political interference also acts as a great obstacle to 'effective planning' in the town and because of these political compulsions—perhaps witnessed throughout this country—a local body is not always free to enforce the law. This is evident from the below-mentioned incident that took place in Faridabad many years ago:

In a way, the main thorough-fare constituted the heart of the transit system of the town—for, there was not only a heavy concen-

tration of commercial establishments on its either side but it also acted as the town's main artery carrying bulk of trucking and heavy traffic from the nearby Highway to the industrial zone of the town, besides returning them to the town, Highway later. There was also the usual traffic of local means of transportation—buses, private cars, cycle rickshaws, and, of course, a large number of pedestrians. As a result, it always had a steady stream of fast-moving traffic, making it particularly crowded and congested at peak hours.

The planning unit of the FCA, which had the responsibility for designing the overall transportation system in the town in relation-ship to the overall plan of land-use, had accordingly taken into account all these factors in the location and design of this thoroughfare. For example, the thoroughfare had been provided with a central verge running throughout its length; it also stood intersected at appropriate distances to permit traffic across it from the minor streets and lanes from the two sides.

A private petrol-pump owner, operating on this street, applied to the Planning Unit for a change in the layout of the thoroughfare whereby he desired a cutoff in the central verge right in front of his petrol station. The intention was to attract more customers from the other side of the street as well as to enable them to have an easy access to his station and an easy exit across to street.


The application was duly examined by the Assistant Town Planner (ATP) in the planning unit. He, however, felt obliged to turn it down for two reasons:

1. The proposed cut-off would clutter the fast-moving traffic on the thoroughfare and the resultant losses from delays and accidents could be enormous; and
2. There were already two cut-offs, located not so far apart from the petrol pump, and the grant of another between the two would go against the Guidelines issued by the Indian Road Congress as well as the Town and Planning Organization of the Government of India.

Both the Senior Town Planner (STP) and the Chief Administrator of the Authority gave their approval of what the ATP had flatly stated on the petrol dealer's application.

Months passed by. Meanwhile, the Senior Town Planner and the Chief Administrator of the town got transferred and replaced by new ones, with the ATP providing the link between the latter and the past history/planning problems of the town.

By then, the FCA had also moved in, as per earlier plans, to build a service road in-between the two cut-offs to provide an additional route to carry vehicular and other traffic which could now get in at one end and out the other (see the Sketch on page 82), without causing any serious inconvenience or dislocation to the moving traffic on the main thoroughfare. The two-lakh project took about a year to finish.



One morning when the ATP was in his office and busy looking through his files, he got a telephone call. The caller was a colleague, a State Civil Service Officer, working in another department of the FCA. He told the ATP that the State Minister for Local Self-Government was camping at the local Government Rest House and wanted to see him.

The ATP immediately left for the Rest House. As soon as he reached there, he saw a motley crowd of bureaucrats, businessmen and others swarming around the hallway there. He also found that the State Civil Service official who had called him in the morning was acting as Minister's 'personal assistant' (PA), running about and regulating the entry of visitors into the well-furnished room where the Minister was seated. The ATP surveyed the scene for a while. All that he saw, however, hardly surprised him because as and when any Minister happened to pass through or visit the town, such a flurry of activity around the Rest House was fairly commonplace; people of all sorts hung around to seek Minister's audience and favours.

In the meantime the State Civil Service official—turned into—PA of the Minister had caught sight of ATP and nodded him in. The ATP found the Minister scanning through some of the papers placed on top of the desk. Next minute he also noted the presence in the room of the petrol-pump dealer whose application for a cut-off he had rejected. It did not take him long to guess why he had been sent for by the Minister.

A little later the Minister turned his attention to the ATP and, handing him a foolscap-sized paper (a representation from the petrol pump owner) said: 'Do this job. Waive the rules, if necessary'. He

then proceeded to extol his merits:

This gentleman has always stood by our party. He had not only been providing financial nourishment to it but also worked very hard to help us all in the last election.

The representation had been marked by the Minister to the Acting Chief Administrator (the actual incumbent has gone on leave a few days back and so had the Senior Town Planner, leaving the ATP to handle all official papers concerning grant of planning permission, etc., in their absence). It carried the following notation by the Minister: 'For necessary action'.

The ATP just managed to mutter: 'I will see what would be done, Sir'. He then left the Rest House and returned to his office. Almost half of his working day had been lost.

Back at the Office, he once again read the Minister's orders and found himself trapped in an identity crisis: to obey the orders of the Minister and do what was blatantly irregular or go by what was rational and in accordance with scientifically-devised norms. Relatively fresh from college and imbued with a sense of idealism, he continued to brood over the matter for a couple of hours, and then decided to stick to his guns. But, deep within he felt stirrings of fear and tension which did not allow him to attend to the other official work that day.

That forces to get his decision changed by the Minister were still at work was evident from the telephone call the ATP received from the Rest House the following morning. Once again it was a familiar scene. Lot of people milling around. As he stood in the crowd inside (including the dealer) he debated in his mind how to face the Minister. But what the Minister said to him as soon as stared at him cheered him up, even though temporarily. He was asked by the Minister to go and fetch a local industrialist or his general manager in his car. The ATP left immediately and was back at the Rest House with the general manager after an hour or so. All that the two talked about was pretty routine to someone who had worked as an urban planner in the State and was quite familiar with the prevailing milieu. . . . so thought the ATP. For example, the Minister had asked the general manager to donate some money for 'developmental projects' in the 'town'. The general manager replied he would gladly get a small project (say, paving a street in a slum) executed but he was not authorized to pay any donations in cash. Suggesting that they would meet some other time, the Minister bade goodbye to the general manager and then turned toward the ATP. Other people had also left. Only two local officials were present. The Minister said:

Mr. . . . What is the matter with you? Yesterday I asked you to do this job but I find you are still trying to frustrate genuine demands of local people.

And, then, he added with sarcasm:

I have already received hundreds of complaints against you. If you don't mend your ways, remember I shall make your life and that of your children miserable.

As if to demonstrate that he really meant what he said, he told the PA to book a phone call for the Department's Secretary at Chandigarh, and ask him to suspend the ATP. However, on that day the lines happened to be out of order and the call, therefore, could not materialize.

For a minute, the ATP felt dazed. He knew that only a couple of weeks back the same Minister had spoken to the Secretary about another official like him and got him suspended. It is another thing that the same day some of the local officials managed to prevail upon the Minister later in the day to forgive the concerned official and obtained Minister's 'revised orders' on a plain piece of paper, hurriedly got typed from the market.

The ATP wanted to put across the objective facts of the case and tell the Minister how the desired cut-off in that street of fast-moving traffic would create all kinds of problems. But, the powerful status-difference between him and the Minister stood in the way.

As the ATP drifted out of the Rest House, he was a total mess. He felt nervous and weak. He had no idea what this conflict would lead to. It was time to go home, so he did not go to the office. He even wrote off a letter that night to his parents telling them about the possible trouble that lay ahead.

When he got to his office next morning, he was still trying to climb out of the previous day's depression. Just then he saw the Minister's car pulling outside his office and saw his PA stepping out. 'Oh, he has been dispatched to pick on me'. He said to himself. The PA entered the room and after exchanging greetings took his seat. A few minutes elapsed while tea was served. He then turned his attention to the petrol dealer's case and suggested sympathetically to the ATP: 'why are you unnecessarily trying to rock your own boat?' 'Patronage by the ministers and compromise by the bureaucrats keep things running smoothly for all of us', chipped in the other official who was accompanying the PA. The ensuing discussion ranged over the various implications of such confrontations with ministers, day-to-day political interference into administrative matters and their dismal effect on the moral of the public servants. The ATP however found the suggested bitter-pill hard to swallow. He tried to argue:

All right, if the Minister wanted to protect a self-interest, he had all the authority in the world to over-rule me. But in all fairness he should put his orders in writing.

Half-way through this impromptu discussion, someone informed

the ATP that the Senior Town Planner had since returned to the town. The ATP felt terribly relieved and expressed his desire to see him. Both the PA and the ATP drove off to the Senior Town Planner's residence to see him. But the Senior, who was quick to judge the stakes involved in swimming against the current, took the expected escape-route from the problem: 'You see, technically, I am still on leave' and, hence, preferred not to see the wrong the Minister was out to commit, and the perplexing predicament his junior had been sucked into.

Luckily for the ATP, the political events in the State that morning took a sudden dramatic turn. The one-and-a-half month old Ministry was dismissed by the Governor of the State and with that ended the three-day ordeal of the ATP.

During the six-week period the Minister held his office, his central preoccupation was to lay the foundation stones of development projects (big and small) in the town.* Though largely this obsession of his went unnoticed by the town people, but when the last count was taken, there were 16 such 'stones'. When would the work on those projects begin—no one knew, not even the local bureaucracy.

*The town was a segment of the constituency from which the Minister had been elected as a MLA during the last State Assembly elections.

FARIDABAD COMPLEX ADMINISTRATION: THE ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP

As already noted in Chapter 2, long before the Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA) was formally installed, there were three of its 'predecessor' agencies that provided urban services to this area: the NIT municipality, the Old Faridabad municipality, and Ballabhgarh municipality. Of these, while the latter two were nearly 100 years old, the NIT municipality was however relatively young and had functioned only for two-and-a-half decades. On January 15, 1972, this separate business of local government in three contiguous towns was swept away by an Act* of Haryana State Assembly and a single administrative system, called the 'Faridabad Complex Administration', unifying all the three municipalities, came into being.

Before we elaborate on the new establishment that was created in 1972, a quick appreciation of the past format shall be in order.

OLD SYSTEM

Old Faridabad

Oldest of the three and extremely small in terms of its population in 1878 (barely 7,500 inhabitants), it was in that very year that the town had its first taste of local government as a Class II municipality. As per the records, the municipal council then consisted of eight members, —all nominated. In other words, to begin with, there was no self-government and the policies and plans were laid by the 'appointees' of the government. The principle of self-government was introduced much later when the number of councillors was raised to

*Faridabad Complex (Regulation and Development) Act, 1971.

nine, four of them to be elected by the local people. The records of the municipality state that a town Hall was built in 1914-15; the building has since been pulled down.

One of the peculiar things about this town has been that while quite a few towns in the State (then called Punjab) had gradually emerged as prosperous trading or industrial centres, the character of Old Faridabad over all these decades depreciated. Worse, it even suffered loss of population which dwindled to 6,367 in the year 1941. The sources of drinking water then were some wells and a tank. There was only one metalled road. Street lighting was provided by kerosene lamps. The sanitation staff was limited.

Yet, another astonishing fact about this town is that even the partition of the country in 1947—which resulted in a big movement of refugees from Pakistan to Punjab (India) did not have much effect on its life—though a considerable number of these refugees had poured in to settle in its immediate surroundings (later named as the 'NIT' or the 'New Industrial Town').

Between 1950 and 1960, however, its economy began to pick up and this led to a relative increase in population as well. From 8,341 in 1951 it jumped to 10,848 in 1961. Since then it has been experiencing slow and steady growth.

Ballabhgarh

It was in the year 1889 that this small settlement, comprising barely 4,000 people, was 'municipally' organized. Ranked as Class II, the municipality's annual income till the end of the 19th century averaged about Rs. 10,000. The official records show that in 1912 there were 12 councillors in all, of whom one (the local Tehsildar) was the *ex officio* President and three were nominated. The town had few paved streets, and oil lamps lighted the streets at night (these were replaced by electric bulbs only in 1954).

It was by the year 1961 that it began to show signs of growth. As against 5,927 persons in 1951, the population increased to 8,329 and 17,411 in 1961 and 1971.

At the time of its inclusion in the Faridabad Complex in January 1972, the total municipal area was about 2.59 square kms.

NIT

From the time of the establishment of the Faridabad Development Board in 1960 to the Faridabad Complex Act in 1971, two other bodies were set up to keep pace with the problems of urban growth and service in this area. These were: The Notified Area Committee (1960), and Class II Municipality in 1965 (converted into class I in 1967).

NEW SYSTEM

As already stated, at the time the FCA came into being on January 2, 1972, there were, within the same area (Faridabad Complex area) three distinct municipalities acting independently of each other and exercising the powers of local agencies in their respective jurisdictions. The FCA Act of 1971 merged all the three in a single administrative unit and put it under the direction of a 'Chief Administrator'.

The FCA began the 1972-73s (its birth year) with a staff of about 1,000 (all categories). Today the total strength stands at about 2,700 (all categories).

Unique Feature

In detailing the FCA's administrative set-up, it would be best to begin by referring to a unique feature of the FCA which not only makes it an institution of its own kind in the State of Haryana but which also materially affects the organization structure. This special attribute is that while the FCA, like other local bodies in the State, discharges the normal municipal functions under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, also amalgamated in it are the duties and powers of an Improvement Trust under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. This means that the FCA has not only greater freedom to act than other local bodies in the State but has also broader powers to operate in the field of urban planning and development (in several other Haryana towns Improvement Trusts constitute a separate entity).

Indeed, the powers given to the FCA are much more elaborate and far-reaching because its principal officer, the Chief Administrator, has also been declared as the 'Director, Town and Country Planning' to enforce the provisions of the

Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of unregulated Development) Act, 1963, in the Controlled Area within the boundaries of the Faridabad Complex.

LEADING OFFICIALS

Chief Administrator

At the top of the FCA structure is: the Chief Administrator (CA, to be brief). He is, as the title itself implies—the Chief Officer responsible for the conduct of all FCA activities subject, of course, to control by the Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Department of Local Self-Government, Government of Haryana, at Chandigarh. The post of the CA results from the provisions of the 'Faridabad Complex Administration Act of 1971'. To a large extent, his powers are described by the Act itself. For example, Section 4 (2) states:

The CA may appoint such number of persons as he may deem fit to assist him for carrying out the purposes of this Act:

Provided that the creation of posts and appointments of all officers with a minimum salary of Rs. 350 per mensem or above and the maximum salary of Rs. 950 or above per mensem will be made with the approval of the State Government.

Again, section 2 of Chapter III of the Act deals about 'delegation of powers'. It states:

Unless otherwise provided, the Chief Administrator, may by notification, with the approval of the State Government delegate his powers except those under section 13, to his junior officers and the delegation shall continue until revoked.

First Division of Activities

In his principal tasks of running the Administration, the Chief Administrator is assisted by ten senior officials (all heads of their respective departments of the FCA). They not

only act in a consultative capacity to the Chief-Administrator on questions of general policy but also serve as connecting links between him and the staff under them.

1. *Senior Accounts Officer and Financial Adviser*

Has responsibility for all financial matters; accounts for all income and expenditure; prepares the FCA budget; arranges payment of salaries to the FCA staff; scrutinizes all tenders/quotations invited for FCA works/purchases; and prepares annotated audit reports;

2. *Medical Officer of Health*

Attends to: sanitary conditions in the town (including burial places, markets, slaughter houses, drains, industrial effluents and other pollutants affecting environment), offensive trades, food and drugs, and epidemics;

3-4&5. *Three Zonal Administrators*

Apart from the general local functions, such as, property tax and octroi collection, in their respective zones, are also responsible for handling such tasks as fall within the framework of the directions issued by the Chief Administrator;

6. *Establishment Officer*

Looks after matters, such as, salary administration, recruitment/promotions of certain categories of staff, transfers, discipline, and maintenance of personnel records;

7. *Senior Town Planner*

Plans for the orderly growth and development of urban area within the Complex, in particular, and the rural area, in general; also has responsibility for implementing national schemes like the 20-Point Programme, and Improvement of slum environment; administers building bye-laws and keeps a check on the erection/re-erection of unauthorized construction;

8. *Administration Engineer (B & R)*

Controls the civil engineering works, such as, construc-

tion and maintenance/repair of roads/buildings in the Complex area;

9. *Administration Engineer (PH)*

Carries out development works like supply, sewerage systems, etc.

The Chart on page 92 depicts the structure of the FCA at this level.


Departmental Interfaces

No organizational chart however can tell us how the different departments of the FCA interact with each other when common organizational tasks bring them together into a single grouping or a series of groupings. Such an 'interaction' is called the 'departmental interface'.

A departmental interface is influenced by a number of factors, say, the general climate of the organization history of interactions between the parties in the past (conflicts or cooperation), and the resultant mutual perceptions and expectations; mix of conflicting and common interests brought to the interface; commitment or lack of commitment to the organizational task/s in question; personal traits and characteristics of the individuals representing the departments; rules/procedures/hierarchies of the respective department; degree of knowledge of the 'context' (larger organizational unit or the society at large), etc. If the interests/values/goals of the departments or their representatives involved in a given project are similar, that may encourage interactions/linkages amongst them and hence the success of the project. On the contrary, if they are antagonistic, conflict and negative outcome may be the result for the organization.

In the sense that our objective is to understand the nature of departmental interfaces at the FCA, we might, first, take a look at the sequence of operations that must be performed here in order to: (a) accomplish a given developmental project, and (b) consequently give rise to a specific type of organisation that gets built up around that project. And, it is in the wake of these very operations that the departmental interfaces originate here.

ORGANISATION CHART OF FCA



SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS AND INTERFACE ORIGINS

<i>Steps</i>	<i>Departments/Official</i>
<i>Stage I—Initiation, Formulation and Approval</i>	
1. Consideration of the project/scheme and its formulation	<i>Planning</i>
2. Preliminary clearance	<i>Chief Administrator</i>
3. Preparation of estimates	<i>Engineering</i> (B & R or P.H. depending upon the nature of the scheme)—responsibility for estimates-preparation rests with the Asst. Engineer located in the concerned Zone who submits them to the Administration Engineer;
4. Approval by the higher-ups	<i>Planning</i> (Senior Town planner takes a look at the estimates and seeks approval of the Chief Administrator (if the expenditure involved exceeds Rs. 1 lakh, the sanctioning authority lies with the Secretary, State Department of Local Self-Government);
5. Intimation to concerned Zone/s	<i>Zonal Administrator</i> intimated of the proposed scheme (he comes in a big way to handle secondary activities on the completion of the scheme; say, allotment of houses to squatters, or day-to-day complaints with regard to the basic urban services provided in such settlements).
<i>Stage II—Implementation</i>	
1. Scrutiny of estimate	<i>Finance & Accounts</i> —Financial Adviser also intimated of

Steps

2. Tender-calling and assignment of work to contractors

3. Monitoring

Departments/Officials

the new project/scheme; he has important contributions to make as the work gets going;

Engineering and Finance—While the Financial Adviser is associated for purposes of scrutiny of tenders, etc., the Engineering Department undertakes execution of project scheme by the contractors;

Planning—if the funding of the scheme is by an outside agency, the Planning Department gathers data and information on the progress of the scheme for reporting to the agency concerned.

The above description demonstrates that, largely speaking, as many as five departments, together with their staff, get involved in the project at different stages (like the Establishment department also come along at some point for a portion of the programme and then withdraw from the scene). There is yet another party that plays a very important role during the 'actual' execution of the projects but lies outside the FCA 'organizational pattern', that is, the contractor. But, the major responsibility for the project—inception to completion—really rests on the shoulders of two departments, namely, the 'Planning', and the 'Engineering'. These two are embedded in this common endeavour to such an extent that the success of the project depends on the quality of the 'interface' between them. But, the kind of problems¹ that often crop up indicate that the interface is both vaguely de-

¹To know what strategies are available to deal with conflict at Department interfaces, see L. David Brown, *Managing Conflict at Organizational Interfaces*, Reading (Massachusetts), Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1983, pp. 101-16.

find as well as loosely organised. Take, for example, the question of 'task-interdependency' between the two. Available evidence suggests that in most project settings the behaviour of the Engineering Department representatives tends to define the boundaries of their own unit *vis-a-vis* that of the Planning rather too rigidly right from 'start'. This is reflected in their commonly-held view that 'so far as the project is confined to initiation/formulation or Stage I, it is their baby (*i.e.*, 'Planning Department'). Once it enters the 'implementational, stage, 'it is our business'. The lines of demarcation are nearly well drawn, with the result that the doors often remain closed to information to the other camp, *i.e.*, Planning. This close 'boundary' approach tends to discourage exchange of information and at times causes withdrawal of the other party (at least the individual staff member) from what is a 'collective responsibility'. As an official of the Planning Department put it:

When we seek information with regard to the progress of the project for onward transmission to, say, Town and Country Planning Organization, New Delhi, they (Engineering Department, seem take it as an intrusion, not 'monitoring'.

The Planning department, thus, finds itself caught in an unhappy position between the two worlds: the world of TCPO demanding information in behalf of the Central Government (the party that funded the project) and the sister-department (Engineering) resisting compliance or employing dilatory tactics.

'Coordination' between the two departments is sometimes carried out through the operating procedures maintained by clerical personnel in each department who are, naturally, concerned more with 'chain of command' than with the 'solution of problems' or 'speed of the work'.

FCA 'Culture'

Apart from the typical 'departmental interface', the FCA—like any other formal organization—has also its own overall 'culture' which emphasizes status, privileges attached to a rank (say, a telephone, an exclusive car, or attached bathroom—

the kind recently added to the office-rooms of the departmental heads), and so on, and governs the administrative behaviour of employees down the official hierarchy. This culture is not just casual or random but is well-entrenched. Indeed, so pervasive is its influence that it has not only perpetuated itself all along the years but has nearly come to acquire an almost caste-like character. Here is a sample:

A meeting in the room of the Chief Administrator (CA) was on, and the key participants were some of the senior and middle-level officials of the FCA. In the midst of the meeting, the CA stood up to go to the attached toilet. As he left his chair, he set into motion a 'cycle' of human behaviour: the boys around the large desk also stood up and stayed in that position till the CA entered the toilet. This 'cycle' closed: when the boss some five minutes later emerged from the toilet, the boys stood up once again, and shoved themselves into their seats only after the boss had done so.

This kind of obeisance and self-effacement is also expected and practised in the lower ranks. Of course, there may be some serious-minded people within the FCA who experience profound unease in such a climate but 'culture' is a force which, once created by man, cannot be easily challenged by lone individuals. In China, Mao had to initiate a nationwide 'cultural revolution' in order to deal with the environment created by certain pre-revolution feudalistic values in that society. Probably the problem in the Indian bureaucracy is much more serious than he has had to encounter.

The dynamics of the FCA culture has yet another interesting attribute. Many officials, while putting up notes/files to the 'Chief Administrator', address him as 'Learned C.A.' or 'Worthy C.A.' (as if everyone else is 'unlettered' or 'unworthy'). Cultural values, norms or beliefs are shaped either by the past events/practices in an organization itself or by the forces in the larger society. If, in the case of the FCA, it is a gift of the former, it is difficult to say as to who brought in here the use of such suave, subtle, artful and flattering phrases. The bureaucratic model, in the strict sense of the

term, forbids such 'personalized' salutations in the realm of subordinate-senior 'official' relationship. Besides, cultural interactions are seldom found in 'formal' organizations. Such behaviour patterns often develop with reference to the cultural background of some key people serving in an organization. In the context of the FCA the purpose behind this practice, however, is clear: a servile attempt to win favour of the boss.

How this 'culture' transforms itself to project a favourable image of the FCA's achievements to foreign or Indian teams visiting, say, a 'slum' project in Faridabad, is revealed in the following story:

It was a foreign team, from a rich, industrialised nation in the West. They were coming to take a look at an on-going low-cost housing project and other smaller schemes in the form of community lavatory blocks, etc. The intention was to learn what could their government possibly do to put the programme on a bigger scale.

An urgent meeting was convened, with the Chief Administrator (CA) in the Chair. The officials—especially from the planning and the engineering units—worked out the details about reception of the team, their visits to the sites, farewell, etc. The minute-to-minute schedule that was finally approved read something like this:

- 8.30 a.m. : Arrival of team at office of the Chief Administrator; introduction of members of team to FCA officials;
- 8.40 a.m. : Tea;
- 9.00 a.m. : Visit to Library Hall (STP/ATP/Architect to arrange exhibition; presentation of garlands and bouquets; group photograph—no colour film);
- 9.15 a.m. : Departure for EWS Housing site;
- 9.25 a.m. : Inspection of EWS houses in Sector...../ [the Administration Engineer (B&R)/(PH)]/ STP will arrange the inspection, sprinkling of water, level of roads to be motorable];
- 9.50 a.m. : Inspection of community latrines blocks in ...Colony (the MOH will make the sanitary arrangements along the route and also on the place of inspection; the Administration Engineer (PH) will arrange sprinkling of water; cleansing of toilet blocks to be inspected by MOH/SSI.

From that time onwards, the concerned units and their men swung into action and worked without respite to clean up the inside of the FCA's Central Office area, whitewash/paint the fencing along the route the visitors would take to go to the site of the project/toilet blocks, or to carry out minor repairs on the pot-holed roads/streets on the way. Sweating men from the Horticulture wing carted plants, big and small, from the Nursery to the site all the day long to give the place an attractive look. The toilet blocks were thoroughly washed and splashed with phenol rather generously. For a day, at least, the place looked and smelt differently. Later in the day the senior officials went out in their cars/jeeps on a tour of inspection of all those places to make sure that all mess and mud that usually fill the slum areas had been removed or carefully tucked away so as to be out of sight of the visitors, and that nothing was improper or faulty.

But, this is not the end of the story.

Many years back—I was informed by the squatters working and living in quarries near Delhi-Faridabad border—when there were persistent complaints made to the minister about the lack of community toilet facilities in that settlement, the minister decided to come over and take a look for himself. Suddenly, about a dozen of single-seat, make shift lavatory units (canvas wrapped around four bamboo-sticks fixed in the ground) went up in those barren, stony hills. These temporary lavatories were there for quite a few days after the minister had come and gone, but disappeared the day some officials in trucks showed up in the area and took away all the materials.

As I listened to the woes of the squatters there, I came across feelings of deep hatred against the FCA authorities. Even a basic requirement like clean, drinking water had not been met for the past 20-25 years, they said.

That is broadly the pattern of 'organization behaviour' that has evolved here over the years. The emphasis is on 'frills', last-minute attempts to cover up ugliness or to cast forward a 'show-piece' rather than on devoted work all the year round and provision of a genuine, clean environment for the slum-dwellers. That is the drill that is gone through (at times, with some variations) every time anybody like that visits Faridabad—from the State Headquarters, the Centre, or abroad. The anxiety is to present a rosy picture of what really may be unsightly or something not up to the mark. In the common man's language, here in the north, it would be called 'lippa poti'. And, once the visiting party is out of

town, the sudden outburst of energy flags, and the 'organisational behaviour' falls into the same old routine.

Besides, these visitors are always in a hurry, under pressure of time to visit another town or return to Delhi. So, they are easily persuaded to believe whatever they see or are shown—in photographs or on the ground (in the form of made-up, cosmetic 'reality').

'Cultural' Interface Between FCA and Squatters

An all-too-obvious truth that spills over from the above two stories is that there is a conflict problem at the interface between the FCA organizational hierarchy and the squatters. Certain cultural assumptions about the squatters ('parasites', 'criminals') in general, are fairly common in the local government bureaucracies in India; the FCA is no exception. When these stereotypes are carried over to the interface between the two, they often produce apathy towards squatters and their problems. Such indifference, naturally, influences official policies and practices, with the result that the local bureaucracies tend to become insensitive to the misery and sufferings of the squatters.

Perhaps it is this conflict-problem at the cultural interface between the two that has been a contributory factor in creating the duality of the character of Faridabad town: the 'Better-off' 'Faridabad', and the 'Poor' Faridabad' (page 190-92).

Decision-Making

Despite the FCA Act (1971) providing for delegation of powers by the Chief Administrator to his immediate subordinates (departmental heads), and more than 10 years of the FCA's history and experience, the net result here is that of the decision-making powers remaining 'centralised'—in terms of both the broad policy matters as well as day-to-day management. To take an example of the latter, FCA rules forbid any houseowner from carrying out any alterations in his residence without the approval of the local authorities. Even if the rules in this context are clearly laid down and the Senior Town Planner (or for that matter the Divisional Town Planner below him) can take action at his own level in behalf

of the Chief Administrator, but the FCA climate demands that the case must be put up to the Chief Administrator.

Likewise, there is no hint of any delegation of powers within the departmental hierarchies. A casual leave application from a lower-level employee, for instance, must be seen and sanctioned by the Departmental Head. He must personally exercise this power; such is the temptation with respect to the decision-making power within the FCA.

Perhaps a primary reason for this way of life within the FCA is that the Faridabad Complex is a compact area and most of the heads of the Units are located at the Central office itself and, therefore, no need has been felt for 'decentralization'.

Hierarchy, authority machine-like image of organization behaviour, job security, and stress on rules and procedures (all the attributes of a generally-bureaucratized order)—are considered positive virtues in the administrative set-up here. It is not surprising, therefore, that such bureaucratic form of the machinery becomes a hindrance when administration of certain tasks (like housing projects) demands a flexibility of structure and dispersion of authority and responsibility. Enquiries have also shown that such an environment often frustrates the morale of some of the professionally motivated officials in the FCA whose commitments centre around 'organizational effectiveness' and 'time-bound' achievement of project-goals.

Traditional Approach

The FCA is also untouched by the concepts/techniques of modern administrative management. Besides, the jobs (particularly below the Departmental-head level) are so narrowly defined and supervision is so close that initiative and motivation yet killed.

SLUM-SCAPE IN FARIDABAD: FCA'S COMMITMENTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

BACKGROUND

The history of squatter settlements in Faridabad essentially goes back to the 1960s. The Master Plan for the New Industrial Town (NIT), prepared by the CPWD provided for large industrial areas to give a strong economic base to the town. But this all-encompassing Plan was not backed up with any serious implementation. There was too much emphasis on attraction of industrial investment. Though a part of it spilled over into the adjacent areas of Old Faridabad and Ballabhgarh, the major recipient of these investments was, however, the NIT itself. Despite the Master Plan, jobs and housing were not linked. Although the concept of building houses near jobs is today considered to be an integral part of modern approach to urban planning, but none of the governmental agencies then operating in the area paid much attention to it. Population was going up all the time. House construction, on the contrary, was less, leaving behind a serious backlog every succeeding year. For examples, on an average, the population of the NIT area increased by 26,500 person p.a., but the house-building record was only about 3,000, p.a. The priorities and practices of the Ministry of Rehabilitation, (the agency which owned most of the public lands), the Urban Estate Department (predecessor of the HUDA), the three municipalities were different and not in tune with the total situation. The municipalities owned neither land nor had money. The Urban Estate Department largely catered to the needs of upper and middle classes through its sale of developed plots. The Ministry of Rehabilitation had earlier built five neighbourhoods for the refugee settlers; later on, it either, indulged in making quick

money through auction of land or encouraged public squatting by the houseless through its absentee-landlordism. The end-result was that the town was trapped in the straight jacket of haphazard growth and a large homeless population, bulk of which belonged to the poor migrant class. All those long years there was no blueprint for the housing of these industrial workers and other weaker sections of the local population. No attempt was either made to collect authentic information about the size of squatting population. As time went by, slum/squatter proliferation continued unabated. A former chief administrator of the Faridabad Complex Administration traces the development of this situation in Faridabad to the lack of concern for housing on the part of the authorities. In a booklet, brought out by the FCA in 1980, he noted:

... no positive steps to provide for housing the industrial workers had been taken other than the normal residential development in the NIT and the Urban Estate sectors. The absence of these positive steps for the industrial workers, tempted the low-paid industrial employees towards public squatting.

The appearance of HUDA in 1977 did not help matters, either. Its policy of sale of plots largely suited the affluent sections—as it normally would, in a society in which wealth stands distributed inequitably. The resultant housing situation, thus, got bogged down by the 'profit motive' because those who owned the plots were not the ones who needed them. The consequence was that 'in spite of a large number of property transactions, . . . the demand for houses for the lower-income group remained unfulfilled to an alarming extent'.

Anti-Slum Phase: Getting Information

The FCA took office in January, 1972. It seems that like its predecessors, the FCA, too, lacked the necessary orientation to think or concern itself seriously with the squatter's problems during the first eight years of its operation. Those

in higher echelon, at the State Headquarters also failed to take notice of the conditions in which the part of the town's population lived. Since there was little support from above, the FCA did not assume responsibility for the squatters problem. By that time, however, the NIT zone was humming with industrial activity. Though a large number of industrial units dotted the other two zones as well (Old Faridabad and Ballabhgarh), it was the NIT that was, in particular, threatened with the spread of squatters slums simply because more workers were employed in this zone and were, apparently, only too anxious to set up new slum pockets closer to their work-places. Not that the NIT authorities had any immediate programme for their prevention (clearance or rehabilitation), but in order to determine the extent to which the evil was spreading, they carried out piecemeal, strictly local surveys of these pockets during the years 1972, 1973 and 1975. The surveys pointed out the following facts:

1. There were only ten squatter slums in the NIT zone until 1975 (as against 36 in 1980—see p. 105);
2. 'Jhuggis' in the Bata Chowk first appeared in 1960. The greatest pressure on public lands in the NIT took shape during 1965-68;
3. The 'working population' was 33.87 per cent of the total. About 88.21 per cent of the households had only learning member, 10.10 per cent had 2, and 1.69 per cent had three or more earners;
4. As for the income-distribution, 65.9 per cent had an income less than Rs. 200 p.m., 27.2 per cent between Rs. 200-300, and 6.94 per cent more than Rs. 300 p.m.;
5. Of the earning members of households, about 44.4 per cent were factory workers, 24.85 per cent were rickshaw pullers/labourers, 10.47 per cent technical hands, 6.17 per cent shopkeepers, and about 8.60 per cent serving in Government/local body.
6. About 84.36 per cent tenements had only one-room accommodation, 15.08 per cent 2-rooms, and only 0.56 per cent had 3 or 4 rooms accommodation.

It was only in the second half of the year 1980 that the FCA authorities began 'recognizing' the squatters problems in a serious manner when it decided to undertake a major socio-economic survey of the squatters' population in the *entire* FCA area. The survey was launched in the month of April and completed in October 1980. Though it did not stir the authorities into any radical action on the squatters front, it however accomplished several other advantages: (a) it brought about a greater awareness amongst the concerned officials, both within the FCA as well as at the Headquarters level, (b) generated a better understanding of the existing realities of the situation, and (c) stimulated an increased FCA's willingness to prod the State Government to grant funds for slum improvement.

A Grim Situation

For the first time, the authorities discovered and comprehended the magnitude and seriousness of the slum problem in the town when it came face to face with the situation that the Complex area stood littered with as many as 62 squatter slums. These clusters had a population of 70,430 persons or, in other words, almost one-third of the total population of the town. The total number of families living in these clusters was 18,934. The Survey also revealed that out of 18,934 families, 10,304 belonged to the 'economically-weaker section' and 5,990 to a category below what is generally known as the LIG. Only 2,640 families were found to have an income level of Rs. 600 and above. Some of the other revealing bits of information the Survey threw up were: Of the 10,304 EWS families, 8,472 were staying in purely 'kutcha' structures, 1,461 in semi-pucca structures and only 371 families were living in 'pucca' structures.

A synoptic view of the broad findings of the Survey are presented in Table 1.

Close-ups of Two Squatter-Slums

The 62 squatter-slums in Fridabad have now been 'settled communities' for the past 20-25 years—overcrowded, poor amenities and gradually deteriorating environment. Some of these slums are located in or near the inner parts of the three

TABLE 1 BROAD FINDINGS OF 1980 SURVEY

Zone	Number of Clusters	Total Population	No. of Jhuggis	No. of Families	No. of EWS (Families)
1. NIT	36	50,896	13,073	12,666	6,634
2. Old Faridabad	15	7,375	2,665	2,493	1,571
3. Ballabgarh	11	12,159	4,136	3,775	2,099
TOTAL	62	70,430	19,874	18,934	10,304

zones where industrial/commercial activities are more marked, others are located on the peripheries. Let us describe a couple of them. 'Neelum-Bata Slum', apparently, commands our attention first, because it is amongst the oldest, and the largest.

NEELUM-BATA SQUATTER SLUM

The settlement derives its name from two important landmarks in the NIT zone—a cinema house called 'Neelam' and the 'Bata' shoe factory. The slum is situated on a stretch of land that lies in between these two commercial undertakings. It measures about 40 acres. The first squatter families are reported to have dug in here in early sixties. Located at a very central place in this zone and standing cheek by jowl to large, posh houses/business establishments, it is an area of high land value today (Rs. 1250 per sq. yard approximately).

If one wishes to take a 'bird eye view' of this squatter slum in Faridabad, one may climb up the Neelum Chowk flyover from the Chowk side by about 50 yards, lean over the parapet on the right and down there he would find himself staring at what stands documented in the official records of the FCA as 'Neelum-Bata Slum'.

The first glance from the flyover conveys an impression of mud-huts lining a 15-feet wide 'canal', stretching south-ward for about half a kilometer. But, if one were to see things at close quarters, it is necessary to climb down the flyover, enter the settlement and then traverse through it at a leisurely pace.

For example, what appeared to be a 'canal' from above is really a 'trench', full of black, stagnant water, utterly corrupted by almost 25 years of putrefying human and animal waste that has flowed into it. As a resident (I talked to) put it:

The water in the trench is so rotten that if you left a live fish in there, it would die in 10-15 minutes.

The sanitary officials of the FCA do visit yearly or half-yearly to disinfect the waters with some chemicals but no sooner the chemicals are poured into the trench than they are absorbed by the mud itself. A total menace to public health.

the trench is a permanent hotbed for germination and dissemination of disease in the slum.

A very large number of families live right on the either side of this one-km long trench, thus, facing it all the time and inhaling the nauseating smell that at times emanates from it. 'The smell is so horrible sometimes that one can't even eat one's food', one of the women complained to me. Many of these huts/shacks are earth-floored. Their inside is dark, despite the bright sunlight outside. Some have their own wood or tarpaulin-enclosed, small toilets or baths built at a level higher than that of the water in the trench. But, when rains come during July and August, and the water-level inside the trench rises, there is a difference of only a few inches between the floors of the huts and the trench water. The ramshackle, wooden bridges over the trench that were built 20-25 years back get submerged, rendering the mobility of the inmates across the trench somewhat difficult and compelling them to wade through dirty water and carrying children on shoulders.

Almost every variety of squalor-jumbles of leaning-out thatched/mud-walled huts or dilapidated fronts of semi-pucca rooms, piles of garbage with pigs rummaging through, listless and dull-eyed, semi-naked children performing their ablutions—can be seen in the vicinity of the trench, as one walks through the narrow beaten path on the left bank of the trench (a very attractive villa like building closely stands desecrated in the midst of such squalor).

The settlement is made up of two 'parts' and two special features can be said to differentiate one from the other: first, the humble self-built dwellings on the left of the trench stand on land that delongs to the Ministry of Railways and, apart from bound by a railway line running very close, are built almost in a straight line from the Neelum to Bata-end of the slum. Second, the dwellings on the right are situated (at least until recently they were) on land owned by the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation, exist in a much greater assemblage than those the left and are interrupted every now and then, by large pucca houses with 2-3-4 rooms and open backyards.

Running through the two parts are two short (not full length)

eight-foot wide paved streets, laid only two years ago. The one on the right also ramifies into small narrow lanes at certain points in this part of the settlement, largely because it is more physically spread and densely populated. This part of the slum also boasts of street light—a facility that the other part lacks.

The part on the right side is different in many other ways: for example, it is in this region that one finds concentration of most of the facilities, like schools of sorts for children (mostly privately-run), doctors (even if most are quacks), and FCA—provided stand-posts-handpumps-lavatories, etc.

Though life for the inmates living in both the parts has never been good and is certainly not getting better, in terms of the facilities provided by the FCA it would be instructive to look at what they—as per the claims made by the FCA—received from the local authority during the past few years are given in Table 2.

Interviews with the residents, however, revealed that the picture of facilities provided by the local authority is not as bright, as shown by the statistic (Table 2). As one of them expressed it:

The handpumps are often out of order. If you wait for official action, it may not come for a long time. So, the residents pool money and get them repaired. But, that does not happen all the time. It all depends upon initiative shown by one of us.

As for the latrines, the number of seats is so small as compared to the users that in the morning there are long queues of people outside every block. Many turn away to go to the fields across the railway line. Inside the stench is so overpowering that it is almost impossible to sit there. The drains are choked and the human waste can often be seen flowing into mud channels out in the street. One latrine-block, constructed a year back, has not been thrown open yet.

As for the standposts, they do not cheer up any one here, either. In fact, in summer when the supply of water in the entire town is a serious problem, it becomes worse for us here. No one knows when the water would start trickling

TABLE 2 FACILITIES PROVIDED BY FCA
IN NEELUM-BATA SLUM

Sl. No.	Name of Block	No. of Jhuggies	No. of Stand-posts	No. of Hand-pumps
<i>Jhuggies on 'Neelum' Side</i>				
1.	Over-bridge to Slaughter-House	215	2	3
2.	Slaughter-House to Mosque	175	3	1
3.	Block—B	160	4	1
4.	Block—C	165	3	1
5.	Block—D	148	3	1
6.	Block—E	150	4	1
7.	Block—F	160	3	—
8.	Block—G	230	2	2
9.	Block—H	215	2	3
10.	Block—J	170	1	4
11.	Block—K	190	2	3
<i>Jhuggies in-between Trench and Railway Line</i>				
12.	Block—Q	188	3	—
13.	Block—R	190	6	—
14.	Block—S	160	2	—
15.	Block—T	155	3	—
16.	Block—U	165	3	—
17.	Block—V	170	2	1
		3,006	48	21

down the pipe. My wife (or myself) is up at 4 a.m. (like many others) to line up our utensils at the stand pipe and return to the hut to do other chores. On many days, we have to go to work without food because there is no water to cook it. Of course, a bath in the morning becomes a luxury to be enjoyed once a while. On days when the water supply is normal for an hour or so, the needs of all the families cannot be met, so there are quarrels, even fisticuffs.

For medical care, it is the quacks operating inside the slum who play a predominant role. The competent but greedy private doctor outside is too expensive for the low income fami-


lies. The industrially-employed workers, of course, visit the ESI dispensaries but find it difficult to buy the costly medicines or nutritive tonics prescribed by the doctor there; at times, some of the medicines said to be out of stock have also to be bought at one's own expense. The most common disease amongst the children in this slum is diarrhoea.

The current status of educational facilities for children in the slum also suffers from several handicaps. Most of the schools are run on profit basis and are one/two rooms buildings. The children sit on the dust-floors. The rooms have often no ventilators/windows, and therefore, receive the sunlight through the small entry-door itself. In the rainy season when the streets outside becomes slushy, the children, the goats, the pigs—all can be seen wallowing through this slush. In one school, I found only one teacher for three classes. The inside looked congested and ugly. Many children looked anaemic. When the sun in summer is unforgiving, there is no fan for them. A large number of children in the slum do not go to these schools because of the high cost of educational materials—some parents told me.


The settlement is divided into several 'blocks' by the local authority. Many of these blocks are still unpaved and without drains. There are deep ruts and holes in these areas in which water constantly stagnates, making the dirt-passages impassable for months together because of the spread and depth of the mud.

The poverty and living conditions of the poorest in the slum appears to be extreme. Their huts—typical of such huts in other squatter slums—are made of scrap material, and patched on the top and the sides with black, cheap shower-proof sack cloth. Stepping into them from outside, one has to blink the eyes to enable them to adjust to the dim light inside. The sight of a sick member of the family lying in the corner is not uncommon. The burning kerosene stove in another corner makes it so stuffy inside. Many of them have dug shallow pits right at the doorstep for the kitchen water to flow-in. These are connected to the foul-smelling and mosquito ridden mud-channels in the street; step over one of these channels and suddenly a cloud of mosquitoes hits you in the eyes.

At the other end of this spectrum, however, a number of



Garbage and the trench with unsavory black waste water in the Neelum-Bata slum



Badly-neglected "C-2" slum

pucca, large houses dot the 'bigger' portion of this slum. Structurally good to look at, but their environment is as dirty as that of the huts of the poorest: the same garbage and exposed excreta outside, and the same smell of urine. 'If economically he was better-off today, why did he still prefer to live in the slum,' I asked one of these inhabitants. His reply was:

Because the land prices in the town are so high today that I cannot think of buying even one-forth of the space I occupy here. I was lucky to arrive here earlier than others when pressure on land was not so intense. I built this house in bits through my savings spread over many years. My income and savings were never so good as to enable me to invest both in 'land' and 'house construction', at the same time. Here, I spent nothing on land. The Government has been regularising other unauthorized colonies. I hope one day they will regularize this place too.

In this part of the slum a good number of TV antennas can also be seen piercing the sky.

'C-2' SQUATTER SLUM

This squatment, too, came up to provide—as in the case of other settlements in Faridabad—temporary housing for some of the immigrants who moved into the town when the NIT was taking shape. Thus, what began as a 'temporary' abode for these squatters, some 20 years back, is still serving its original purpose—the only difference being: the second generation has grown up and the density is much greater now than it was earlier.

Though in terms of physical complexion it looks like any other typical slum, but compared to Neelum-Bata it is much smaller (385 families, cramped in an area of about 6.48 acres). The passages in-between the closely-built mud-huts are much narrower than the ones I saw in Neelum-Bata. They are also windy, and totally unpaved and undrained. When I visited it, I found the passages overflowing with mud (it had rained the previous day), and walking through them was both slow and uncomfortable. It is also one of those few clusters in this

town which is littered with mud-huts and shacks made of low walls.

As for the civic amenities provided by the FCA, this seems to be one of the most neglected squatter-settlement in the town. Take for instance, 'sanitation'. The pigs, stray dogs can be seen roaming about and serving as scavengers of the decomposed or waste food-stuff thrown in the mud-passages. The problem of sanitation, however, is further exacerbated by the inadequacy of public latrines and the habit among children of shitting out in the open. There is only one block of these latrines (having 10 seats for a population of 1,806 people); and when I stepped in, I discovered the broken pots full of human waste. 'They are not kept clean by the municipal staff', I was told, 'because the lavatory block does not get any supply of water'. The floor and the inside walls were literally covered with flies. It was an ugly and annoying sight. 'No one seems to care for us', was the lament of a resident standing by. Asked how long he had been living in there, he said: 'Nearly 15 years'. Why did he come to Faridabad?

Back in the village, the small holding we had was not sufficient to support a family of three grown-up sons and two daughters. The income of the family was not enough to meet our essential needs and so we had to supplement it by recourse to wage labour in the surrounding villages. My eldest son was the first to migrate here. We, first, set up a shack in the area now called Sector 5. On learning that there could be some trouble later, we shifted to this place and have since been living here.

The primary school building is a drab and dreary structure. Through the open gateway (the school was closed for summer vacation) I walked in to take a close look at the classrooms. I could see that the door-handles had come off, one or two classrooms did not have any windows and those which had them, failed to close, the furniture was broken, blackboards were hardly 'black'. There was no guard or chowkidar to take care of the building, and so a group of teenagers were busy playing cards. A temporary scavenger, engaged for Rs. 50 per

month, paid only scant attention to his duties, I was told. The contours of the two maps of 'India' and the 'State of Haryana', drawn in colours on the walls, many years ago, were barely visible. 'In such an environment, the motivation of the teachers could not be high and their attitude towards their duties towards the children not positive'—I ventured to suggest to the few residents who by now had taken upon themselves the task to show me around. And, they almost confirmed it in unison:

It was definitely one of apathy and indifference. Their interest in teaching the children died long back.

Ironically, a faded inscription on the wall read: "This school: A storehouse of knowledge".

The school was also without electricity.

The settlement has been without a dispensary all these 20 years. 'So, when someone in the family falls ill—especially an elderly person—it is a total disaster for us', said one of the residents. He also added:

You have no idea of how people like us try to meet our medical expenditure out of our tight monthly budgets, based upon fixed wages.

This is one of the squatter-slums in the town that the FCA proposes to retain and provide with some elements of environment improvements. A detailed plan has also been drawn up. The FCA is looking for funds.

FCA'S COMMITMENTS TOWARDS SQUATTERS

By providing the FCA with certain important clues about the existing size of the squatters population in Faridabad, the Survey findings helped the Planning Unit to put the problem in the town in better perspective. A basic strategy for improving the living conditions of these people was also hammered out. A fundamental characteristic of this strategy was to find

appropriate solutions for each of the three segments of squatter population within the confines of its respective zone. The underlying idea was not to disturb the existing relationship between housing and place of work of each set of population. Such a step, it was felt, would be acceptable to the squatters as also keep within reasonable limits the responsibilities of each zonal administration to care for their civic needs. It was also felt that rehousing be undertaken only in cases where it was not possible to retain slum pockets at their existing sites because of certain constraints, such as, non-availability of trunk services.

Since the 'economically weaker' group was found to be more than 50 per cent of the total squatter population in the town, the FCA thought that four conditions were indispensable if 'positive housing' was to be provided to them:

- (i) Maximum utilisation of limited resources so that larger number of dwellings can be produced within the same unit-investment;
- (ii) Needs and constraints of settlements;
- (iii) Implementation to be consistent with technology best suited to the socio-economic needs of the slum-dwellers; and
- (vi) People's participation in solving their own housing problems.

As stated above, the basic thrust of the FCA policy was to avoid dislocation of squatter population from one zone to another, and so the FCA drew up its land-use and other plans accordingly. What type of attention and assistance the squatters and the three zones were to receive under these plans—a blueprint prepared by the authorities, presenting meaningful comparison of the three different scenarios is detailed below:

Old Faridabad

Of the fifteen squatter settlements identified in this zone the land under nine of them was found to be the property of the HUDA. Since this land stood zoned for certain other purposes by the HUDA under its own plans, the FCA decided to

involve the HUDA for the settlement of these squatter families in a way so as to ensure, as far as possible, compatibility with the original plans of the HUDA.

A different possibility was thought of to deal with the rehabilitation of 1,161 families (mostly quarry workers) living in the other four clusters. One of these was the largest and had 492 families. It was proposed that the families from the other three clusters be shifted and absorbed in that cluster. An area of 8.3 acres needed to house all these 1,161 families was available at site and it was suggested that developed plots of 35 sq. yards per family be provided to all the families in the three clusters on that site, duly supported by the necessary urban amenities. The plots were to be given to the families in accordance with the HUDCO scheme.

Of the remaining two clusters, one having 21 families was proposed to be retained at the same site (being on the FCA land). The other with 510 families, who had dug in the low-lying area behind Frick India factory, did not present much a problem; these families were proposed to be allotted developed plots (total requirement: 7 acres) out of 15.94 acres of FCA land closeby.

Ballabhgarh Zone

The FCA had 11 clusters and 3,775 families to wrestle with here. It proposed to correct the situation as follows:

Four clusters (Nos. 3, 4, 9 and 10) were earmarked for up-gradation at their existing sites. One thousand forty five families would profit from this scheme. As three of these clusters are located over the land notified by the HUDA, this scheme would have to be linked up with their proposals.

Of the remaining seven clusters, two small ones (25 families) have already been cleared by the HUDA. The other five (2,645—families) are located on the bank of canal or along the railway lines, etc. It was proposed to provide 2,172 families with developed plots of 35 sq. yard each with HUDCO financing and the land-need for the purpose was to be met out of the land available with the FCA near Bapu Nagar. The commitment suggested for 388 families in these clusters was in the form of 50 sq. yards developed-plots in the HUDA sectors.

NIT Zone

This zone had the largest concentration of squatter settlements: 36, with a staggering population of 50,896. Ten clusters were earmarked for upgradation at the same sites. Twelve (comparatively smaller in size) happened to be located over such areas which were set aside for parks as per earlier plans. Moreover, these areas were not close to the network of urban amenities in the town. It was, therefore, decided to move at least 1,159 families to planned, built-up houses in the NIT zone itself or to be planned in future.

Of the remaining 14 clusters, ten stood on land owned by the Central Ministry of Rehabilitation whose absentee landlordism on a large scale, as narrated elsewhere in this report, had been the main contributory factor for attracting public squatting in the NIT. Two clusters were located over the land owned by the Central Ministry of Works & Housing (now Ministry of Urban Development). Because of this factor and non-availability of urban services in close proximity to the sites, the logic of the situation demanded that the families in these clusters be also given developed plots in the area towards the west of the locality called NH—2.

Implementation

The problem of squatter settlements in the Faridabad Complex areas (as shown above) was widespread. In substance, the FCA strategy was aimed at doing three things: Upgradation on site, developed plots, and positive housing, as follows:

<i>Upgradation (Families)</i>	<i>Developed Plots (Families)</i>	<i>Positive Housing (Families)</i>
8,349	8,067	1,159

The 'up-gradation' scheme for 8,349 families spread in 16 clusters in the three zones was proposed to be tied in with the HUDCO terms of financing; as per these terms 50 per cent of the cost of providing urban amenities to the slum dwellers is met at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per beneficiary. While this amount together with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum shall have to be recovered from the

beneficiary over a period of 10 years, it was felt, however, that the State Government would also be requested to provide additional financing (about Rs. 83.49 lakh) to make up for the other half of the total upgradation costs.

HUDCO was expected to do its share in the other two efforts as well. For example, HUDCO terms provided 100 per cent assistance for 'developed plots' (not exceeding Rs. 5,000 per dwelling unit). As the number of families involved were only 8,067, it was estimated that a loan from HUDCO would see FCA through and there shall be no need to ask for any financial assistance from the State Government. Again to obtain 'positive housing' for 1,159 families—it was felt a sum of Rs. 9,700 per dwelling unit (against an actual cost of Rs. 12,000) can be made available by HUDCO, but the State Government shall have to come to the rescue of the FCA by giving a soft loan of Rs. 26.65 lakh to meet the total expenditure.

The FCA set up physical targets as well in order to accomplish the above-said goals, and, both the 'positive housing' and the 'upgradation' schemes were expected to be completed by the middle of 1984. Though it anticipated some problem with respect to the third step, namely, allotment of 'developed plots' it was however quite hopeful that it should be possible to meet the requirements of most of the families by the same dead-line.

To make living in 'Neelum-Bata slum' better, the FCA also chalked out plans to remodel the 5,115 feet long open trench there that had made the life of the people truly wretched. The proposal was to give the drain a concrete floor in order to ensure proper drainage and to grow plantations all along its run through the slum. The project was expected to cost Rs. 20 lakh.

But, that was during the year 1981-82. There is no doubt that the FCA showed both sincerity and imagination in producing the plans it did for the squatters in Faridabad Complex area. Later, it also displayed considerable vitality in putting into effect at least a part of its plans when it sought financial aid (loan) from the HUDCO to construct, 1,624 EWS housing units in the area called Saran village (see the following Section 'FCA's Achievements'). But, all of its aspirations in

this regard have not been fulfilled. Thus, in a communication No. FCA/STP/85/2374 dated July 15, 1985, addressed to the Local Government Department at the State Headquarters, it spelt out the details of the principal jobs with regard to the squatter problems at Faridabad, and the financial assistance it would require to complete them:

Out of total population of about 4 lakh (3,25,992 in 1981) roughly 1.5 lakh of population is living in various slums spread over the entire Complex area, on government as well as private lands. Out of this population, about 42,000 persons living in objectionable slums, *i.e.*, those located on the designated parks, on land along railways line and those along Gurgaon Canal, have been proposed to be rehabilitated under site-and-services scheme. The balance slum population is proposed to be accommodated on their existing places by way of improvements in their living environment. For rehabilitation of a population of about 42,000 persons through site-and-services scheme, the requirement of land is 115 acres in NIT area, 20 acres in Old Faridabad area, and 60 acres in Ballabhgarh area. In order to acquire and develop the above 195 acres of land, this Administration shall require a total sum of Rs. 4,75,00,000 (Rs. 2,92,50,000 plus Rs. 1,82,50,000) as grant-in-aid from the Government. In addition to this site-and-service scheme, a loan amount of Rs. 4,22,75,000 at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per plot shall be obtained from the HUDCO. The improvement of living conditions for the balance population on the formula of grant-in-aid at the rate Rs. 25 per person should require nearly 2 crore of rupees. Thus on a conservative estimate the improvement of total slum population shall require a financial outlay of approximately Rs. 9 crore.

Keeping in view the magnitude of slum problems at Faridabad, the Government is requested to approve the following policies in principle so that action could be initiated in the right earnest:

1. Ownership rights to the slum-dwellers recommended to be retained by the Administration on the

- same sites;
2. Rehabilitation of slum-dwellers on the basis of re-layout plan of the area on scientific basis with mutual cooperation of slum-dwellers;
 3. Loan assistance for construction of shelters by the slum-dwellers on self-help basis;
 4. Provision of 3 crore of rupees for acquisition and development of land under the site-and-services programme for settlement of objectionable slums;
 5. Provision of 2 crore of rupees as grant-in-aid for environmental improvement of those slums which are to be retained on the existing sites;
 6. Arrangement of adequate funds for augmentation of water supply, improvement in sewerage system with effluent treatment plant so that these amenities could be extended to the slum areas; and,
 7. Matching contribution for initiating feasible Urban Community Development programme/schemes in slum areas or otherwise.

Meanwhile, the slum population and the number of squatter-settlements in the town are heading for increases, as usual. For instance, as per the Planning officials, two additional settlements have appeared in the Complex area ever since they conducted their town-wide survey in 1980-81.

FCA: THE ACHIEVEMENTS

We now turn our attention to the FCA's accomplishments in this field. With all the limitations—financial, organizational, motivational, and so on—the FCA can, with justifiable pride, claim credit for filling up at least some 'gaps' in the living conditions of the squatters in Faridabad. These achievements fall into two parts:

1. Environmental improvements in squatter-settlements; and
2. EWS Housing.

While in the former case, the FCA was able to act only because of the financial support it received under the aegis of the '20-Point Programme', it must be stated that as regards the latter—i.e., 'EWS housing'—the initiative was solely its own and it did succeed, sooner or later, in constructing as many as 1,624 dwelling units for re-housing a small section of squatters, and carried out this plan with a minimum of inconvenience or discomfort to them.

Environmental Improvement

We, first, note the 'environmental improvements' brought about by the FCA in 36 squatter settlements during the past ten years or so.

<i>Name of Settlement</i>	<i>Population</i>
(a) <i>Settlements with five amenities</i> (brick-paving, hand pumps, street light, drains, and community toilet blocks)	
1. Neelum Bata	10,839
2. Shastri Colony Jhuggies	471
(b) <i>Settlements with 'four' amenities</i> (brick-paving, hand pumps, street-light, and drains)	
3. Indira Nagar Jhuggies	2,565
(c) <i>Settlements with 'three' amenities</i> (brick-paving, hand pumps and street-light or drains)	
4. Jhuggis near Mill-hard Co.	1,552
5. Press Colony Jhuggies	682
6. Auto-Pin Jhuggies	2,824
7. Adarsh Nagar Jhuggies	4,793
8. Jhuggis in Central Green	389
9. Bhagat Singh Colony along.	674
(d) <i>Settlements with 'two' amenities</i> (brick-paving, and hand pumps or toilets)	
10. Jhuggies in Market N.H.—I	632
11. Jhuggies near 'Samshan Ghat'	1,201
12. Nehru Colony Jhuggies along Outer Road N.H.—III	3,708

<i>Name of Settlement</i>	<i>Population</i>
13. Sant Nagar Jhuggies in front of Railway Station	2,982
14. Jhuggies behind Frick India	1,982
15. Jhuggies along road to Anangpal	427
16. Dayal Nagar Jhuggies	4,233
<i>(e) Settlements with only 'one' amenity (Hand Pumps or street-light)</i>	
17. Jhuggies behind Transport companies	2,206
18. Jhuggies between D.M. Road and Railway line	1,564
19. Jhuggies in 1-F Park	225
20. Jhuggies in Market NH—1	632
21. Jhuggies in 2-B Park	387
22. Jhuggies in 2-C Park	2,336
23. Jhuggies in 2-D Park	1,002
24. Rajiv Nagar Jhuggies behind Hitkari Potteries	1,323
25. Jhuggies along Railway line near Escorts Plant II	8,405
26. Nayak Nagar Jhuggies near Power House	1,218
27. Azad Colony Jhuggies near Good Year Factory	1,027
28. Shiv Sharda Colony Jhuggies opp. Railway Station, Ballabhgarh	4,148
29. Sanjay Colony Jhuggies opp. Elson Cotton Mill	182
30. Jhuggies near Milk Plant, Ballabhgarh	79
31. Jhuggies in Sector 24	190
32. Jhuggies along Gurgaon Canal Sector 24	899
33. Jhuggies in Sector 20 along Badkal Road	325
34. Jhuggies along road dividing Sectors 19 and 28	485
35. Jhuggies near Gurukul crossing North Pocket	1,107
36. Jhuggies Nahar Nagar, Gadha Khol	1,501

As of March 1986, the various 'environmental improvements in Faridabad squatter-slum', made possible by the

Central grants, are as follows:

1. Street Light points	153
2. Community toilets/Urinal blocks	14
3. Water Supply	127 pumps/standposts.
4. Brick Paving	32,419 sq. meter
5. Drains	63,712 running sq. ft.

Housing for Squatters

One of the commitments that the FCA had made and put emphasis on in its plans was the provision of EWS houses for squatters in the NIT Zone. The idea was not only to lift these families out of their present degrading existence and restore them to better living conditions but also to get some of the occupied public parks vacated.

The FCA moved decisively towards this direction when in early 1981 it began negotiations with HUDCO for loan money for investing into a project which comprised three housing schemes:

Scheme No. 1648	512 Units
Scheme No. 1949	392 Units
Scheme No. 1966	736 Units

The FCA intended to borrow money to meet 80 per cent of the total costs and supply the remaining 20 per cent from its own budget and savings. The expected cost of each housing unit was to be Rs. 8,000 and allotments were to be made on the basis of Rs. 500 as down-payment at the time of registration, Rs. 3,500 at the time of possession, and the balance in monthly instalments of Rs. 50 spread over a period of 19 years.

But, it must be remembered at this stage that the FCA was the *first* and the *only* agency in the town to have a try at 'housing for squatters'. As already noted, other two public agencies, namely, the Haryana Housing Board and HUDA had also made efforts in this direction but none of these were, strictly speaking, aimed at 'housing the squatters'. For example, when HUDA invited applications for allotment of 50 and 100 sq. yds. plots (at the rate of Rs. 135 per

sq. yd.), its primary condition was the production of an affidavit testifying that the monthly income of the applicant was not more than Rs. 300. And, they went on allotting plots indiscriminately to whosoever brought in such an affidavit, without checking whether the applicant genuinely belonged to the category of 'economically weaker section' of the society or was an ill-housed squatter on HUDA lands.

The first instalment of HUDCO money arrived in September 1981 and the work on Scheme nos. 1648 and 1649 (512 and 392 units respectively) started in April/May, 1982. Scheme no. 1966 (736 units) took off a year later, *i.e.*, August 1983. Target dates for the completion of the schemes were also fixed and it was planned to erect these houses within a year's period from the time work began on them.

However, the work on the first two schemes had barely gone on for a couple of months when the contractors withdrew their labour from the scene for reasons of non-availability of cement and other building materials. This sudden shortage was caused by a generous amount of these materials directed to the Asian Games Stadium, being built in New Delhi at that time. The unhappy situation led to a dispute between the contractors and the FCA about the contractual obligations. The basic fear was rising costs while the work was at a standstill. The terms of the agreement provided for a referral to an arbiter in the event of a dispute. It took quite some time to find an arbiter and another few months for him to adjudicate. The judgment which tipped the scales in favour of the contractor directed the FCA to pay him at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per dwelling unit. The construction was eventually resumed but continued in a slow and erratic manner. The houses were ready for occupation in September 1985. As for the units under Scheme no. 1966, these were completed by March, 1985.

The worry that troubled the FCA authorities now was: who would pay the 'difference': the HUDCO, the allottees, or the FCA itself. It, first, took up the matter with HUDCO which had, *vide* its circular letter dated July 1, 1982, also started sanctioning new housing loans at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per unit. But, the HUDCO turned down this request by saying:

that it did not—as a matter of policy—finance ‘over-runs’ arising out of past agreements and that these would have to be met by the implementing agency from its own resources.

In the meantime, the FCA circulated information amongst squatters in the NIT Zone about the availability of houses and the terms on which these would be offered. Nearly 4,000 applications were received, but not all were ‘squatters’.


Uncertainty engulfed the allotment process for a year because the FCA was not surefooted on the question of ‘over-run’ of Rs. 4,000 per dwelling unit. Many applicants had, by then, asked for refund of their deposit amounts.

The FCA’s quest for a solution ended only in August 1986 when the then Haryana State Minister for Local Government (who also represented the Faridabad constituency as MLA) used his power and influence to persuade 500 squatters families in Parks 1-A and 1-B in the NIT zone to move into the newly-built EWS houses and the squatters lent him a sympathetic ear. These families—a mix of the well-off squatter and the poor—have since occupied their new houses and the two parks cleared of squatting, without the usual slipshod method of using the police force.


The ‘old order’ is gone at least from two locations. It is certainly not a small achievement. Another 1,124 such families shall have to be persuaded to help FCA fill the rest of the dwelling units and also attain it a certain feeling of job satisfaction.

But, we got to bear in mind that, despite these marginal changes, a substantial number of squatters, fragmented in three zonal areas, still continue to suffer from lack of even basic amenities, let alone the hope of getting EWS houses in the near future. At least, as of today, there are no such houses or plots waiting for them, no drainage, no sewerage, no water supply, no schools, and no dispensaries.

Squatters—Still Waiting for Public Housing Projects



Some Other Slums—Living Conditions no Better



5

MAJOR CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR PROFILES

Many questions on the squatters' challenge in Faridabad Complex have been raised in the earlier chapters and a host of problems highlighted. There are three major aspects, however,—or 'three major constraints', one is tempted to say—on which enlightenment and facts are also needed. These have, from time to time, seriously weakened the FCA's will (and continues to do so even now) to deal with squatments within the framework of the national policy on this subject. The three constraints are:

1. Organizational capabilities of the FCA's Planning Unit that is responsible for slum clearance or environmental improvement in them, and rehabilitation of squatters;
2. Relevance or anachronism of laws available to deal with squatments; and,
3. FCA's financial power.

PLANNING UNIT

Historical Sketch

The FCA wing that is concerned with the physical order or shape of the Faridabad town—including squatter settlements—is the 'Planning Unit'. Set up after three years of the establishment of the FCA itself, its career, until now, spans roughly a decade and a half. In the formative years, its growth was rather piecemeal. For example, when it made its appearance in December 1974, it had only a lone planner, designated as Assistant Town Planner. A Superintendent (Office), recruited some two months earlier, was looking after the administrative work of the Unit. That was also a period

of rapid demographic change and new industries in the town.

The birth of the department took place only after the town had gone through painful experiences. For example, during the preceding 20 years of its growth, the town could not come to acquire the right type of administrative machinery. If between 1955 and 1960 the Government of India inspired 'Development Board' had the ownership of all the acquired land but no legal powers (or even the inclination) to check unplanned growth, between 1961 and 1970 the Notified Area Committee and its successor municipality in the NIT Zone (besides the two other neighbouring municipalities in Old-Faridabad and Ballabhgarh) had the necessary legal powers within their respective boundaries to enforce planning laws (however inadequate) but no land ownership to affect positive development of the town. The Urban Estate Department of the Punjab Government, of course, had made modest contribution in developing several residential and industrial sectors but the unmet needs of the town in terms of housing and other areas were piling up so fast that the situation continued to be critical. The inevitable result was that by the time the Planning Unit was beginning to find its feet, the town was already overwhelmed with burdensome problems. For example, squatter settlements in different parts of the three zones had not only become a fact of life but had also assumed serious proportions; zoning existed only on paper, for rows of residential blocks had been turned into factories or a mixture of the two; civic amenities were extremely poor, and infrastructural support was totally inadequate.

One of the first tasks the Unit was faced with was the formulation of a development plan for the NIT Zone (prepared under the guidance of a Senior Town Planner at the headquarters), for that is where planned land-use was facing its major threat. Its second most important pre-occupation those days was helping mould a policy towards unauthorized colonies that were mushrooming all over the town. It assisted a committee set up to look into this problem in April, 1975. The problems demanding its attention were, of course, in plenty but the Unit was severely handicapped—both professionally and numerically. Faced with the disturbing pro-

blem of ever-increasing unauthorized construction in the four neighbourhoods during the past several years, and to bring it in line with effective planning not only of the neighbourhoods but also of the entire town, the FCA sought the help of a professionally—equipped consulting firm based at Pondicherry. They were invited to look over the problem, make a preliminary survey and indicate the time and fees they would take. When the firm sent in their fee estimate amounting to Rs. 1,00,000 for the first phase, the authorities dithered and shelved the issue. That was in the year 1974.

In June, 1974, the FCA took its first step towards plugging that loophole in the Unit when it borrowed the services of a Senior Town Planner from the State Department of Town & Country Planning. The idea to have an official of that status was based upon considerations with regard to both the principle of hierarchy as well as the need to secure tested knowledge and experience in the field of urban planning. With his appointment, it was felt, the lines of authority and responsibility from the Chief Administrator of the FCA (who had the rank and powers of 'Director Town & Country Planning' at the Headquarters) would run smoothly to the base of the planning pyramid in accordance with the accepted principles of organization as well as strengthen the technical expertise in the Unit. Accordingly, he was named as Head of the Unit (it is necessary to remind the reader that all senior town planners here—four so far, including the present incumbent,—come and go and are not, as is the case with other staff members of the Unit, on the permanent pay-roll of the FCA). An architect, who was earlier functioning independently in the Complex Administration was also brought under the wings of this Unit (incidentally, the FCA is the only local body in Haryana which can boast of an architect).

In the meantime, new tensions and strains of urban problems gripped the Unit. One of them was provision of housing for the economically weaker sections. HUDCO had by then announced its scheme for such housing and the Unit sought, in behalf of the FCA, loans for construction of a few blocks in Old Faridabad, Sector 22, etc. The planning needs of Ballabgarh and Old Faridabad—the two old towns with their typical narrow street designs, coupled with the on-going

unauthorized construction—also came into sharp focus. The draft plans for these two administrative zones were prepared and published by the Unit.

Increasing burden of work compelled the Unit to seek enlargement of its strength. In a communication, dated January 16, 1975, the Chief Administrator, FCA, wrote to the Secretary, Local Self-government Department, requesting approval for appointment of additional staff and the necessary sanction of funds. The FCA submitted a detailed note on the role the Unit was required to play in an increasingly turbulent situation in the town and the staff strength it urgently needed to cope with it. The said Note emphasized that the degree of planning effectiveness in the town was very much dependent upon the manpower available with the Unit. The Note stressed its manpower needs as follows:

Senior Town Planner (1); Divisional Town Planner (1); Assistant Town Planners (2); Planning Assistants (2); Superintendent (1); Senior Draftsman (1); Assistant-Draftsmen (4); Junior Draftsmen (3); Tracers (3); Patwaris (2); Assistants (4); Clerks (8); Section Officer-cum-Building Inspectors (8); Senior scale Stenographer (1); Junior Stenographer (1); Stenotypists (3); peons (8); and Khalasi (4).

However, to the dismay of the FCA authorities, the State Department authorized, through its reply dated March 18, 1975, its sanction only for the following staff:

Senior Town Planner (1); Assistant Town Planners (2); Planning Assistants (2); Superintendent-Officer (1); Senior Draftsman (2); Assistant Draftsmen (4); Patwaris (2); and, Section Officer-cum Building Inspector (1).

The Department also allowed appointment of some additional clerical staff. But, the FCA's hopes to make the Planning Unit technically strong largely stood dashed.

The FCA took immediate steps to recruit one new Assistant Town Planner and two Planning Assistants because the most compelling worry of the Planning Unit then was the appalling mess created by the vendors who had put up wooden shacks all

along the major traffic arteries of the NIT Zone. The problem occupied the Unit's energies for some months to come. The vendors were provided alternative sites and, finally, moved on to them. But, the recently-recruited Assistant Town-Planner and two Planning Assistants did not stay on with the Unit for long and chose to leave for greener pastures elsewhere. Their departure plunged the Unit to its previous stage of disability once again, for it was the technical support of these three professionals which had enhanced, even though to a limited extent, the Unit's ability to handle tasks, such as, data collection for policy-making and production of development schemes on scientific lines.


The Unit struggled hard to maintain, somehow, a balance between the constantly-shifting and worsening urban problems of all kinds and the shrinking size of its staff. The most serious of these problems, of course, was change of 'land-use', *i.e.*, the conversion of residential plots to commercial use taking place in the town on a large scale. Hence, a very heavy price the Unit had to pay (till this day), because of its limited strength, is that it has totally failed to resist these pressures from retailers (groceries, drug, general stores, etc. and other business activities of a section of the town's population) who do not seem to have any understanding of or respect for planning laws. This tendency has virtually set at naught the whole concept of publically-planned five Neighbourhood Units in the NIT zone. In many instances, this has become a vicious circle, leading to evils like sky-rocketing values of property, generation of black money, and other illegal financial dealings/practices.

A year later when the situation got worse and the unauthorised construction was threatening in new forms all over the place, the authorities decided to invite a New Delhi specialist team to advise them not only on the 'immediate' problem but also related ones, including a master plan for the entire NIT area (roughly 327 acres). The consultants demanded a fee of Rs. 3,62,835. The efforts to achieve balanced development of the town, however, did not fructify, once again, for the amount was simply beyond the financial resources of the FCA and the State Government was not willing to help.

It is this struggle of the Planning Unit (to check the irreparable damage being done) that was reflected in its renewed effort to get the strength of the staff raised, from time to time.

In the year 1979-80, the organization chart of the Unit looked somewhat like this:

**SENIOR TOWN PLANNER'S UNIT -
ORGANISATION CHART**



From the chart above, it is apparent that the Unit was not even organized to deal with the day-to-day tasks expected of it, let alone important activities like long-range projects for a population of over four lakh.

No wonder, in 1980, when the State Department of Local Self-Government at Chandigarh asked the FCA to carry out a survey of the squatters settlements in the town, it was hard put to identify such staff who had even the minimum knowledge to undertake this job. As a consequence, even clerical staff employed in different units of the FCA—many of them barely educated up to matriculation standard—were also roped in for a specialized work of this kind.

An example of how cut off those at the headquarters seem to be from the harsh realities at Faridabad and their inability to realize the significance of the part played by the Planning unit is provided by a letter that landed at the desk of the Chief Administrator, FCA, in April 1980. The tenor of the letter suggested as if those at the headquarters questioned the very wisdom of having such a Unit at Faridabad at all. Indeed, there was a time when the Headquarters did not believe that there were squatter slums at Faridabad—incidentally, the bane of all industrial towns. The reaction of the staff in the Unit was one of distress and shock. For once, the letter put a heavy damper on whatever little zeal and motivation that had sustained a hard-pressed Unit all those years.

In its reasoned reply, the FCA authorities presented a detailed analysis of the existing staff strength (only 40 per cent of the actual requirement), the numerous measures adopted by the Unit for planned physical development of the town during previous two years. It also listed the job descriptions of the senior professional staff and their relevance to the various tasks of an orderly growth of the town in future. The reply also pleaded for an early sanction of two additional senior posts in the fields of planning to make the Unit sufficiently strong to meet its responsibilities in the years to come.

All along these years nothing much has changed. The two planning assistants who had left the Unit in 1977 have not been replaced. Eight years ago, the strength of the Unit stood at seven technical hands (seniors included). Today it stands at eleven.

Analysis

A planning unit of eleven people may be capable of adminis-

tering its responsibilities in an efficient manner in a municipal town of 30/50,000 people. But, when it is expected to take on the gigantic problems of a growing industrial town of about 4,00,000 people, it is certainly too small. The size of the planning unit in a town should always be directly related to its functions and responsibilities. The unit must be self-sufficient both in terms of numbers as well as specialised skills to deal with the special problems the town faces or is likely to experience in future.

Since efficient planning operations require that the strength of the staff in the unit is organised on the basis of its major functions, let us, first, take a look at its wide-ranging functions at Faridabad:

1. *General*

The inter-relation and coordination of different improvement and development programmes of the FCA including detailed planning/programming/monitoring and feedback to the Chief Administrator;

2. *Enforcement of certain Provisions of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Act, Road with Section 42 of the FCA Act:*

- (a) to deal with change of land-use cases, and
- (b) planning and enforcement work related to private colonies approved by the Government under Act No. 41 of 1963 and Act No. 8 of 1975;

3. *Perspective Planning*

- (a) long-range planning, and
- (b) preparation of remunerative schemes;

4. *Slum Clearance/Improvement/Rehabilitation*

Preparation of slums schemes of different types, securing approval from government for grant-in-aid and co-ordination among concerned departments of the FCA for their implementation; and

5. *Architectural Designing of the Projects*

While all the functions mentioned above are important for the Unit, but a function that concerns us here most is the one relating to "squatter-slum clearance/rehabilitation improvement". Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that this function is one of the major reasons for the very existence of the Unit, as handling slums in Faridabad is the legal duty of the FCA. It would, therefore, be appropriate to start our analysis of its own 'human resources' with respect to this function of the Unit.

The methodology for preparation of a slum clearance scheme, as spelt out in the 1961 Slum Act, envisages three basic steps. These are:

1. Collection of data and their interpretation,
2. Analysis, and
3. Plan proposal

That means, before an actual slum-clearance scheme is to be undertaken, a great deal of basic information has to be gathered and then analysed. While the type of information to be collected shall vary with the objective of the scheme, it is obvious that if it relates to, for example, clearance and rehabilitation of slum dwellers on the same site, the survey should be designed to obtain the following type of data; *Physical* (topography, floods, land-use street, transit, transportation facilities and their use, etc.); *Social* (population, its growth, composition, housing/rents, etc.); *Economic* (occupations, incomes, employment/unemployment, building costs, trade/business); and *Legal* (laws concerning land acquisition, planning and related laws, etc.)

One of the purposes of the survey is to determine the extent, intensity and location of slum conditions and income and other attributes of the families directly affected.

After assembly of data and its analysis, the Act obligates the Planning Unit to follow the following procedural steps (some of them undertaken simultaneously): Issue of notices to the individual owners of the structures in the slum under Section 7 (1) of the Act, (2) deal with the objections after they are received, (3) preparation of statement of objections, (4) selection of right project on the basis of analysis, (5) sub-

mission of the project scheme to State Government for approval, (6) issue of notices under Section 12 (1) for acquisition of land, (7) assessment of cost of structures to be acquired, and (8) preparation of rehabilitation scheme.

Project selection/scheme preparation, sometimes, raise very many practical problems. These problems can be both legal and economic, say, difficulties of land-assembly, or high costs of land acquisition/construction of structures, or even political.

The administration of all this important and time-consuming work apparently calls for a large body of staff and the availability of many specializations in the Planning Unit, *i.e.*, men with technical knowledge and experience in different aspects of the work involved. But, the Unit has only four draftsmen who cannot conduct research, analyze data or help prepare schemes. They are just like 'artists' who are trained only to produce drawings of physical maps. The Assistant Town Planner in the Unit is mostly tied down with implementation of various programmes undertaken by the Unit, from time to time. The Senior Town Planner has the overall responsibility of supervising the planning staff, advising the Chief Administrator on policy matters and representing FCA before outside organizations, besides the public. The Divisional Town Planner performs assigned tasks of an advanced nature, apart from acting as a facilitating link between the Senior Town Planner and the junior staff below. All of them are often overloaded with work. Besides, there is a small nucleus of clerical staff who, though not technically trained to handle 'planning' work, are also, at times, forced into it. The result in terms of both quantity and quality of output is anything but satisfactory.

To this bleak picture if we add factors like poor working conditions, absence of opportunities for advancement and the right motivational climate, it is absolutely futile to search into the existing Planning Unit a potential force capable of taking any steadfast action so far so the 62 squatter settlements in the town are concerned. It is also not difficult to comprehend why the FCA has shown little interest in 'squatter-slum clearance/rehabilitation' beyond the drafting and issue of a Gazette Notification in January, 1985.

The work of the Planning Unit can be made effective only when it is provided with sufficient trained staff, their tasks are well divided so as to pay specialized attention or different phases of planning in the town. For example, apart from persons with specialized training in areas like planning, engineering and architecture (which the FCA, fortunately already has), the Unit must have on its staff men trained in social sciences (economics, political science, sociology and statistical analysis as well who can help interpret the survey data and then come out with intelligent policy choices. The planning work would become more effective if it is also influenced by skills like 'network techniques', 'materials managements', etc.

Indeed, the value of additional and professionally-trained staff is obvious from yet another angle. The dreaded disease of unauthorized construction and colonies has struck the Faridabad Complex in a big way. There are as many as 25 unauthorized colonies in Ballabhgarh Zone alone. While regularization of such colonies in all towns and cities has been accepted as a part of the existing political realities in India, but—contrary to popular conception—'regularization' of an unauthorized colony is not merely an 'official fiat'. If pursued earnestly, it entails heavy responsibilities for the Planning Unit almost on the same lines as outlined above for a slum-clearance scheme. For instance, an unauthorized colony, too, may not have any open spaces, or there is considerable traffic congestion in a street or there is need for a vigorous enforcement of the building code. It may also be without a water supply/sewerage system. In order to bring such an unplanned colony within the unity of planning in the town for ever, it would be necessary for the Planning Unit to systematically go through the same three steps, namely, survey, analysis and scheme preparation. For reasons of paucity of staff, I was informed, the FCA has not been able to initiate even a single such scheme in Faridabad Complex so far.

Similarly, the formulation of, say, a 'rehabilitation scheme' for squatters or a 'site and services scheme' involves an enormous amount of work, again, by way of collection of data and furnishing, on that basis, constructive proposals for activating well-balanced programme for their future

settlement. This is possible, only if there is sufficient manpower within the unit and in addition, full and active support and cooperation among the various administrative, financial and engineering units of the FCA who must contribute, as a team, their total commitment to the overall results.

The Planning Unit is handicapped in yet another sense. Violation of planning rules in the town—some very subtle, and others quite serious—have been on the increase over the years and, as of today, have grown to substantial proportions. These violations are occurring in the three administrative zones, as well as into remote areas. The hitherto instrumentality, used by the FCA to deal with this menace, has been to engage a part-time local practising lawyer (he was hired and fired by the State Headquarters without ever consulting the local officials, and his appointment was often the result of political influences) who was supposed to handle all (not merely planning violations) legal matters involving the FCA, as a whole. He gave legal advice to the Chief Administrator, prepared legal papers and documents when a case was initiated by the FCA itself and represented the FCA in courts of law.

As soon as a suit was filed against the FCA and the court notice received by the Establishment Division, a copy was marked to the concerned FCA unit. The purpose was to afford an opportunity to the particular officials in that unit to carefully study the 'facts', as given by the complainant, and certify/refute them (whichever the case) together with their comments.

The approval of the Chief Administrator was required before the note was sent to the legal adviser for his information and legal advice/assistance. The detailed note enabled the legal adviser to get a first-hand 'feel' of the case and confer with/seek additional information from the FCA officials. He then prepared a suitable reply which was discussed with the Chief Administrator. Once it was cleared, the legal adviser proceeded to file it in the court of law.

A major flaw in this arrangement was the 'congestion', at times, caused by hundreds of such on-going suits every year—against the FCA or by the FCA against other parties—and the limitations of a part-time counsel trying to catch up with

the mass of work awaiting him (in addition to the litigation work he had picked up privately). Of course, it did not cause any crisis-situation so far, primarily because the arrangement had not been 'tested' in the real sense of the term—*i.e.*, when *all* the planning violations resulting from the increasing complexities of urban life in a rapidly growing town like Faridabad had been fully detected and then proceeded legally. There are stories afloat about one of these part-time counsels who, in collusion with the FCA staff, would strike 'working agreements' with the accused (say, in cases of unauthorized construction or public land-grab) to drop the matter or settle it on 'mutually profitable' term. Small wonder, as a result of these difficulties and abuses the whole 'legal' system in the FCA had become self-defeating.

It is apparent that this decades-old practice of hiring a part-time advocate was hardly a desirable arrangement. First, the appointment was not based upon merit but guided by pulls and pressures or likes/dislikes of the political powers that be at a given point of time. Hence, the appointment of a competent person did not always follow. Secondly, as laws of urban planning and development are highly technical subjects with which an average city lawyer does not have frequent contacts; therefore, at times, this disability meant unsatisfactory handling of such work. Thirdly, there were cases that dragged on for years and a part-time counsel was not able to devote the time and attention the cases called for. Much depended on his personal commitment and motivation. Luckily, the old system stands scrapped and the legal work is now handled by the Assistant District Attorney, attached to the State Department of law.

The Planning Unit has also not been able to discharge its responsibilities towards slums/squatter settlements because the FCA, like most local bodies and State departments in India is run on 'traditional' assumptions (Classical model) and is not designed (structurally) to handle problems that require swiftness and integration across multiple layers. Like other local bodies, the FCA, too has yet to awaken to the necessity of applying modern management methods to its administrative operations. An opportunity to try one of them came up

some time ago but it did not grab it. HUDCO, in collaboration with Hari Om Ashram, a Baroda-based voluntary organization, had devised a new tool in the form of a competition amongst urban bodies in the country the aim of which was to demonstrate, through planning and actual execution of live housing projects: (i) low cost techniques, such as, efficient functional planning, (ii) use of local materials, (iii) innovative construction methods, and (iv) economical land utilisation. The basic intention behind this competition was to stimulate the evolution of 'project management' within the existing administrative framework of an urban body that will, in turn become the model and centre of motivated expertise for 'International Year of Shelter for Homeless—1987'.

Here was a challenge that the FCA could have taken up. But, as the work would have involved more than one unit of the FCA and the "team spirit" which is basic to the success of a such a challenge, does not exist, the FCA gave it up without having a go at it. Even if the FCA chose to ignore it, I feel that an actual demonstration, as a simulation exercise—would have shown what were the built-in handicaps in the administrative machine, if any, and also prepared the organization to reach such goals faster in future. A trial-run (say, a round-table discussion amongst the concerned units/officials) would have put the necessary punch into the FCA's organizational framework.

The quantum and scope of work of the Senior Town Planner's unit in the years to come is certain to expand at a rate greater than it has over the past ten years or so, particularly when it assumes its new responsibilities in connection with the NCR projects. But, this would be possible only with the availability of sufficient number of trained planning personnel. Rightnow, however, as stated above, it is too small even for its existing load of work. In fact, when compared to the staff strength of technical staff attached to the office of a typical District Town Planner (DTP) in the State Department of Town & Country Planning, the Planning Unit of the FCA appears to be still in its infancy. The Table on next page reveals this imbalance.

TABLE TECHNICAL STAFF STRENGTH—A COMPARISON

<i>Rank</i>	<i>STP's Unit (FCA)</i>	<i>Typical DTP's Unit (State Department)</i>	<i>Differ- ence</i>
1. Asstt. Town Planner	1	3	2
2. Planning Assistant	—	2	2
3. Senior Draftsman	—	1	1
4. Junior Draftsman	1	3	2
5. Asstt. Draftsman	4	6	2
6. Tracer	1	2	1
7. Surveyor	2	6	4
8. Field Investigator	—	3	3


Needless to say, comprehensive planning of the town now or in the future will not be possible until well-balanced staff and adequate budgets to support them are provided.

Before we conclude our consideration of the planning unit, it may also be worthwhile to add that if 'human resource' within the FCA itself is to be groomed in order to develop the larger human resource in the town, including the squatters and their problems, in a socialist style (befitting a socialist country like India), reorientation of yet another kind would be necessary. For, the outcome of my interviews with the heads of the various units at the FCA convinced me that many of them appeared to view a typical squatter as a 'nuisance', and also tended to regard his low standing in the social hierarchy as a 'personal failure' in life. I also discovered that while they were willing to accept the indispensability of the services these people (rickshaw-pullers, domestic servants, construction workers, hawkers, etc.) rendered to the economy of the town, but were not inclined to have their living places anywhere close to their own living quarters. Poverty was seen with a certain sense of fatalism, and not as the result of man-made, unjust distribution of wealth in the society.

Clearly the officials need to be exposed to a scientific analysis of poverty as a 'social' ill. They need to be told to adopt a 'total' or systems approach' not only to understand the problem of poverty but also the 'culture of poverty' as a result of which slum-dwellers, willy nilly, pick up certain un-

desirable habits. A circular diagram I saw in the office-room of the Senior Town Planner at Faridabad graphically portrayed the problem from the Systems' angle which, essentially, advocates, first, a holistic view of the problem and then of the parts it is made up of and their inter-connectedness. This 'inter-connectedness' clearly stands out in the diagrams¹ as reproduced below; it shows how one step naturally leads to the other, trapping the poor into a vicious circle out of which there is no easy escape for them.

VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SLUM PROBLEM AND THEIR
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY REPERCUSSIONS



DIAGRAM

NOTE: Center to first circle shows the problem, second circle the various basic aspects of the problem, third circle the primary-repercussions and fourth circle the secondary [repercussions of the basic aspects.

¹P.R. Das, *Slum Housing Strategy—Case Study Calcutta*, Journal of Institute of Town Planners, India, March, 1974, p. 25.

So long as unwarranted perceptions/attitudes/values remain deeply etched into the psyche of the officials (here or elsewhere), any positive headway toward a comprehensive solution of the squatters problem would be impossible.

LEGAL RESOURCES

Available Legal Tools to Deal With Squatters Problems

While policy-making (as also budgeting/resource allocation, etc.) for squatters settlements all over Haryana is the prerogative of the State Government, for their 'implementation' the State authorities look toward the local bodies, such as, municipal corporations/committees, town improvement trusts or State-level agencies like HUDA and the Housing Board. Of these bodies, some are, of course, more directly involved than others. Giving them a major role in the implementation of these State policies are a set of Acts; one of them owes its origin to the British days, while others are the provincial creations of the Independent India.

Two things need to be noted about these Acts: *First*, 'squatter settlements' are not the principal focus of all of them; most have only an overlapping interest in this problem. *Second*, a couple of them were first adopted by the Punjab Government and were extended to the new State of Haryana when the latter came into being in the year 1966. This was the result of certain exceptional circumstances then facing Haryana, that is, when it was established, the young state found itself too hard-pressed for time to produce its own acts and rush them through the legislative process to regulate governmental activities in certain spheres. Thus, it chose—in the light of commonality of its problems/administrative practices with Punjab—to adopt some of the acts that were operational in the composite state itself. Three such acts that Haryana borrowed from Punjab, for example, were: The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911; the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922; and, the Punjab Slum Areas (Improvement) Act, 1961. To illustrate the point further, sections 93 to 150, 154 to 171, 173 to 189, 192, 197, 197A, 199 to 201, 208, 224 and 237 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 were declared as applicable to the municipalities in Ballabhgarh, Old Faridabad and NIT

(the three components of the Faridabad Complex today) in 1961—as in the case of other local bodies in Haryana.

The nine Acts that constitute the main legal arsenal for the town of Faridabad to deal with the squatters settlements (some directly, and others only marginally) in the town are:

1. The Punjab Slum Areas (Improvement) Act, 1961;
2. The Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977;
3. The Haryana (Punjab) Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973;
4. The Haryana Housing Board, Act, 1971;
5. The Faridabad Complex (Regulation and Development) Act, 1971, and
Four other acts that have been tacked on to the "Faridabad Complex (Regulation and Development Act, 1971)", in part or in full, are:
6. The Haryana Municipal Act, 1973;
7. The Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922;
8. The Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas—(Restriction on Unregulated Development) Act, 1963; and
9. The Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975.

However, before we assess their standing and limitations with regard to the squatters settlements at Faridabad, it would be useful, first, to attempt a brief outline of each of these Acts.

The Punjab Slum Areas (Improvement) Act, 1961

The interest of local bodies in 'slums' in this part of the country can be said to begin really after the passage of this Act in 1961. The focus of the Act was clear-cut; 'clearance of slums' (and this included, as it were, "squatter settlements", too and rehousing of the slum-dwellers). Indeed, it did not merely talk in terms of the rehabilitation of slum-dwellers but also of grant of State financial assistance to local bodies to provide some building materials to the slum-dwellers, free of charge, to enable them to build their own tenements on new sites. It also called for new enforcement

powers to the local bodies and a definition of slums. For example, it stated:

The slum area means an area where the competent authority upon report from any of its officer or other information in its possession, is satisfied that the buildings in that areas:

- (a) are in any respect unfit for human habitation, or
- (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such building, narrowness of faculty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, inadequacy of open spaces, community facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health or morals.

The 1961 Slums Act also suggested a fairly comprehensive approach in order to produce a *housing strategy* for slum dwellers and also a *housing investment programme*. The two important principles on which the strategy was based are:

- (i) There should be minimum dislocation of slum dwellers and efforts should be made to rehouse them, as far as possible, at the existing sites of the slums and/or sites and nearby, in order to insure that they are not uprooted, from their fields of employment; and
- (ii) In order to keep down rents within the paying capacity of slum-dwellers, the emphasis should necessarily be laid more on provision of the minimum standard of environmental hygiene and essential services, rather than on construction of any elaborate structures.

An original intention of the Act also seemed to be to encourage the slum-dwellers to construct their own dwellings with some building 'material' given by the State as an input. For instance, it stated that:

- (i) The slum dwellers may build huts of the prescribed

pattern themselves on self-help basis under the technical guidance of local bodies, who should provide slum dwellers with developed and demarcated plots of land and about Rs. 150 worth of building material like 'ballies' of proper length, roofing material, etc.,

- (ii) the size of plot might be 1,000 to 1,200 sq. ft.,
- (iii) each plot should be provided with one-foot high earthen platform of about 300 sq. feet (this will help to limit the area on which construction can take place and will also keep out the damp,
- (iv) a pucca latrine 4' x 4' and
- (v) An enclosed pucca bathing and washing platform 4' x 4', properly connected with drain, and also a tap, wherever possible.

The Act also required the local bodies to construct houses/tenements for slum dwellers in case the above said strategy was not feasible and/or the slum dwellers could afford to pay higher rents. In case of 'houses', it demanded compliance with the following 'minimum accommodation' requirements: (1) Room 120 sq. ft.; (2) Varandah and kitchen 84 sq. ft.; (3) Bath room 16 sq. ft.; and (4) Lavatory 12 sq. ft.

It also went on to provide guidelines for the kind of tenements to be constructed. Recommending the provision of two rooms within the same overall area (a living room in addition to a multipurpose room to be used for cooking, etc.) the Act laid down the following minimum standard* of accommodation in each unit:

	<i>Sq. ft.</i>
1. Living room	120
2. Multipurpose room	84
3. Bath	16
4. Latrine	12
	<hr/>
	232
	<hr/>

*It is interesting to note that this Act recommended provision of two rooms for urban poor, not *one*, as being provided at present.

Two types of financial assistance to slum dwellers were also offered. These were in the form of: (i) a loan up to 50 per cent of the cost of the project, and (2) a subsidy up to the same limit. However, if the rent-paying capacity of the slum dwellers was low, higher loans and subsidies were to be made available. Special subsidy was also provided for members of scheduled Castes.

The Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977

For a long time in Haryana the control over various aspects of urban planning and development was divided amongst various government agencies. Recognition of the 'unified' need in the area of 'urban Development' was noticed when the State adopted this Act and a new State-level agency, called, the Haryana Urban Development Authority, was set up in 1977. An interesting feature of this new development in urban legislation in Haryana was that HUDA was charged *inter alia*, with the responsibility for, "to acquire, develop and disburse land for residential, industrial, and commercial purposes" and *to make available developed land to Haryana Housing Board and other bodies for providing houses to economically weaker sections of the society.*

HUDA has floated seven residential estates in Faridabad (in addition to the 14 set up by the Urban Estate Department, HUDA's predecessor). Two of these estates (Sectors 3 and 30-31), amongst others, boast of 727 plots (537 in Sector 3 and 190 in Sector 30-31) to quarter 'economically weaker' families (not necessarily squatters settled on land controlled by HUDA itself). These plots measured 50 and 100 sq. yards each and were priced at the rate of Rs. 135 per sq. yard.

The Haryana (Punjab) Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1972

Designed to check the worsening excesses of uncontrolled occupation of public premises over the years by individuals as also groups, this Act was not essentially the first one on the State statute book to grapple with the problem of unauthorized occupation of public land, etc. The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, forerunner of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, also provided powers to local bodies to secure the same

objective. This Act defined 'public premises' as:

any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the State Government or requisitioned by the competent authority under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1954, and...any premises belonging to any local authority...

The Act gave the Collector of a district the power to serve such occupants with a notice in writing, asking them to show evidence/cause in support of their occupation and if satisfied that such occupation was unauthorised, to evict such persons (using force, if necessary) to take possession of the public premises.

The Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971

Here is another Act that can be said to figure conspicuously in the town's programme and promise of improving housing situation for the houseless, including squatters. As per the provisions of the Act, the Housing Board is legally obliged to provide 'accommodation for any class of inhabitants, industries, institutions, offices, local authorities, cooperatives or corporate bodies'.

The Faridabad Complex (Regulation and Development) Act, 1971

As explained elsewhere in this report, this Act was really designed to catch up with a run-away situation, caused by the crisis of a fiercely-expanding industrial activity in the 1950s and 1960s in the Faridabad area where as many as three different municipalities (Ballabhgarh, Old Faridabad and NIT) were operating—with none of them to be trusted to bring the situation under control in their respective areas. Besides, in the physical sense, the jurisdictions rubbed so closely and certain vital problems demanded quick and common solutions that the State Government felt obliged to pass the above legislation under which one new local authority for the entire area was created and named as 'Faridabad Complex Administration'.

It was a unique Act, with a unique form and powers, keeping

in view the complex problems of a 'Complex born out of three different local bodies'. One manifestation of this uniqueness, for example, was the wide-ranging powers given to this local body under the Act, by drawing into its orbit the State power with respect to urban problems that otherwise stood scattered in *four* different statutes of the State, namely, (1) The Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, (2) The Punjab Improvement Trust Act, 1922, (3) The Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction on unregulated development) Act, 1963, and (4) The Haryana Urban Estates Act, 1975. In bold statements, different Sections of the 1971 Act, for instance, proposed that the Chief Administrator of the Faridabad Complex Administration may/shall:

1. exercise the same powers and perform the same functions as... a Municipal Committee or its President or Executive Officer or any other functionary of the Committee would exercise and perform as if the Faridabad Complex were a Municipality of the first class,
—Section 5
2. Exercise the powers of the chairman, trust, trustee, committee appointed under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, or any other functionary of the trust,
—Section 9
3. ...with the previous approval of the State Government by notification, declare the whole or any part of the area within the Faridabad Complex including an area within a distance of 8 kilometers on the outer sides, controlled area,
—Section 29
and,
4. exercise and perform all powers and functions of the Director, Town & Country Planning in respect of the Faridabad Complex, and acts already done under provisions of Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 (Act 41 of 1963), shall be construed to be acts done by the Chief Administrator under this Act.
—Section 42

The Chief Administrator of the Faridabad Complex has,

thus, extensive powers to shape the physical contours of the city—even though those provided by Section 5, 29 and 42 largely confer only land-use and other 'negative' controls. The legal authority provided under Section 9 of the 1922 Town Improvement Act is, of course, sufficiently adequate (so far as this Act is concerned) to renew or replace the 62 squatters settlements in the town.

Analysis

Such is the variety of Acts dealing with the physical growth of the town, in general, or relating to the squatters settlement in Faridabad area. As is apparent, these acts—from the year 1922 down to the present day—reflect the changing policies of the successive periods and governments all these decades. We might now critically examine as to what their potential and limitations are with respect to the squatters settlements in the Faridabad Complex. However, in view of the diversity of their objectives and the relevance of these objectives to the problems of squatters settlements, it is suggested that we roughly rank these Acts along two scales:

1. those making *very* explicit statements about squatter settlements/slum dwellers, and
2. those that are *less* explicit on this goal but contain provisions relevant to squatters' problem in this town.

A scanning of their statement of goals shows that while the "1922 Town Improvement Act" (as tacked on to the 1971 Faridabad Act), the '1961 Slums Act', the '1977 HUDA Act', and the '1973 Public Premises Act', belong to the first category, others fit the second.

To take the 1922 Town Improvement Act, first, it can be safely asserted that it provided the first legislative basis for physical improvement in 'certain' localities of towns in the State of Haryana. These "certain localities" included buildings considered unfit for human habitation, congested conditions in cramped streets or buildings or the want in them of light, air, ventilation or proper conveniences or any other sanitary defects. The unfit houses in badly laid-out streets often existed in the inner city/town areas. No wonder, a

major preoccupation of the improvement trusts set up in various towns was with physical improvement of such built-up areas or framing of new development schemes for under developed areas. Of course, Section 25 spoke of "housing accommodation for industrial labour" (most of whom often are found in squatter settlements) but this was rarely taken up in right earnest, as bulk of the resources were invested in raising new shopping complexes for commercial purposes or projects like parks, or road-widening. Besides squatters' problem did not exist then (1920s) on the scale as it does today; in case it did in some of the towns, the implications and risks in the slowly snow-balling situation were never sufficiently appreciated by the powers that be. In Faridabad, too, the authorities do not appear to have made any use of the powers provided in this Act. The Act became operative at Faridabad, Ballabhgarh and NIT in the year 1972 when the Complex Administration came into being. The outlook earlier was probably bleak for the three municipalities, more so for the one at NIT, where the local body was locked up in a long-drawn battle for possession of 'public lands' from the Union Ministry of Rehabilitation,—a battle, it must be said, it fought with much heart and conviction (see p. 63). However, it is a moot point whether or not the authorities would have let themselves go at the squatters' problems at full steam, had they been provided the necessary resources (land and money), in addition to the legal powers which they were sufficiently armed with even at that time (1972-73).

The facts, however, suggest that the laxity on the part of the three municipalities in the first half of the 1960s prevented them from influencing the squatters situation in a positive manner. For, if they really meant business, they would not have missed the opportunity to make use of the financial help (however small) offered by the State Government in the year 1964-65. In a letter (No. 3615-2Hg-65/10825 dated May 4, 1965), addressed to all the Presidents of municipal committees, and Chairmen of Improvement Trusts, the then Secretary to the Government, Housing Department, lamented;

...the problem of slum clearance and slum improvement is

colossal. It is to be tackled on priority basis. I regret proper attention is not being paid to this problem.

It is not that only the three municipalities at Faridabad had failed to grab the money, the town improvement trusts/municipalities in the other towns of Haryana, too, had failed to catch up. This was evident from his frustration, expressed as follows, in the same communication:

During the year 1964-65, the response was so poor that the Housing Department had to surrender more than 50 per cent of the budget provision under the Scheme (slum clearance and slum improvement).

Adoption of the Slum Act in 1961 was a significant event, both for the squatters and the town. For it not only contained specific provisions with regard to 'slum clearance' but also featured 'subsidy' and 'loan' programmes for the building of tenements (self-help basis by the squatters or by the local authority). But, no major effort was undertaken by the authorities to implement the liberal provisions of this Act, either. Here was an Act which provided the Faridabad Complex Administration the necessary springboard to make a determined advance towards this direction, but it does not appear that much use of this Act has ever been made by the authorities.

Perhaps the only result of the application of this Act was the creation of 'Bapu Nagar', a re-settlement colony established in 1975-76. The pressure to clear squatters at that time touched its high point when the FCA used helmeted policemen to tear down about 6,000 jhuggis from the various locations in the town. The first targets for clearance were those clusters which were 'centrally' located in the three zones of the town.

Thousands of squatters were affected. Within a month of the demolitions, the FCA formulated a site-and-services housing scheme under which each squatter family was offered a 28 sq. yard developed plot, with the FCA extending help to get loan money from the banks for building its house. The evictees were asked to pay Rs. 500 as down-payment at the

time of the possession of plot and pay the balance in easy instalments of Rs. 20 per month without interest. In addition to the plots, amenities, such as, public lavatories, street lighting, water supply through standposts were also to be provided. A primary school was also planned.

The FCA gave wide publicity to the scheme through printed handbills distributed in factories. Though about 2,500 workers responded and filled up the application forms, only 110 of them actually made use of the FCA offer and built their one-room houses (1,300 plots are still reported to be lying vacant).

This poorly-conceived scheme failed to live up to the expectations of the settlers. Basic amenities like a public toilet block and stand-posts were made available but these were hardly made operational. For instance, the disused toilet block stands there in falsification of the very Act which laid more emphasis on "minimum standard of environmental hygiene and essential services rather than on construction of any elaborate structures."

The Act made yet another humanitarian gesture towards the poor in squatter settlements when it provided for gifting of building material like 'ballies' (bamboo sticks) worth about Rs. 150 as 'roofing material' for such squatters/slum dwellers who could be encouraged by the local administration to construct their own dwellings. Though the intent behind the provision was certainly laudable, it seems, however, that the policy-makers, at the time of putting it in the Act, totally lost sight of the negative effect of this 'incentive'. Every now and then one reads in newspapers about the huts of the poor caught up in fires. And, more than often, it is these very huts made of straw and 'bamboo sticks' that are gutted and render hundreds of squatters homeless. As the huts are made up of highly-combustible material like bamboo sticks, they just burn up like match-sticks and are reduced to ashes in minutes. Men, women and children, with their blackened faces and tattered clothes are then seen rummaging through the burnt belongings to rescue some of the left-overs. There is considerable bewailing and crying also. Another day comes and goes and a new cluster of huts comes up. Another fire, in the same cluster or another after some weeks or months.

And, the cycle goes on. The basic problem is 'poverty', not availability or non-availability of 'bamboo sticks' with the slum-dwellers. Provisions of this kind in the Act have served more as ravagers of the huts of the poor than as their builders.

But, the most critical question here is not that the local administration did not work hard for eradication of squatter settlements in the town all these decades, despite the comprehensive powers the law provided it with or that it did not make any attempt to make use of the money the State Government occasionally made available. Perhaps, a more serious slip has been the exceptionally long time it took to 'officially' recognize that a squatters problem of great magnitude did exist in the town. For, it published its first gazette notification about the 62 squatter settlements in Faridabad only after these settled communities had dotted the townscape of Faridabad for 25-30 years, with all the ills that such settlements are commonly associated with: overcrowding, poor-to-horrible living conditions, disease, petty crime, and so on. Published on January 8, 1985, the notification said:

.... In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection 10 of section 3 of the Punjab Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1961 and having satisfied upon the report from Senior Town Planner, Faridabad Complex Administration, about the slum conditions prevailing in these areas with faculty arrangements and design of buildings, narrowness and faculty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light and sanitation facilities which are detrimental to safety, health and morals for the inhabitants of these areas, I, Chief Administrator, Faridabad Complex Administration (Competent authority) hereby declare the areas mentioned in the Schedule given below to be slum areas.

The Schedule then went on identifying these physically and morally deteriorating pockets of slum dwellers in the town.

The evidence shows that the Administration did make use of the '1972 Public Premises' and Eviction Act to mount a determined attack on the problem during the year 1974-75. The Act had enough teeth to throw the squatters out and,

for once, the authorities, then, tried to carry out an aggressive drive against squatters in some settlements. But, the inspiration and the pattern of eviction were different, for those were the days of the Emergency. The mind of the bureaucracy had then been directed on to a concerted campaign in favour of 'family planning' and this led to a flurry of activity inside the squatter settlements for sterilisation of couples as also their eviction from the present sites. This policy was resisted by the squatters. There was much confusion and anger against such wholesale uprooting and the attendant misery of helpless families. There was also the tragic story of an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police who was reportedly lynched alive by the squatters during the course of one of these evictions at Faridabad. Evictions have always produced violence ('visible' in the form of attacks on policemen/municipal officials or 'invisible' in the form of simmering anger within). For, the very act of eviction touches the whole lot of human problems and the continuous nightmare the squatters have to put up with in their struggle to survive in an economy which has failed to provide them jobs in their own villages or the small towns nearby. But, if they are guilty of breaking the law (in the narrow sense of the term) by squatting on land which, legally, does not belong to them, the bureaucracy is also guilty of contravening the time-honoured principles of management by not taking decisions that should have been taken some 2-3 decades back. To blame the squatters alone for the grim situation in Faridabad today would be tantamount to a very dubious interpretation of the laws on the statute book, on the one hand, and the universally-accepted decision-making practices strewn in countless books on modern management, on the other.

The 1973 Haryana Municipal Act offered little that was of direct relevance to the removal of squatters' settlements in Faridabad. There were no new, innovative provisions in it to deal with this problem. It was essentially a continuum (with some reshaping here and there) of its older counterpart, namely, the Punjab Municipal 1911 Act. Of course, its provisions could be used to improve the living and environmental conditions of squatters' settlements. Even if it is admitted

that there cannot be instant or immediate slum-clearance, (because it is a continuing, slow-motion programme), that does not mean that certain improvements in their immediate lives should have waited.

Looking at the HUDA Act and the Slum Act as a 'group' it may be said that efforts were more intense while serving better-off segments of the population than in the case of the squatters.

The two other Acts, namely, the 1963 Punjab Scheduled Roads Act and the 1975 Haryana Urban Areas Act stand on a somewhat different footing, but it does not appear that any use has been made of these Acts, either. The 1963 Act is a case in point, for example. Though not a very perfectly-drafted law (it can be used to declare a 'controlled area', and to prepare a development plan for the area, but the Act fails to name the implementing agency for such a plan), and yet not without sufficient restrictive and regulative provisions, the unscrupulous developers of unauthorized colonies have succeeded in circumventing it largely because the FCA authorities failed to enforce it. Charles Correa provides us another interesting illustration of how the propertied classes in India have been manipulating the national act on urban property at the expense of the urban poor:

In order to decrease this disparity and the move towards a more equitable society, some Third World Governments have tried to reduce the holdings of the rich by socializing the land. For instance, some years ago, the Government of India passed an act which places a ceiling on urban property (limiting it to 500 sq. m. in large metropolis, 1000 sq. m. in smaller cities and so forth). Any surplus land has to be surrendered to the Government at a minimal price for construction of low-income housing. Unfortunately, this has not worked, because the law can be evaded by sub-division of the property This act is only radical enough to galvanise the rich into defensive action (which has effectively frozen almost all land transactions in our urban centres and, thus, ironically, sent up the values of the existing buildings even higher). At the same time, it is not draconian enough to bring about any real change in

the pattern of our cities.²

Last, but not the least, behind the facade of all these acts there has not been much zeal in using them to bring an increasingly-uncontrollable situation under control. Over the years, these acts have remained, by and large, five pieces of urban legislation, merely added to the statute book so far as squatters's problems are concerned.

Besides, each one in its own way (as revealed above) takes a fragmented view of the squatters' problems and, not surprisingly, therefore, each one in its own way tries to wriggle out of the complex situation without dealing with them in an all-inclusive manner. It only goes to confirm that there is an urgent need to scrap the outdated and unrealistic features of the existing, disjointed acts and replace them with a comprehensive and cohesive piece that would treat the squatters as a 'human resource' (not 'human junk') and emphasize their 'integration' (not 'isolation') into the economic system of the region/state and also into the spatial and physical organization of the town they live in. After all, their poverty and squatting by them are not matters of their individual choice but the results of certain wider forces in the society that are beyond their immediate control.


The draftsmen in the State legal department may also like to ponder over the fact that the language used in the drafting of the acts also counts. For, if we continue to project these victims of the 'wider forces' in the society as invaders/squatters, etc., these terms would also continue to induce feelings of hatred and/or pity in the minds of the bureaucrats. On the contrary, if a positive term is used for them, it might encourage planners/administrators to think of them as a 'human resource' whose potential has to be discovered, developed and then integrated into the developmental process in the region/state and the country, as a whole. A typical bureaucrat—as is well known—always prefers to go by the 'letter' of the law. So, let us ensure that at least the letter of the law does not distort their perceptions.

²Charles, Correa, *The New Landscape*, The Book Society of India, 1984, p. 105.


FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Ever since the FCA came into existence in January 1972, it has witnessed substantial changes in its revenue and expenditure. If the income has been soaring, so has the expenditure, in terms of new items of expenditure in sympathy with expansion of traditional functions or emergence of new ones, and, of course, the increase in population of the town and in the number of employees on its pay rolls. To get an idea of these changes, we may look at the comparative picture—for the years 1972-73 and 1982-83:

WHERE THE MONEY CAME FROM



HOW WAS IT SPENT



However, it needs to be clarified that the large amount of money, set aside for 'works', is no indication of the FCA's ambitions to expand these services in the town on a vast scale.

A splitting of this allocation in any year—1972-73 to 1982-83 and thereafter—would show that, often, more than 50 per cent of it is used by the 'salaries'/'maintenance' or 'debt-payments'. For instance, during the year 1981-82, out of the total allotment of Rs. 62 lakh for 'drainage', only Rs. 25 lakh were spent on new developmental activities.

As seen from above, 'works' can be said to have consumed nearly half of the expenditures in both the years (the pattern was the same in between the two years as well). However, an interesting feature of this most important single function of the FCA all these long years has been that the FCA rendered little or no services on its own in the field of 'works' in the squatter settlements.

A look at the FCA's annual 'income' and 'expenditure' figures for the past 14 years should also be of interest in this connection (see p. 159).

The figures reveal two outstanding facts about the FCA's financial power:

1. This body is not so poor, as most local bodies in the country are; and
2. It has been able to meet its financial needs adequately.

Though each financial year ended with a 'surplus', it cannot 'however' be said that the FCA has developed its fiscal capacities to such an extent that it is in a position to finance all of its expanding public services out of its annual savings. Like other growing towns, Faridabad Complex, too, has been requiring improvement plans involving heavy capital outlays and, hence, the need to borrow money from financial institutions such as the LIC, from time to time. A picture of the FCA's indebtedness on this account is presented below:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Loan Amount</i>
	Rs.
1971-72	38,07,000
1972-73	15,98,000
1973-74	14,50,000
1974-75	9,90,000
1975-76	9,00,000

<i>Years</i>	<i>Loan Amount</i> Rs.
1976-77	10,86,000
1978-79	18,31,000
1979-80	19,00,000
1980-81	31,30,000
1981-82	16,00,000
1982-83	30,74,000
1983-84	56,97,000
1984-85	42,66,000
1985-86	40,19,000
	<hr/> 3,35,48,000 <hr/>

Another source of financial help for the FCA has been the grants-in-aid received from the State Government:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Grants Amount</i> Rs.
1971-72	10,65,000
1972-73	3,06,000
1978-79	89,000
1979-80	37,69,000
1980-81	1,17,500
1981-82	2,05,000
1982-83	23,70,000
1983-84	8,00,000
1984-85	12,95,000
1985-86	5,50,000
	<hr/> 1,08,66,500 <hr/>

Resource Suppliers for Slum Improvement/Housing for Squatters

From the 'legal' point of view, the FCA is supposed to have taken over the responsibility for slum-clearance and improvement from the very day it took over the command of the three municipal areas (NIT, Ballabgarh and Old Faridabad) and the municipal functions within them. But, it seems that during the first seven years of its operations (1972-73 to

FCA'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURE STATEMENT (1972-1986)

	15-1-1972 to 31-3-1972	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78
Opening Balance	6,49,043	19,54,702	53,75,942	98,37,700	48,81,733	69,16,799	67,21,270
Total Income	38,31,623	1,35,46,643	1,53,62,108	1,54,87,189	1,96,09,365	2,29,12,540	2,12,36,375
Total	44,80,666	1,55,03,345	2,07,38,050	2,53,24,889	2,44,91,099	2,98,29,339	8,84,57,645
Total Expenditure	25,25,964	1,01,27,403	1,09,00,350	2,04,43,156	1,77,69,829	2,44,61,262	2,10,40,846
Closing	19,54,702	53,75,942	98,37,700	48,81,733	67,21,270	53,68,087	69,16,799

	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85	1985-86
Opening Balance	53,68,087	8,67,833	9,11,490	10,06,080	13,92,133	17,10,476	13,96,216	15,01,959
Total Income	2,85,20,970	3,57,81,503	4,01,39,254	4,53,18,433	5,35,09,486	6,61,87,608	6,89,45,446	7,42,62,885
Total	3,38,89,057	3,65,89,336	4,10,50,744	4,63,24,513	5,49,01,619	6,78,98,084	7,03,41,662	7,57,64,844
Total Expenditure	3,30,81,224	3,56,77,845	4,00,44,664	4,49,32,380	5,31,91,143	6,65,01,868	6,88,39,703	7,40,02,762
Closing	8,07,833	9,11,490	10,06,080	13,92,133	17,10,476	13,96,216	15,01,959	17,62,082

1978-79) it was not willing to set aside even modest funds annually on a regular basis for improvements in squatter settlements. The thrust of its own expenditure for a long time, thus, has been in areas other than those occupied by the 'underprivileged' in the town. The situation underwent a change only in the year 1979-80 when, after the inauguration of the 20-Point Programme in 1975, the Central Government started aiding various State Government/Union Territories with certain 'special purpose' grants for slum improvements. FCA, too, like other local bodies all over the country, was the recipient of this aid.

Central Government (Channeled Through State Government)

The financial help from the Centre for slum improvement received since 1979-80 is illustrated by the figures below:

<i>Years</i>	<i>Amount of Grant</i>
1972-73	Nil
1973-74	Nil
1974-75	Nil
1975-76	Nil
1976-77	Nil
1978-79	Nil
1979-80	35,00,000
1980-81	Nil
1981-82	2,00,000
1982-83	10,50,000
1983-84	6,00,000
1984-85	7,95,000
	4,00,000
1985-86	4,00,000

It is evident from the figures above that the FCA launched its 'environment improvement in slum' programme in the year 1979-80 when it received a heavy injection of finance from the Central Government (via the State Government) in the form of a grant amounting to Rs. 35,00,000.

Let us now examine as to what was accomplished with this massive dose of Rs. 35 lakh and similar grants received by it during the successive years.

To take the very first grant, on the face of it a figure like Rs. 38,00,000 looks like an enormous amount, but, in terms of the actual slum improvement activities in Faridabad, very little is said to have been achieved with this assistance. A considerable portion of this money was used up in carrying out surveys of areas that needed immediate attention. The rest was devoted to what can be started as 'miniscule' projects, like a few hundred feet brick-paving here or a few thousand-feet there. These one-shot projects did not improve even a fraction of the environment of the slums. In such work—I was told—the local politicians often get themselves associated with and, by virtue of their political clout, manage to divert funds to their own favourite projects which quite often lay outside the squatter-slums. Besides, in the climate that characterises the State politics in India today, the bureaucracy largely has no option but to come to terms with the politician. There was, for example, the case of an unauthorized colony, namely, "Indira Gandhi Colony", and a part of the money from this amount had to be put at the 'disposal' of the local politician to carry out certain development tasks which were solely the responsibility of the residents themselves, or from whom the money spent on those works should have been recovered later.

Strangely, funds meant for improving environmental conditions of slum dwellers were also used—it appears—to 'subsidize' the private sector when as a result of pressures from politicians, some handpumps were installed in Dyal Nagar, an area near the Faridabad-Delhi border where a large number of quarries are located. Though *prima facie* the hand pumps were dug in for the benefit of the quarry workers living in jhuggies there, but indirectly their installation also meant financial support for the rich contractors there who were supposed to provide, under the law, drinking water facility for these poor people and had successfully evaded this responsibility for many years. The amenity provided is said to have hurt the interests of slum-dwellers elsewhere also because the cost of a single handpump in Dyal Nagar turned out to be Rs. 55,000 as compared to only Rs. 11,000 in other areas.

In the following year, 1980-81, the town failed to command

any funds for the slum improvement.

The 1981-82 grant amounting to Rs. 2 lakh was also aimed at meeting the cost of certain environmental improvements in settlements that had not received any benefits so far. But, the grant was not large enough to make any serious dent on the complexity of the problems faced. The Planning unit was aware of the deepening crisis all along, for because of the politics of 'implementation' and 'spending' money was such that, in ultimate analysis, the total amount in no way succeeded in making any perceptible impact on the environmental improvement of the squatter settlements. The settlements were expanding and so were their problems.

The figure of the next year's grant (1982-83) was, fortunately much bigger, say almost five times of the grant received the previous year, i.e., Rs. 9.5 lakh. But, it failed to achieve its purpose, primarily for two reasons. In the first place, it came in two instalments, and secondly, both the instalments arrived only towards the end of the financial years: Rs. 7.5 lakh on November 11, 1982 and Rs. 2 lakh on February 17, 1983. The late arrival of the grant led to late formulation of schemes by the Planning unit. Delay in receiving the approval of the higher-ups at the headquarters further compounded the problems. The end-result was that the money received could not be spent in that year and in order to meet some pressing needs in a couple of squatter-slums the FCA had to spend some of its own money on environmental improvements.

Payment for the year 1983-84 (Rs. 6lakh) was again not received in time; it arrived only in November 1983. Nonetheless, certain improvements were carried out and the total bill the FCA paid for street-light in some settlement and hand-pumps, etc., in others was to the tune of Rs. 6,75,635. The excess was met out of the surplus that had accumulated over the past two years.

Relatively, the FCA found itself financially strong in the following year (1984-85). The amount of cash in hand grew when in addition to the 1983-84 unspent balance of Rs. 10,74,965 it received a large grant amount in two instalments Rs. 7,95,000 on August 29, 1984 and Rs. 4,00,000 on March 18, 1985, making a fat sum of Rs. 22,69,965. The expenditure on drains, brick-paving and water supply in some of the

squatter-slums was, however, restricted to only Rs. 15,75,478.

The appropriation for 1985-86 was to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000 (received on August 17, 1985). A balance of Rs. 6,94,487 from the previous year was also available. Until March 1986, the FCA had exhausted as much as Rs. 10,95,969 on the usual type of projects in various slum pockets.

HUDCO (Loan for Squatters' Housing)

The idea of constructing houses for squatters came from the plans which the FCA had earlier worked out for improvements in their living conditions. However, as the costs of building these dwellings were going to be prohibitive, there was no question of the FCA undertaking such an effort on its own, particularly because it was already in heavy debt for the monies it had borrowed for expanding certain city services. There was no prospect of getting any help from the State Government, either. So, the natural thing for the FCA was to turn to the HUDCO for financial help (see p. 122). The proposal of the FCA was approved by HUDCO and the latter agreed to meet 80 per cent of the cost of these dwellings under its programme of EWS housing; the FCA was required to arrange for remaining 20 per cent.

The details of HUDCO funds, received by the FCA, from time to time, are as follows:

<i>Period</i>	<i>Total Amount Rs.</i>
September 1981 to July 1985	33,02,000
September 1981 to July 1985	26,10,000
December 1982 to July 1985	50,78,000
	<hr/>
	1,09,90,000
	<hr/>

In addition to this loan amount of about Rs. 1.10 crore made available by HUDCO, the FCA is reported to have expended around Rs. 51 lakhs from its own resources in the construction of these houses plus, of course, the additional

Rs. 4,000 per unit—which is the difference between the original cost (Rs. 8,000) and the actual one (Rs. 12,000).

Analysis

From a close examination of foregoing facts and figures, it appears that for a long time the squatters in Faridabad have been treated as a 'forgotten lot' by the FCA. Be it 'environmental improvements' or 'EWS housing' for the squatters, the FCA has, by and large, been interested in netting money from outside sources, rather than spending its own. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that but for the HUDCO money there would have been no housing for squatters in Faridabad, nor any environmental improvements in 36 clusters without the Central Governments' monies. This is quite evident from the local body's stance during the first seven years of its operations when it hardly made any effort to arrest the deteriorating environment within the ever-growing number of squatter settlements. For example, the total income over the years (1972 to 1986) provided the FCA over 63 crores of rupees. If only it had diverted just one per cent of this massive sum to environmental improvements, say, in a large slum like Neelum-Bata (population: 10, 839), the living conditions for the inmates would have happily been different and the present crisis and chaos in there averted. But, problems in squatter settlements were allowed to pile up, layer upon layer simply because the FCA's response to them was either niggardliness or neglect.

Unfortunately, the rule of thumb within the FCA (to a certain extent this can be said of the most local bodies in India) seems to be that high-income areas (residential/commercial/industrial) which assure it a higher return in terms of tax money alone deserve prior attention. As for the squatter areas, they have to be content with bad or no services. This type of reasoning is an affront to reasonableness—more so, in a country wedded to the idea of 'socialism'. The squatters may not have taxable properties and, thus, not paying any taxes to the local body. However, as citizens of this country, they do pay taxes—though 'indirectly'—to the State, as a whole, and therefore are entitled to urban service out of the

monies received from the State Government. The worst part of this reasoning is revealed when we are told that in this country the money paid by the poor is being cleverly manipulated to be spent for the benefit of the rich. This view was very well stated by J.D. Sethi, a former Member of India's Planning Commission:

India is the only country in the world in which the poor pay for the education of the middle classes and the rich. . . . Nearly 82 per cent of the government tax revenue of the Central and the State Governments comes from indirect taxes, the incidence of which falls heavily on the poor. Nearly 55 per cent of these taxes comes from those whose monthly income, at 1973-74 prices, was Rs. 100 or less. Worst of all is the deficit financing, the burden of which falls entirely on weaker sections. . . .³

There are many officials who would still argue: 'Locally' speaking, we are not obligated to provide amenities to the squatter settlements. But, the question is: How about 'Constitutionally'?

The State Government has also been giving substantial support to the FCA (over Rs. 1 crore up till now) for a wide variety of activities like public health, roads/streets, sewerage, water supply, etc. Of this financial support, the most substantial has been during the year 1979-80, *i.e.*, Rs. 37,69,000. However, virtually nothing out of these grants has been used to improve the environment within the squatterments.

In the light of such an antipathy towards squatters, one wonders whether the FCA is really 'short of funds' or 'short of orientation'?

Loans and grants are only a means of buying time. The FCA must re-organize and marshal its own financial resources in such a manner so as to provide for regular budgetary allocations for slum improvements. That would be the only right way to fulfil its 'Constitutional' responsibility towards the squatter settlements. For, these are the areas where most of the people living were poorly paid and where there was grea-

³J.D. Sethi, in *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, December 15-21, 1985.

ter need for sanitation, public health and education. In doing so, the FCA would be performing its duty in pursuit of a national policy, as also the NCR objective, namely, 'human resource development'.

6

CONCLUSIONS

Thus far, *i.e.*, Chapter 1 to 5, we have focussed upon, *inter alia*, the efforts made by the FCA and other governmental agencies in Faridabad to help improve the 'quality of life' of nearly one-third of the 'human resource' that has been struggling against rock-bottom environmental conditions in 62 squatter settlements (now 64) during the past 30-odd years. It should now be possible for us to pick up the major missing links in the chain of jobs that these agencies have tried to do, but which seems so insignificant to a poor squatter who once told me:

For me, and my bare-foot children, it is still the same old story of being huddled together in a small, dark room, mud inside and mud outside, foul smell in the air, mosquitoes and flies by millions round the year, and an extreme shortage of the key amenities like clean water and toilets.

The response of a highly-paid private executive in Faridabad was no different—though he was looking at things from a different angle:

The fact is that the unmet needs of the town have been allowed to pile up all these long years to such an extent that they have suddenly begun to go critical.

WHY GONE CRITICAL?

This is a question that I went round asking of the senior officials at the FCA. Why—despite all the special legal powers (not available to other local bodies in Haryana)—and all that money that came to it or could have been raised (internally or externally), the progress has been so slow and the FCA has not been able to discharge its obligations towards

the squatters, in particular? The thoughtful amongst them always replied:

The linchpin of physical development of a town (including squatter slums) is 'land', and this vital resource in Faridabad has been with the Central Government for a long time. In fact, we are still without it.

Central Government

A close view of the early history of the town's growth (Chapter 2) certainly supports the FCA's officials' despair and hidden anger. There is no doubt that this 30-odd years' of the Central Ministry's control over 'lands acquired for public purposes' has had very deteriorating effect on FCA's development strategies and activities, including its plans for the squatters. Neither the NIT municipality nor the FCA later could acquire lands on its own or go ahead with a development plan, as a whole. There was a sort of 'institutional vacuum' in the town—despite the two administrative machines operating and running concurrently. There were many loose ends, but the Ministry would neither tie them up itself nor let the NIT municipality do it. Take, for instance, the issue of acquisition of 350 acres of land in-between Mathura Road and the Railway line. Two decades back, it could have been acquired at the rate of Rs. 4 per sq. yard; at the present rates, it would cost many times over. In such a situation, one might ask: which migrant family would not like to enjoy the luxury of freely available land for building its hut or shack. No wonder, quite a few squatter-slums (like Gandhi Nagar) today exist on this piece of land.

Here is one good example of how avoidable squatting was not avoided. Perhaps Abrams was trying to draw our attention to such pitfalls when he wrote:

Frequently, squatting is the product of poor land policy or no policy at all. Squatting can be avoided by anticipating population movements and planning for them in advance¹.

¹Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1984, p. 236.

It seems that at Faridabad, too, the Central Ministry's 'poor land policy or no policy at all' provided the migrant-workers a climate that permitted squatting to emerge slowly all over the Complex area, and today the problem has become such an urban disaster for the FCA that it is almost groping in the dark as to what to do. For the time being, it can only produce schemes and projects for the planned settlement of the squatters and that is precisely what it has largely been doing—though it is true that it has built a base of 1624 EWS houses (original plan for 1640 units) exclusively for squatters (and even moved 500 families into them already) but this small step, after lengthy delays, hardly touches the heart of their multiple problems.

The main objective of the Central Ministry and its Development Board was 'rehabilitation of refugees' and not 'planned development of the town'—whereas the two should have proceeded side by side. It also failed to undertake the correlate problems (like sewerage) of a rapidly-growing town, even though they were badly needed at that very time.

State Government

Now that the land (1,329 acres—see end of Chapter 2) has been transferred by the Central Ministry to the State Government of Haryana, it appears that the yearning of the FCA to take possession of these lands at an early date is not yet appreciated or shared by the State Headquarters. In fact, a curious situation exists. About two years have gone by since these lands changed hands, and it goes without saying that during these two years—like the earlier 30-odd years—not only new slums have come up but more congestion, overcrowding, insanitation and disease must have been added in the older slums as well.

It is rather difficult to say why the State authorities is not favourably disposed to an early release of the lands to the FCA to enable it to serve the requirements of the squatters and other immediate town requirements. Is it because of the hassals of payment, (*i.e.*, at what price the lands should be passed on to the local body), the kind that characterized the attitude of the Central Ministry towards the FCA's predecessor (NIT municipality) and which has brought a number

of urban problems in the town to a nearly ruinous situation? The State Government must realize that any more delay in the transfer of lands would make the situation intolerable for the FCA. The problem of squatters in Faridabad is not solely the headache of the local body; it is also a responsibility of the State Government. After all, the residents of Faridabad—squatters or others—are not merely the 'residents' of this town; they are also the residents of 'Haryana State'. And, the State Government is like a parent to the local body and, as such, it must act as a helper, an adviser and guide to the later and provide it all the resources it needs to handle the problem. Moreover, the State Government is a leading member of the NCR Board and in that role it has been actively participating in the NCR debates all these long years. To be so deeply concerned and engrossed into a project of this kind and yet give short shrift to a very important 'ring town' of the NCR itself (Faridabad)—sounds like a contradiction in itself? The need for State Government's action is immediate, or else the vacant lands would get degenerated into additional squatter slums at a speed too fast for the local body to catch up with.

As a creature of the State, the local body is subordinate to the headquarters. It can only make submissions to those above or, at best, make repeated attempts to persuade them to realize the gravity of the situation. It cannot, on its own, dictate the order of things. After all, in all policy matters and major investment decisions it is tied to the apron-strings its administrative mentor, namely, the Department of Local Government, Government of Haryana.

I am equally puzzled by yet another omission on the part of the State Government which has done so little all these long years to build up the 'Planning Department' here—a unit of the FCA which, really speaking, should have been put in high gear right from the start to secure the goals of a 'planned town', a status that the 'new' Faridabad was bestowed upon at the time of its birth (foreign experts had been invited and they had drawn up the plan of a beautiful, modern town with a very wide ring-road around it—which, incidentally, also today stands encroached upon at a number of points).

But, unfortunately, the need for putting it in a 'high gear' was never recognized or even seriously scrutinized in the past; nor does one hear of any plans for its revitalization in the future. This is certainly very disturbing, particularly in view of the worst excesses of urban decay taking place in the town (the latest being the practice of land-grabbing by religious groups, what to speak of the unchecked and maddening unauthorized construction, etc., going on all the time).

That the Department secured its present status and limited strength after a good deal of struggle—is a fact that has already been dealt with in Chapter 5. A look at the organization chart of the unit would also show (p. 130) how the staff has been haphazardly thrown together all these long years.

Indicated below is only a fraction of the major tasks that await attention of the Department for want of staff:

1. Finalisation of 'Controlled Areas' development plan (first prepared in 1966, twice amended and revised in 1982). The Plan is still in a draft form because the NCR Board has not yet approved it;
2. Revision of the NIT Master Plan;
3. Designing of Ballabhgarh and Old Faridabad Master Plans;
4. Elimination of widespread non-conforming uses in the town (*i.e.*, business establishments in residential zones);
5. Adaptation of unauthorized colonies (Ballabhgarh alone has 25 of them) to the existing planning needs of the town;
6. Mapping and planning for land recently released by the Central Ministry but still with the State Government.
7. Change of land-use and enforcement of law: formulation of policy framework; and, last but not least; and
8. Environmental improvement/rehabilitation of 60 Squatments population.

It would be fruitless to argue about the urgent need for the well-developed planning organization to handle all the

above tasks, aside the numerous other responsibilities—professional' as well as those involving 'planning administration'.

But, what is of immediate concern is that the Unit continues to be grossly short of its total requirements of staff (is still without be Planning Assistants, for example) and, consequently, there is a mood of disillusionment. It appears to be like a planning unit that is 'supposed to plan' the entire town but is itself 'not planned'.

Zoning has been rightly called the 'strong arm' of planning. As zoning in Faridabad has almost gone haywire, the need for a well-equipped unit is all the more necessary.

Inter-agency cooperation and coordination is absolutely essential to make the total Development Plan of Faridabad and its application a success. All the five governmental bodies (listed on p. 80) are supposed to be partners in urban planning and development in Faridabad but none is willing to give up its own interests in favour of the total interests of the town. Indeed, at times, the activities and attitudes of some of them are positively antagonistic.

HUDA, for example, seems to be hypnotised by its own grandiose dreams. It is anxious to plan new sectors while many of its already developed sectors are lacking infrastructural amenities. One view—as held by its critics—is that its planning is largely conditioned by what they call as 'commercialism'. Its model of efficiency of urban development—like that of other development bodies in the country—is: elegant shopping centres, surrounded by housing blocks of the upper and middle classes.

Another view is that the HUDA does not wish to venture into activities like the 'squatters' rehabilitation' because such schemes do not bring in any revenue, and so long as it does not act like a revenue-producer, it would not be able to project itself as an 'efficient' organization.

Whether this criticism of HUDA is valid or not, the fact is that such assumptions do seem to press very heavily on the minds of senior officials working in urban development bodies in India. A point that needs to be made here, therefore, is that so long as urban bodies pursue such 'piecemeal planning', independent of the 'total planning' of a town, and neglecting the urban-poor, they are not only harming the planned

character of a town but also paying lip sympathy to the 'Directive Principles of State Policy' enshrined in the Constitution. In a poor country like India, the resources of all such public agencies must be used to alleviate symptoms of poverty, like inequalities in housing, etc., in their respective towns/cities. India cannot afford 'frills like Disneyland'—the kind they are now planning to set up in Delhi.

Most HUDA plots and Housing Board flats, originally programmed for squatters in Faridabad, should have been allotted only to people displaced from squatterments in the town—and not on the basis of an 'affidavit' (certifying the monthly income of the applicant) which, if one is a little clever, can be obtained by dozens in the contemporary India.

The failure of HUDA to pay any attention to the development of the town-level facilities like a composite water supply scheme, sewage disposal, construction of over-bridges, a green belt between the Delhi-Mathura Road and the railway line, have further added to the sense of despondency in the Planning Unit.

Thus, it is apparent that this Unit has failed in discharging its responsibilities as a 'coordinator' in the town because, essentially the State Government has never cared to assign it a clear-cut coordinating role with reference to the other governmental agencies operating within the town.

'Land' is said to be the most basic ingredient of housing. It is its control over land that has given the HUDA all these years a fertile field of operations. Had the same control been given to the FCA right from 1972-73 onwards, perhaps the pattern of the town's growth would have been different. A foremost task of the State Government, therefore, is to make sufficient land available to the FCA *from the HUDA* so that housing for squatters and the physical development of the squatters' areas can proceed side by side with those for the privileged strata.

The fact that the first phase of EWS housing by the FCA took 5 years (1981-1986) for completion instead of two years, as planned, shows that the situation was not closely coordinated by the State Government in either the command or control processes. The Government does not seem to have

reacted with the seriousness and gusto, the situation demanded after the project deviated from desired performance. *It is needless to say that a housing project, undertaken for the poor, should always be on a war-footing, put up quickly and at minimum cost so that the houses could be occupied by squatters and public lands released immediately.* No doubt the 'Asian Games' situation had its impact on all housing in Faridabad (because of heavy demand for cement, etc., for new stadia at Delhi), and there was shortage of building materials. But, the State Government could have used its own influence to get the cement and other materials allocated on the basis of priority from their producers or made other arrangements. Had the Government used all its powers, the project could have been completed on time and cost of housing restricted to a reasonable amount instead of rising to Rs. 12,000 per unit. Obviously, the State Department of Local Government does not incorporate a monitoring mechanism.

A problem that looms large in the FCA is the rather extraordinary time taken by the Headquarters to react to the communications sent by the FCA, including those about the welfare schemes for the squatters. A case in point is the detailed letter sent to the higher authorities soon after the FCA team (consisting of the Chief Administrator and the Senior Town Planner) returned from their study-tour of the 'urban community services' programme at Hyderabad. These communication—I understand—are at times left at the mercy of the clerical staff there who, generally speaking, are not sufficiently aware of the immediacy and significance of their contents. Thus, while important projects/schemes or proposals get stuck up and fall into doldrums, the motivation at the local level also begins to dry up. There have been times when the local officials, on a visit to Chandigarh, have found it quite problematical tracking down old letters/reminders with a view to getting their replies expedited.

The amounts of Central grants for environmental improvements, received from the State Government, have never been proportional to the actual needs of the slum situation in Faridabad. Some towns in the State (perhaps because of the

political clout of the politicians representing them) have been managing to get more than what might be considered their 'normal' share. For instance, for the year 1985-86, out of the total Central grant of Rs. one crore, Hissar got as much as eight lakh as against only four lakh given to Faridabad which has a much larger squatter population to tackle. Such inequalities in resource allocation amongst the different towns need to be looked into. Unless Faridabad receives or spends on its own a larger share of the Central/State assistance (Faridabad Complex occupies a crucial position in the NCR scheme of things), the town is doomed to continued mediocrity in slum upgradation or rehousing of squatters. At present, the authorities are not doing enough even to 'stand still', let alone 'run ahead' of the problem.

It has been rightly observed that as and when a town comes to acquire a special character of its own (say, like Anand in Gujarat as milk and other dairy products centre) its special needs require a sound understanding in advance by the concerned authorities, followed by an effective orchestration of policy and implementation issues in order to ensure timely and appropriate action at the right stage.

Faridabad was *en mass* an industrial town in the 1950s and continues to be so today. As the mention of squatters is where the industry is, it goes without saying that Faridabad being an industrial town right from the start, the State authorities were in a better position to anticipate influx of jobless, rural people into this town and the subsequent rise of squatter settlements. Regrettably, no such advance thinking or planning was gone into.

The State Government shall have to, henceforth, develop the right vision for the job at Faridabad if the town, with its 43 unauthorized colonies and 62 squatter settlements, is not to turn into a sprawling slum by the year 2001. As of today, the problem seems to be dealt with complacency.

If planners/administrators tend to ignore the slums and view the slum-dwellers as 'nuisance', politicians (elected representatives) are known to use these urban poor in Faridabad as potential 'vote banks'—a sort of political weapon which they can and do exploit at the appropriate time. This is 'politico-

administrative 'may hem', not 'urban planning development'; nor is it 'human resources development'.

A major responsibility that the State Government must discharge is that of providing 'perception-oriented training' to all those officials who are concerned with squatters' problems. By this strand of training I do not mean one of those 'canned courses' that usually are organised on the subject of urban development in various training institutions but such training as would be specifically directed at increasing the awareness of officials on topics like: the problem of poverty and the powerful socio-economic forces that create it; deeper layers of diseased urban issues (including squatting); concept of human resource development and its implications for the town/region/society's development; and, managerial skills needed to carry out projects for the urban poor/squatters. This kind of training would also encourage commitment to Constitutional goals, attitudes/values consistent with the objectives of schemes of national importance and empathy for the urban poor. Of course, such training works better if the superiors at higher levels, first, get the training themselves.

Fortunately, the terms, 'slum' and 'slum dweller' are now beginning to acquire wider meaning and new connotations in India. The Planning Commission Task Force, for example, recognized this 'attitudinal changes' as follows:

1. A major shift in attitude towards people (not an un-productive burden but a productive resource);
2. A new interpretation of and approach to peoples' self-initiated housing actions and self-generated housing stock (even if deficient, approaches to a solution not a problem). Not to be demolished but to be conserved and improved);
3. A new definition of a house (not necessarily pucca or permanent, status symbol but one that shelters adequately);
4. A redefinition of the housing task (not necessarily permanent buildings but liveable environment);
5. A new role for the traditional housing agencies (not dcers but facilitators, not builders but promoters);

6. A new relationship between housing agencies and the clients (not donors and receivers but partners);
7. A new economics (not charity but investment);
8. A new definition of scale (not symbolic gestures but full coverage); and
9. For some, a new vision (not houses alone but overall development)².

But, in India these 'attitudinal changes' are still on paper. Of course, an attempt is being made to bring about such changes in the urban planners/administrators through training programmes. However, the size of the bureaucracy is so massive that those who have undergone such training so far are only a drop in the bucket. The problem is further complicated by the fact that 'perceptions' and 'attitudes' do not change so quickly even after exposure in such training bouts (if, hopefully, they are on right lines). A decisive factor that largely controls and conditions the perceptions/attitudes of most of us is the socio-economic structure of the larger society and the class to which we belong to. Unless, we become alerted to the influence of this force, I am afraid, such training shall not be very useful. Besides, the force of inertia in the Indian bureaucracy is fairly strong. It does show its propensity to 'change' but only under 'stress', say, a visit by the Prime Minister to a housing colony of the urban/tribal poor which has not been provided electricity. But, often the change lasts as long as the visit of the VIP and the bureaucracy moves back to its own momentum the moment the 'stress' eases or is laid off.³

The Central assistance for 'environmental improvements' under the aegis of the '20-Point Programme' began to flow into Faridabad only in 1979-80. Enquiries made at the FCA, however, show that the money did not always arrive in time

²*Task Force No. IV*, Planning Commission, Government of India, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

³See *India Today* 'New Delhi, January 31, 1985, for an expose on claims made by the Orissa Government with respect to the implementation of a crash welfare programme, ordered by the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for the benefit of tribals in Kalahandi district (See also *India Today*, September 15, 1986).

from the State Headquarters (at times, only towards the end of a financial year). Every time the funds were received late, the implementation programme lost a part of its cutting edge because the late arrival of money not only affected the very rhythm of the work at the FCA but also lowered the motivation of the officials—impairing, thereby, the very effectiveness of the programme.

The administrative aftermath of the rather quick transfers of FCA's chief administrators by the State Government on some occasions in the past is something that has not always turned out to be in favour of this local body's interests. For instance, a very important project in which the outgoing CA might have been greatly involved could get a temporary setback or its original objectives somewhat blunted. A general impression within the FCA is that as and when a chief administrator has had a longer tenure, commendable work has been done (of course, the 'commitment' of the concerned official is an equally important).

Faridabad Complex Administration (FCA)

Surely, part of the blame for the confusions and problems in Faridabad Complex today can be laid at the doorsteps of the Centre and the State Government, but many of the problems that plague it are uniquely FCA's own. Here are some of the principle ones:

The FCA was set up because the three municipalities then operating in the area were too weak structurally to not only cope with the various problems in their own areas but also to handle those which required integration across their jurisdictions. The FCA's creation repaired this damage to the extent that the 1971 Act (as well as other acts) granted the FCA with special and ample powers that the other local bodies in the State did not enjoy. But, the hope that a brave new world would arise with the on-coming of the FCA in this leading industrial town of the north did not materialize: neither the benefits of all those Acts have accrued to the town because there has been no proper administration of these Acts at the local level nor the spirit of planning has ever found its grip on the slowly-deteriorating situation.

A management expert has tried to draw a distinction

between "possession of resources or access to resources", on the one hand, and 'the ability to use them', on the other. In other words, even if the physical resources are available, an additional resource that an organization would badly require is the ability of its men to have the willingness/ability to use them in an effective manner. The construction of the 1,624 EWS houses for the squatters is a case in point. The objective was laudable: to provide low-cost housing to the economically-weaker sections in some of the squatterments in Faridabad. It was hoped that once the houses were ready, these would be sold for not more than Rs. 8,000 per unit. But, what was initially a sound proposal later became a high-risk project, not because of merely the impact of the Asian Games but *also* because there did not exist—as should have been the case in such an enterprise—a 'project manager' who could act as a 'focal point' for the integration of the work as well as forecast the influence of the coming uncertainties.

As we have already seen (Chapter 3), the established administrative mechanism in use at the FCA in regard to the 'start' and 'completion' of a project seems to suffer from a serious lacuna—*i.e.*, no single department or official is held accountable for the success or failure of a scheme from its beginning to end. The total responsibility, on the contrary, appears to be divided and sub-divided amongst the various organizational units (planning, engineering, administration, etc.) or individual actors within them. It is axiomatic that when such divisionalisation is carried through without proper integration at the appropriate stages of the operations, the end result is always that of each one taking a narrow view of its own role, without relating itself to the 'whole'.

The central notion of integration of planning-implementation-control is that when a plan is being drawn up, all those who are going to be closely associated with it through the various stages, should work it out collectively so that they are able to reach a common understanding of 'what is required, when, and at what cost'? And, if there are any different perceptions about, say, the objectives of a scheme or constraints in its implementation, these can then be perceived and resolved at that very stage, as far as possible. This kind of integration does not seem to exist within the FCA's

administrative set-up.

Besides, a basic requirement of any monitoring system is 'timely feedback'. It seems that here at the FCA is a system that relies on feedback *after* the deviation from desired performance is discovered (example: construction of EWS houses). No wonder, such discoveries often being late, the actual accomplishments have been missing 'planned physical targets'.

FCA also lacks the 'informational' infrastructure. The existing arrangement is nothing more than routine accumulation of year-end summaries of the money spent, and concerned with 'cost' in rupees rather than 'achievement of results'.

What does a rehabilitation scheme for squatters attempt to do? It, essentially, tries to reorganize their living in a new environment and then provide all such facilities that would enhance the livability of the settlers, say, water-supply, street light, community toilets, drainage or sewerage, transport, schooling for children, a shopping centre, parks, and so on. The experience of Bapu Nagar (p.150) however, shows that in the reckoning of the FCA bureaucracy 'sincerity' towards such rehabilitation programmes is overlooked in favour of only 'lip sympathy', because its fragile facilities' house-of-cards collapsed soon after the squatters moved in their new site.

For, if you take yourself to this small settlement standing in the midst of open fields and scattered factories on the outskirts of Ballabgarh, you will still find (as I did) its public toilets a total wilderness, its standposts without any water and electricity poles without light. In fact, the scheme is reported to have failed to enthuse the displaced worker-families right at the start. Only 110 plots found buyers amongst them, with a substantial number (1,300 plots) still lying idle. Perhaps the most ironic fact is that a good part of the land cleared of the squatters under this scheme was slowly re-occupied mostly by those evicted earlier.

FCA must also realize that cosmetic treatment of certain slum areas or public relations devices—it adopts at the time of visits by an Indian VIP or foreigners' party—will simply not do. The frustrating living conditions in urban slums in India are too well known to be hidden or papered over

through last-minute embellishments/window dressing.⁴

The size of investment (Rs. 72.40 lakh) made by the Centre in the "environmental improvement of slums" in Faridabad during the past-even years certainly makes an impressive figure. But, anyone looking for 'real' or 'tangible' environmental improvements—barring the negligible few here or there—in the slums of this town would find very little to excite him. Take a walk through pockets like Neelum-Bata and one comes across horrible insanitary conditions and nauseating sights and odours. The fact is that the few amenities that have been provided have proved to be only a few drops of improvements in what is really an 'ocean' of misery and squalor.

Indeed, it is virtually impossible, in most areas (where improvements have been carried out) to 'measure' the benefits received. Indeed, to ask such a question is to suggest the impossibility of answering it. For, the so-called improvements (like non-functioning water pumps, occasional spray of chemicals) have hardly brought about any worthwhile change in the quality of life of the squatters. How can they—when there is only one hand-pump/standpost for every 600 persons (aprx.) as against the Government of India norm of 'one tap for 150 persons'? As a squatter put it:

The full advantage of this Central aid has certainly not

⁴HUDA should also refrain from making exaggerated claims which it has done at times. Take, for example, page 2 of its glossy publication titled "Pace of Urban Development in Haryana—1985" wherein the language used ("...under the 20-Point Programme, an ambitious plan to allot house-sites to EWS of the society formulated...") appears to assert its role as a champion of the economically-weaker sections. The fact is that the planning goals of HUDA are heavily biased in favour of the wealthy sections (not EWS) and all the development it has brought about in Faridabad does not reflect the character of a multi-class, balanced urban community.

To mention another instance: on the same page, it claims: "...the most modern and the best organized City Centre is being created in Faridabad, hardly a distance of 20 kms. from Connaught Place in Delhi. The City Centre is planned to be the best in the country and is likely to be dedicated to the nation by the end of this financial year."

The reality is that the town of Faridabad still lacks this much-publicized 'City Centre.'


reached the poor in our Pocket. It might have reached the contractors or others.

The problem of 'environmental improvement' in slums here seems to have been viewed with a certain sense of complacency. Being poor, and too many of them squeezed together in small spaces they need much more of these improvements and need them *all*, and *at once*—not in a fragmented manner. The whole implementation of this 'nationally important' scheme here smells of a kind of an 'impersonal' transaction between a bureaucratic machinery and the needy, rather than a socially-sensitive public service and the victims of injustice in the society.

The EWS houses (1,624), built by the FCA for the squatter families, do not seem to represent what may be called 'healthful housing', and it appears that in the design of these units basic health objectives, present-day hygiene standards and concern for domestic felicity have been ignored. Take, for instance, the small area in one corner provided to meet the kitchen-needs of a squatter-family (see the diagram on next page).

First, the area given is not adequate for well-organized kitchen work; cooking place being the most dangerous area in a house, any mishap can be anticipated in such crowded living conditions (say, for exmple, spilling of hot liquids, slipping, getting injured). It won't allow the housewife sufficient ease and efficiency in walking, carrying and moving about. On top of it, if the family happens to use cooking gas, it can prove hazardous for human life, especially when every one is forced into sitting, eating, sleeping in a single room (a kerosene stove can be equally perilous). *Secondly*, cooking gives rise to smoke, steam and odours. In high summer temperatures, fumes from the stove can choke or cause harm to eyes. *Thirdly*, when someone falls ill, it would always be a problem both for the sick and the other family members. *Fourthly*, children wanting to do school home-work shall have no privacy. *Fifthly*, in such conditions no-one can expect to enjoy any quiet, rest or observe minimum measures for preventing spread of communicable diseases. *Sixthly*, the room is not sufficiently big to accom-

SKETCH OF AN EWS HOUSE* AT FARIDABAD
SHOWING DEMARCATION OF SPACE FOR,
AMONG OTHERS, COOKING (2) BATH (3) WC
(4) AND FAYOR (5)



*Eight dwelling units (i.e., four each on the ground and the first floor, served by a staircase) are located on a plot of land measuring 38'-6" x 43'-3" (185.02 sq. yds.)

moderate the typically large squatter families. On being asked as to how did the *nine* members of their family manage to sleep inside during a rainy day, the eldest son in one of the families there told me:

After allowing space for trunks and other household items of storage, we could hardly squeeze in here three cots. So six of us sleep on them and three underneath.

Last but not the least, living in a house like this would always create feelings of inferiority in the minds of grown-ups as also the younger ones.

In sum, it may be stated that some of the squatters in Faridabad may have got the proverbial 'one roof' over their

heads, but the design of these one-room houses as stated earlier is a far cry from 'healthful housing'.⁵ Even if these 500 families have been moved out of their earlier wretched environment, I think it would be wrong to assume that re-shaping of their 'environment' had taken on a new shape.

Indeed, the type of housing one lives in is said to influence perceptions, health, behaviour and attitudes. Let us know what effects may result from poor housing. According to an American expert, these include:


a perception of one's self that leads to pessimism and passivity, stress to which the individual cannot adapt, poor health, and a state of dissatisfaction; pleasure in company but not in solitude, cynicism about people and organizations, a high degree of sexual stimulation without legitimate outlet, and difficulty in household management and child rearing; and relationships that tend to spread out in the neighbourhood rather than deep into the family.⁶

But the FCA is not haunted at present by such revolutionary goals of 'healthful housing'. The big and immediate question before it is: how can it go about constructing similar one-room houses for the ill-housed families in the remaining 61 squatter settlements. How and wherefrom it shall get the necessary land and funds for the purpose? The picture is, indeed very depressing. A former deputy commissioner of Faridabad, attempted some calculations in this regard and

⁵Committee on the Hygiene of Housing, American Public Health Association: "Standards for Healthful Housing—Planning the Home for Occupancy", *Public Administration Service*, 1313 East, Sixtieth Street, Chicago, Ill., 1950.


⁶Alvin L. Schorr, *Slums and Social Security*, United State Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, DC, 1963, pp. 31-32; Studies done in England have shown that children and young people born and growing up in poorer parts of big industrial and commercial cities were not only 'born to fail' but that bad housing also had stunting effects on their mental and physical development. See, J.B. Mays, *Growing up in the City: a Study of Juvenile Delinquency in an Urban Neighbourhood*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1954, and P. Prosser and H. Wedge, *Born to Fail*, Arrow Books, London, 1973.

EWS HOUSES



Concerned more with stuffing squatters into a limited space than with "human" needs; hardly the kind that would help shape their children into "human resource"

ANOTHER VIEW OF EWS HOUSES



came out with a gloomier verdict:⁷

According to the norms of HUDCO, a low income house would cost Rs. 12,000 which, if repaid in monthly instalments will work out to Rs. 50 at the rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent interest. But, in the HUDCO scheme even this monthly instalment is not permitted. The allottees have to pay as much as Rs. 500 at the time of registration and Rs. 4,000 at the time of allotment. For an employee earning Rs. 350 per month and having a family of 3-5 members it is almost impossible to incur such sums unless he has other sources like saleable ancestral property. Even if a liberal monthly instalment scheme is adopted, this employee cannot earmark Rs. 50 p.m. out of his meagre budget. *The stark reality, therefore, is that unless the income levels of the economically-weaker sections is not brought up to a level where savings to the tune of Rs. 50 can be effected, they will have to remain in kutcha houses for years.*

He went on to say:

The magnitude of the problem is itself forbiddingly large. Constructed 25,000 pucca one-room tenements at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per unit will mean an investment of Rs. 30 crores. Government investment of such a magnitude is not possible due to budget constraints. Even if the investment is to be made in a phased manner over a decade or so, the building activity is bound to find itself badly outpaced by the population growth.

His analysis is instructive. Given the existing constraints—as outlined by him—housing for squatters in Faridabad would continue to be outdistanced by their increasing numbers, and the FCA—even with the occasional help from bodies like HUDCO—is most likely to find itself forced into rearguard actions ('fire-fighting', to put it differently) against the tortuous problem/of finding even 'a roof' for all the squatter families in Faridabad in the near future.

⁷FCA Files: A Note titled 'Slum Improvement-cum-Rehabilitation Project for Faridabad Town'.

One of the shibboleths of the 'housing for the urban poor' in 1987, the year marked as "International Year for Shelter for the Homeless" (IYSH), is: low-cost housing. But the search for cheaper houses in a country like India seems to be an illusion, primarily for three main reasons:

1. In a 'market economy' the materials that go into building a house pass through many hands from producer to the consumer and at each sale-purchase some profit is added, making the material very expensive for the ultimate consumer. Thus, these ever-rising building costs in a profit society are a continuing threat and have already reduced the supply of housing for the poor (the decision of the Haryana Housing Board to stop building low-income house in Faridabad after 1982, and the rise in the prices of the FCA-built EWS houses from Rs. 8,000 to 12,000, are two examples of the possible direction of this trend);
2. Another obstacle would be the low income of the urban poor. With a single item like food absorbing almost the entire earnings in a month and with virtually no savings at all, a typical poor family shall always face serious difficulty in purchasing (or even contemplating the purchase) an EWS house, or once purchased, may have problems paying the monthly instalments; and,
3. The misfortune of the Indian milieu is that here the contractors who build houses for the public agencies like FCA or DDA are not interested in using cheap building materials like 'mud' (euphemistically called "technology for the poor" in seminars and conferences).⁸ They are interested only in using the expensive 'cement' (called "the European earth" by the African tribes),

⁸In Brazil a working group is analyzing mudbrick conservation techniques. The Lampa municipality in Chile has already built 250 mudbrick houses for low-income families. A group of Peruvian architects are also exploring the new mud technology mentioned as 'adobe' in UNDP/UNESCO seminars/documents.—See TCDC News, 1984/2, p. 4 published by the UNDP, Division of Information, One UN Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

for—as an official at the FCA told me—“cement can be sold in black, not mud.

Recently, the idea of ‘urban community development’ in Hyderabad appears to have caught the imagination of the FCA authorities when in April, 1986, the Chief Administrator accompanied by the Senior Town Planner (both have since been transferred) visited that city on a fact-finding mission. The FCA is now interested in carrying out a similar experiment in Faridabad, and is looking for financial support from the State Government.

But, as already noted (Chapter 1), we must be absolutely clear in our minds about what UCD can and cannot do in a society like India. The greatest strength of this programme is said to be its impact on the ‘attitudes and values’ of the target-group.⁹ Assuming that the UCD—once initiated in Faridabad squatter settlements—will succeed in changing the attitudes of those who are at the bottom of the economic scale here and make them highly motivated individuals, set to ‘break the barriers of stagnation’ and come up in life in business or professions. The fact remains, however, that the examples of such “highly motivated men” are exceptions rather than the rule. The superiority of their “psychological mechanisms” notwithstanding, a majority of poor people in Faridabad (as also in the rest of the country) must still cope with the quality of economic base the town has to offer (which, in the case of Faridabad at least, is pretty depressed at present)¹⁰ and the other obstructions imposed by the socio-economic inequalities which always stand in the way of equal opportunities in real life. Apart from these impediments, the rising tide of unemployment in urban areas makes the situation still very frustrating. The job markets in towns and cities

⁹Williams J., Cousins and Catherine Goyder: ‘Changing Slum Communities (urban community development in Hyderabad)’, Manohar, 1979. The book offers a ‘Sympathetic and analytical account’ of the UCD programme in the ‘Slums of Hyderabad, the fifth largest city in India.

¹⁰See the write-up ‘Faridabad Going Down Hill’, *The Statesmen*, New Delhi, March 22, 1986.

are an immensely tight and complex affair. Evils like favouritism and nepotism aside, a job is a vicious struggle in which hundreds of people are found chasing a single job. Corruption is alleged to have reached even the public service commissions in some states and there are reports of price tags on certain government jobs which go to those who have the money to pay that price.¹¹ Thus, Alejandro dismisses such 'motivational theories' from the West as nothing more than an 'arithmetic approach'¹² which does not take into account the 'differences in positions in the stratification system' and the 'existing arrangements of economic and political power' in the poorer countries.

One can already find evidence of this phenomenon in the recently-launched (September 1, 1986) Government of India scheme called Self-employment Programme for Urban Poor or SEPUP, in short. It has stirred up popular interest amongst the urban poor but there are press reports that even before they (men and women) lined up outside bank branches to collect their application forms, these had been allegedly sold in black market or cornered by the usual 'operators' (the screening procedures are not fool-proof). At places the situation became so ugly that the police had to be called in to control it.¹³ There are other unanswered questions as well. For instance, the loan ceiling is only Rs. 5,000 (with an interest rate of ten per cent). Can this amount lift a family above the poverty line? How about the demand constraints in the traditional occupations in which these people usually invest their money? Any thought given to improve their marketable skills? And, so on. This unhappy example dramatizes one such obstruction the urban poor have to contend with in the 'existing arrangements of economic and political power'. Radical writers like Burgess view such remedies as attempts to 'rationalise mass poverty' in Third World countries.

Such a conclusion carries conviction when one juxtaposes the above arguments with the well-known fact that no Third

¹¹*The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, October 2, 1986, p. 9.

¹²Portes Alejandro, 'On the Sociology of National Development—Theories and Issues', in Abu-Lughod, Janet and Hay Jr., Richard (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹³*The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, October 12, 1986.

World country, following the Western model of development. has so far been able to stem the rural-urban flow of population, much less reverse it. Meanwhile, all these millions of slum-dwellers in countries like India are getting conditioned by a revolution of highly-rising hopes and expectations in a consumption-oriented value system (see *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, August 17-23, 1986).

Moreover, what to speak of changing the attitudes of the coming generation of slum-dwellers, as of today, the cities and towns in India can be freed from the existing squatter settlements (in the narrow sense) only if there is a vigorous constructional effort in the field of housing in both the urban and rural areas. But, what are the prospects for such a massive effort in India? Very bleak—if one looks at the rather mind-boggling figures of housing shortage in India: 24.7 million units (1984 figure)—to which now we shall have to add the expected number of units needed to satisfy the additional demand during the 7th Plan period.

'Financing' represents yet another bottleneck in India's race toward housing for all—which, unfortunately, stands at a very low level. For example, the proportion of 'investment in housing' to 'total investment' declined from 34 per cent in the early fifties to only 7.5 per cent in the late seventies.¹⁴ On a very conservative estimate, it has been figured out that an investment of more than 50,000 crore (1969 prices) would be required to wipe out the housing shortage in the country. Bodies like HUDCO and the HDFC have played a key role in the sphere of housing in the country—though in a limited manner. What impact the proposed agency like the 'National Housing Bank' shall have on the supply situation in the years to come—is a question that can best be left to the turmoil of times ahead.

Besides, launching of a programme like the UCD calls for a highly efficient and committed administrative machinery. The FCA shall have to be sure of that before it can take up

¹⁴The Share of housing in planned public investment fell from 16 per cent in the First Five-Year Plan to about 1.6 per cent in the Sixth Plan. Davendra B. Gupta, *Urban Housing in India*, World Bank Staff Working Papers, Number 730, The World Bank, Washington, DC, p. vii.

the challenging task. At least, for the time being, this does not appear to be case with the FCA.

Will Urban Community Development programme ever come to Faridabad? Will it succeed or fail? Will there merely be a new burst of activity in the form of 'environmental improvements' or EWS housing for the squatters in Faridabad in the near future? It is no easier making any forecasts. But, the impact of what has been going on so far is there for anyone to see: two different faces of the town—(1) the 'Better-off Faridabad', and (2) the 'Poor Faridabad'. Charles Correa calls this syndrome as:

...common to almost all Third World urban centres. Each seems to consist of two different cities. One is for the poor; the other (interlocked with it) is for the rich. Very often the latter has a special name. In Bombay, for instance, it is called "The Fort". In Dakar, Senegal, it is 'The Plateau'—which is astonishingly accurate, both in terms of geography, as well as the economic/psychological realities of that city.¹⁵

"BETTER OFF" FARIDABAD

This is the area (like HUDA Sectors nos. 15, 16-A and neighbourhood III and V in NIT) where, largely speaking, the privileged stratum of the town resides: the powerful bureaucrats, the lesser lights of the officialdom, the rich businessmen, professional/occupational groups, and the other neo-rich. Most of them are part of higher and middle-level status hierarchy of the town by virtue of their being employers (factory owners), or holding managerial/supervisory positions. These are the people with better education and higher incomes. It would be no exaggeration to say that by creating some exclusive residential sectors for the elite, the HUDA has indirectly helped this upper and middle-level strata of the society inspiring themselves from direct contact with the lower sections of the society insofar as 'housing' is concerned. The layout of this newly developed area is attractive and visually agreeable: wide, straight and smooth-surfaced roads/streets, laid out (mostly) with single-storey houses that are architecturally pleasing. Of course, in some HUDA Sectors there are large bungalows/mansions with very stylish designs. Strips of open spaces are fairly generously provided. The housing blocks are

¹⁵Charles, Correa: *The New Landscape*, The Book Society of India, 1985, p. 103.

surrounded by well laid-out parks and, at some places, clearly-defined green belts of adequate width (though, many have yet to mature). The plantings inside the houses are also very pleasing. The proportion of double-storey houses is not very high. Densities in the residential areas being low, there is not much traffic (vehicular and pedestrian) on the roads and streets, either. As one walks through some of the residential sections in this area, one is struck by an atmosphere of quiet and spaciousness. All of the 'neighbourhoods' or sectors may not have a bank, a post office, a library, but most of them do have nursery/primary schools, shopping centres, parks, etc. The sanitary standards are fairly good. Sewerage and drainage facilities are also provided. Water supply is regular. As the elite of the town lives in here, the local bureaucracy is relatively more sensitive to the demands and grievances of the people in those areas. The urban amenities and their maintenance command a lion's share in the FCA's annual budget. The general impression is that of clean, orderly localities and the flow of a leisurely, placid life in them.

POOR FARIDABAD

By 'Poor Faridabad' I mean the typical squatter-slum in this town. It is largely inhabited by people who eke out their living by selling their physical labour. Many of them do the work that dirties the hands. For example, back in their villages they worked as agricultural labour in the fields for the rich farmer. Here in the town, they are the 'arms, legs and backbones' of the industrial establishments, or work as hawkers, rickshaw pullers, construction labour, etc. They lack education and have little hope of rising above their present status. Most live in 'kutcha' mud-huts or semi-pucca one-room dwellings. The single hut or room in many cases serves as a combined cooking/living/sleeping space. Being located on low ground these are amenable to flooding during rains. Those built with grass, card-board, etc., are prey to destructive fire. In contrast to the 'openness' and 'orderliness' of the 'rich Faridabad', a step into the settlement gives the visitor a feeling of an 'enclosed' area which is visually most offending and environmentally suffocating: piles of garbage, exposed human waste; stagnant water pools, intolerable stench. Water supply is always irregular, and there are endless disputes and frictions at the standposts. Density of population being very high, congestion is the order of the day. Community toilets are few and far between, and so a large number of men, women, and children have no other option but to make a public nuisance of themselves by shitting in open spaces. Facilities for bathing (for ladies, in particular) are non-existent. If these do, they are primitive—about a sq. yard area covered from all sides with hessian. Dogs, pigs, stray cows can be seen moving about in a maze of unpaved, undrained mud—paths that are poorly lit at night. One strong shower, and the

entire area turns into a sea of mud. The filth and rubbish that lies all around for months on end poses a grave problem to the health of the inmates, and it is difficult to say what type of diseases—fatal or otherwise—may be lying hidden or lurking within the small huts or the dirt outside. Garbage collectors or sweepers from the local body rarely show up. The local bureaucracy is normally non-responsive to their needs; if not outright hostile, their foot-dragging on civic amenities for them here borders on negligence. Occasionally an 'improvement/upgradation' scheme is carried out, but the basic elements of slum life—in spite of those improvements—persist. Excepting the small percentage of prosperous workers who enjoy some affluence (TV, etc.), the overall picture is that of constant struggle, misery and degradation.

GENUINE DEVELOPMENT AND GLARING CONTRADICTIONS



The 'dichotomy' delineated above clearly indicates the lack of intensity with which the FCA and the other public agencies like the HUDA and the Haryana Housing Board, have pursued the squatters problems and—if I may say so—this also shows how much store they have so far put together in treating the squatters in Faridabad as a 'human resource'. Incidentally, this was the crunchpoint of the curiosity that led me to start with this study, *i.e.*, to find out how far the *NCR plan document's bold declaration of inten on realization of maixmal potential of the region's human resources* had been a matter of concern—at current reckoning—for the authorities in this ringtown of the region (as already stated, I picked off only the 'squatters' in the town as the focus of my study).

However, before we get into this 'human resource development' (HRD) factor so far as squatters in Faridabad are concerned, let us, first, try to get a sufficiently-wide view of the term itself.

Briefly, HRD means identifying and nurturing (physically and mentally) what is useful in each member of a society whereby he can not only realize his own maximum potential, and make positive contribution towards material production/prosperity in the society but also attain 'self-fulfilment' in his life.



In understanding a term like the HRD, it is also necessary to remember a very important distinction between what some-

"POOR" FARIDABAD



The gap between the living conditions in the "Poor Faridabad" and the "Better-off" areas presents a bewildering contrast. Note the hodge-podge of straw huts, filth, and mud paths (unfit even for walking) in one of the squatter slums above, and the large houses, well kept parks and the wide smooth-surfaced roads in the better-off localities (see the photographs on the reverse)

"BETTER-OFF" FARIDABAD



writers call as 'raw material' and 'resource.' They argue that just as in the manufacturing world, 'dead matter' like crude iron or rubber (raw material) is not considered complete and suitable for use (as a resource) unless it has been refined through a developmental process, likewise in the world of 'living matter' (human society), the latent potential of an individual (raw material) has to be developed (into a resource) before it can be considered fit for production of goods or services.¹⁶ 'The underlying rationale is that a human being is to be fed, clothed, housed, given medical care and education before he can take the leap from the lower condition of merely being a 'raw material' to the higher one, namely, ready-for-use 'human resource'. The ultimate goal is to bring about man's highest intellectual, economic, political and moral development.

The blunt truth about the squatters in Faridabad, however, is that a majority of them today stand far removed from the second stage, namely, 'human resource' in one way or the other. For example, having got 'official recognition' rather belatedly (January, 1985), almost all kinds of suffering has been borne by the poor amongst them all these 30-odd years. Ten years ago (1975-76), many of them were, first, forcibly evicted from their hutments. As a reaction, when they and the members of their families rioted, they were canned by the police. The authorities then were in a mood to 'clear' them and 'Bapu Nagar'—a re-settlement colony set up away from the centre of the town (p. 150) was one example of such clearance. 'Clearance', no doubt, but certainly not 'rehabilitation'—for, the project's several subgoals like public toilets, drinking water, medical facilities, a nearby shopping-centre were never realized. A key constraint that the residents of Bapu Nagar still suffer from is the non-availability of cheap/regular transport to work/hospitals/shopping centres in the city. Public agencies like the urban Estate Department/HUDA/Housing Board's plans for squatters have had no specific direction and they have been, by and large, operating in an ad hoc fashion. Thus, while the latter two bodies have

¹⁶Raj Nandy, 'Developing Human Resources', *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, October 7, 1985, p. 9.

been engaged in building operations for the urban poor in Faridabad, from time to time, in reality, the needs of the squatters, in particular, have never been met by them at all. It was only in the early 1980s that 1624 EWS houses were constructed for the first time by the FCA exclusively for squatters but these can hardly be considered 'healthful'. The one-room units, when crammed with 5-9 members of a family would soon deteriorate into slum *within*, if not outside, because of the open spaces and wide streets outside (though, on a recent visit to the blocks occupied by 500 squatters I found that spaciousness outside the houses was already gone and it had been replaced by overcrowding in big way).¹⁷

As for the remaining 60-plus squatter settlements in the town (and about a lakh of people trapped in them), they are still wallowing in dirt and filth—with or without 'environmental improvements'. Indeed, some of them, now blessed with all or some basic amenities, still remain deeply touched with intolerable living conditions. To lift the spirit of all of these pockets to a reasonable standard, substantial improvements would have to be carried out. As regards those pockets which have not been provided with any facility whatsoever, the overall picture is that of misery and degradation, exerting an unhealthy environmental influence not only on the settlements themselves but also on the affluent built-up areas nearby. Water is available only on rare intervals. The smell of the wind from the human wastes lying in the open almost forces the visitor to quicken the pace of his movement. There are no nearby well-equipped dispensaries. The distant, overcrowded and understaffed public hospitals have become more of disease-exchange centres than places for health-care. The poor can hardly afford the tuition fees of the nearby privately-run schools (Rs. 35 p.m.) plus transport, bringing the total

¹⁷A couple of well-to-do squatters' families in these blocks have taken full advantage of this housing programme by purchasing two houses, either side by side or one above the other, and turning them into one large two-room unit. Though the re-sale of these by the allottees is forbidden by the FCA, a squatter I met there told me in confidence that the illegal sales were already on clandestinely. 'After all, who would not be enticed by the possibility of making a handsome and quick profit in the form of black money', he added.

to about Rs. 50 or 60 p.m. Perhaps thousands of these slum children, long accustomed to bleak existence, are living here with no hope of getting: (a) any nourishment toward off the various childhood diseases, (b) an educational ladder from 'gutter to the university'—to use Thomas Huxley's famous phrase—to train them at least as fitters if not space-engineers, and (i) jobs to absorb them. I heard reports about a large number of young men in those settlements who are reportedly without work or caught in poorly paid jobs. I also heard from parents reports of school drop-outs and neglected children ending up in juvenile delinquency. The misfortune of this town, however, is that its economy seems to be cracking up, with many industrial units already stopped expanding and others planning to move over to Delhi because the position of electric supply there is more comfortable. Housing which has always been a critical problem in the past is likely to worsen in the future, because a serious deterrent to the construction of new houses, particularly for low-income families, would always be the ever-increasing costs of land, materials, labour, administrative inputs and higher rates of interest on loans from the financial institutions. Under these circumstances, it would almost be impossible for public housing agencies to pin down the prices of EWS houses,* or at least fix them sufficiently low to enable an industrial worker in Faridabad with an average income of 600-700 rupees a month to purchase them (50 per cent of the total working force in the town belongs to this category). It should not surprise us if the one-room EWS house constructed for Rs. 12,000 in 1983-84 might cost Rs. 25,000 in the year 2001. Indeed, it looks to me as if the worse is still to come, that is the urban poor in future may not be able to live in a cement house at all.

Evidence of it was found in the FCA's recent experiment with the construction of 1,624 EWS houses when the escalating costs forced the authorities to affect certain reductions in the original constructing specifications (like, when they decided

*An outstanding example is the EWS houses, built and sold by the Haryana Housing Board. Earlier, a low-income family could obtain such a house for Rs. 28,000 or so. Now, the same house carries a price tag of about Rs. 34,000.

to drop cement plastering of the walls of these houses) lessening, thereby the life-span of the buildings. In fact, it occurs to me that with the idea of 'environmental improvements', having already become respectable in India (thus, legitimising 'slum existence' for millions of people), not much would take place on the housing front—in any case, not at the pace called for by the desperate situation in Faridabad. After all, it took about 15 years for the FCA to provide housing to over 1,000 squatter families; think of how much time it would require to provide shelter to the additional 15,000 families or so.

Needless to say, such horrific physical and economic conditions in Faridabad hardly reflect the kind of environment that would act as fertile soil for the 'raw material' in squatter families to blossom into 'human resource'. A primary requisite for its development is the availability—in *ample measure and at the same time*—of all the *basic* necessities of life so that they can, first, realize their potential (physical as well as mental,) to contribute to the production of goods/services in the society and, then, achieve self-fulfilment. Only when all the frustrations resulting from the present lack of these deprivations disappear from their lives, that their hitherto thwarted energies would get released and enable them to attain personal development worthy of human beings in a free, civilized society. However, what to speak of achieving 'self-fulfilment', the question that should give us cause for reflection is whether in these days of inflationary pressures many of them have sufficient economic means even to realize their physical potential'. The fact is that the frustrations of meeting even the physical needs are increasing, day-by-day not decreasing, particularly for those who happen to be living below the poverty line and can't always be sure of a belly-full of 'dal, roti'¹⁸ twice a day (I met a widow who said that

¹⁸The phrase 'dal, roti' in India was presumably coined with reference to the times when these two items (constituting the staple diet of the common man) were relatively cheap and he could easily afford them. But, with the ever-increasing prices of 'dal' (pulses) in a profit society like India even pulses have become a luxury for the poor and the phrase, therefore, seems to have become some sort of an oddity today, and cannot really be paired with the poor in India.

she and her two undernourished children were constantly in a state of 'physical want' because of her low earnings of Rs. 7 per day).

A FOOTNOTE

This may well be the place to ask the question: if the past policies and practices of the FCA have failed to make the most of *this* 'human' asset of the region, what is the hope in future?

I think it is fair to say that the squatter problem in the town is likely to sink further in the time to come, primarily because of 'shortage of funds'. My discussions with the authorities at the State headquarters revealed that they were not in a position to make any heavy investments in the uplift of these people out of the State budget—now or later. The financing required to improve their 'environmental' conditions is supplied by the Centre; withdraw that and the chasm between their 'needs' and the 'help' would in no time become almost unbridgable. The FCA with its own increased financial burdens is unable to find fresh money for squatters because it needs an increasing quantity of funds to tackle its own city-based avalanche of problems like water supply and sewerage. The impression that I got was that while the FCA looks to 'Chandigarh' for practical solutions to these problems, Chandigarh, in turn, has either been passive or looks to the 'Central Government' and the NCR board. This tendency to shed their own troublesome problems and then pass them over to the higher authorities is not likely to offer the poor amongst squatters an early escape route from their sufferings.

It seems that Faridabad has already lost its vantage point in this battle against squats. Even if the NCR stands by it to support a couple of stray physical projects, I am afraid, renewing of physical environment of the town in a couple of area would not eliminate the basic cause of squatter settlements. It is not enough to talk of a few blocks of EWS houses (important, no doubt, as a temporary solution); unless policy at the higher levels is designed around a long term strategy, all that we are doing to save the situation in the

short-term is wasted. These short-term strategies would merely aggravate the situation (apart from giving us the illusion of accomplishments)* by prolonging the sufferings of these people without hope and, thereby, undermining the town's responsibility toward preparation of these urban poor and their children for their march into the techno-scientific society of the 21st century.

If this town—as also others afflicted by this problem—is to realize the tremendous human resource potential represented by over a lakh of people in these slum pockets, several changes in the society (both at the macro and micro levels) shall have to be carried out—all of them very fundamental from their point of view. For instance, first and foremost, a change in the economic system which presently distributes the wealth created in an inequitable manner and creates an 'underclass' (rural and urban poor) and isolates it from the system. But, there is nothing that the FCA could do about it.

However, even within the framework of this severe limitation, the State Government as well as FCA can initiate certain steps at their own level—at least to prevent the problem from getting worse, if not improve upon it considerably. To achieve this job, several inputs are needed. Let us see which ones are the lead items amongst them:

1. a high order of commitment to squatters as a 'human resource';
2. sufficient land;
3. finance;
4. trained manpower;
5. system's approach as a philosophy of management ; and,
6. innovative structural changes (like a 'task force' or 'project management') in the administrative machinery

*Take, for example, HUDCO's latest plan to force its borrowing agencies (like Housing Boards) to set apart five per cent of all 'under-development' land for settlement of the shelterless. However, if press-reports are to be believed (see *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, dated June 25, 1987), many of these agencies seem to be trying hard to out-manuever HUDCO's strategem by advancing several reasons why it cannot be carried out in their respective States.

to achieve optimal results.

The first item, namely, "a high order of commitment to squatters as a human resource", appears to me to be strikingly important, for while squatter slums may be in the front-rank of global discussions (UN, World Bank, etc.) and of national interest (EIUS, 20-Point Programme) but these did not seem to be in the front-rank priorities of some of the officials here. In the arguments of some of them I detected a deeply-entrenched bias towards the squatters. There were others who were totally ignorant of the 'human resource' aspects of the squatters problems and did not quite realize what a tremendous social cost the nation was paying in terms of human stagnation, thwarted lives and, of course, growing crime (who knows, after all, how many potential athletes like P.T. Usha and Kartar Singh are being lost to the nation through this neglect). I, therefore, believe that if we are serious about obtaining the application of bureaucracy's commitment to squatters problems in our towns and cities, it is time to change their present perceptions of squatters as 'outright burdens/carriers of disease and crime/disrupters of the planned form and beauty of cities' to that of 'normal people possessed by normal desires for economic security, better incomes and a nice way of life for themselves and their children'. Rita Monteiro made a pertinent point:

These hutment/pavement dwellers—the self-employed hawkers of vegetables, rickhaw pullers, casual labourers like construction workers, domestic servants, dhobis, cobblers, masons, painters, etc.,—did not come to the city of their free choice but are victims of 'enforced migration' because they were unable to eke out a living in their villages. The point, however, is doesn't the city need them as much as they need the city? Don't they make life easier for the middle and upper classes by providing them number of services? If they are uprooted, would not the industry, trade and office-life suffer? In fact, if the city will sink *with* them—as is often made out—will not sink *without* them?¹⁹

¹⁹Rita Monteiro, "Garib Hatao Drive in Bombay", *The Statesman*, New Delhi/Calcutta, October 28, 1983, p. 8.

Charles Correa also noted with concern:

This is not always understood by the rich who often conveniently overlook the fact that they need the poor to run the city—not to mention their own households. In most of Bombay's privileged homes, there are a multitudes of tasks (from the daily washing of the car to the weekly laundry) that are regularly performed—for a pittance—by squatters.²⁰

Perhaps, it was a recently-held²¹ National Seminar, organised by the Joshi-Adhikari Institute of Social Studies, New Delhi (see Appendix VI), which, more than any others, presented the case of squatters/urban poor effectively in a number of significant ways. Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, has called these millions of labouring people as the 'real heroes and architects of the country' and demanded immediate enactment of legislation by Parliament to protect the interests of pavement/slum dwellers in the country.²²

As for the 'land' squeeze that the FCA finds itself in at present, one hopes that the State Government shall act in an enlightened manner and not hold the 1,329 acres longer than what is necessary. If the 'money' position is tight, I wonder, shouldn't the State Government and the FCA find ways to make the money now spent on comparatively less-productive things do a better job. It is ironic that a nation which can afford crore of rupees on building brand new cities as state capitals cannot spare ample funds for the uplift of the very people who happen to be, amongst others, the builders of these cities and who, alongwith their children, are forced to live in disease and stench as they move from one construction

²⁰Charles Correa, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

²¹National Seminar on 'Urbanisation, Growth of Slums, Social Conflict and Environmental Hazards', New Delhi, January 17-19, 1987; also see Recommendations made by the National Seminar on 'Development Programmes for the Urban Poor', February 2-3, 1987, organized by the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.

²²V.R. Krishna Iyer, *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, October 23, 1985, p. 1.

site to another. The political wisdom epitomized in the establishment of a Ministry of Human Resource Development at the Centre cannot be fully appreciated unless substantial investments are made to give these 'architects of the county' what is constitutionally and ethically due to them.

It is also worth reminding ourselves that between the two items, *i.e.*, 'land' and 'money', it is the former that is likely to be the tomorrow's single most important input for the entire houseless population of Faridabad, including the squatters. For, with every inch of land in the inner areas in Faridabad already on premium, and every parcel of space being intensely used in the fringe areas, the present HUDA policy of selling large plots of 1,000/500 sq. yards to the affluent shall have to cease. Instead, HUDA would do well to sell, in future, plots not larger than 250 sq. yards in view of the population crush that lies ahead. Planning does not merely mean 'regulation of land use'. More important than that, in a country wedded to a socialistic pattern of society, it also means 'a fair and just distribution of land amongst all sections of the society'. Apart from that, 'land'—unlike many other natural resources—is an absolutely *limited* resource and, in the context of present day urban requirements, is the most vital possession and basic ingredient of a community's existence. How it is used *now* will affect the lives of generations of people to come and the quality of their lives. Hence, it is imperative that there is a rational allocation of land in the community right at this stage.²³ The planners of Stockholm have always emphasized that it was not their 'superior ability but control over three major resources (land, money, and an effective administrative machinery) that 'enabled them to make Stockholm a model for other cities.'

Slums are a disgrace from any angle. The worst damage they inflict on a society is that they slowly destroy the very 'human resource' we talk of preserving in the Constitution, Five Year Plans, NCR documents or management books,

²³Edward Higbee, *The Squeeze: Cities Without Space*, Cassell, London, 1961.

And, when millions stand condemned to slum existence²⁴ in a society, it cannot claim to be humane or healthy, much less democratic.

Nor do slums happen by chance. They are the consequence of inequalities of wealth in a country and inaction on the part of powers that be. As long as urban policymakers keep thinking in terms of only 'physical changes' without parallel 'economic changes', transition to a squatter-free society would be a hard road to tread upon. It must be added, however, that merely a buoyant economy will not help; it has to be accompanied by distributive justice as well. Or, as authorities like the late Gunnar Myrdal and Mahbub el Haq have stated: "If you pursue economic justice, growth will look after itself."²⁵

The problems of human decay²⁶ are much worse than the problems of physical decay because it is always the human development that breathes life into physical development. Therefore, if proper weightage to the development of human resource like the urban poor within the National Capital Region is not accorded by the implementing agencies, the NCR aims and ambitions would be reduced to a routine repetition of jargons in training programmes/seminars/conferences, or, at best, remain a programme of 'magnificent intentions'.

²⁴For Birdi, the word 'slum' takes on the following form when he tries to give meaning to each of the four letters that go to make it: 'S' for Shell, 'L' for Languishing, 'U' for Urban, and 'M' for Masses, or when read together, "Shell of languishing urban masses". This description, he says, appears to depict the "prevalent conditions in any slum area". See H.P. Birdi, *Delhi Slums and Law*, Delhi, 1982.

²⁵Quoted in Lean Geoffrey, *Rich World, Poor World*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978, p. 104.

²⁶It has been long recognised that malnutrition in early years can cause several childhood diseases. However, as C. Gopalan, India's eminent nutrition-expert once warned, this commonplace observation should not be allowed to obscure yet another less-known but equally important fact that malnourished children gradually grow into a pool of substandard adults who, then, serve to perpetuate the undernutrition scenario over successive generations. This waste of human resource every year, he said, must cause us even greater concern than the actual population rise in India. See the daily, *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 1982.

APPENDICES

Appendix I
ESTIMATED URBAN POPULATION AND SLUM
POPULATION AT THE END OF THE
SEVENTH PLAN (STATE-WISE)

<i>(Persons in lakh)</i>					
<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Name of the State/Union Territory</i>	<i>Urban population 1981</i>	<i>Growth rate 1971-81</i>	<i>Estimated urban population 1990</i>	<i>Estimated slum population 1990</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1.	Andhra Pradesh	124.88	48.26	190.37	38.07
2.	Assam	20.47	58.80	33.14	6.63
3.	Bihar	87.19	54.40	137.72	32.70
4.	Gujarat	106.02	40.82	155.05	31.01
5.	Haryana	28.27	59.16	45.86	9.17
6.	Himachal Pradesh	3.26	35.25	4.58	0.92
7.	Jammu & Kashmir	12.60	50.35	19.44	6.27
8.	Karnataka	107.30	50.29	165.62	33.15
9.	Kerala	47.71	37.63	68.16	13.63
10.	Madhya Pradesh	105.86	56.07	168.81	33.76
11.	Maharashtra	219.94	39.82	312.55	62.51
12.	Manipur	3.75	163.77	9.61	1.92
13.	Meghalaya	2.41	62.74	3.99	0.80
14.	Nagaland	1.20	133.84	2.75	0.55
15.	Orissa	31.10	68.29	53.02	10.60
16.	Punjab	46.48	43.66	68.93	13.79
17.	Rajasthan	72.11	57.15	115.69	23.14
18.	Sikkim	0.51	159.86	1.29	0.26
19.	Tamil Nadu	159.52	27.78	213.78	42.76
20.	Tripura	2.26	38.51	3.24	0.65
21.	Uttar Pradesh	198.99	61.22	326.54	65.31
22.	West Bengal	144.47	31.61	198.57	49.64
TOTAL STATES		1526.30	—	2298.71	477.24

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1. A.N. Islands		0.49	89.31	0.93	0.19
2. Arunachal Pradesh		0.41	129.73	0.93	0.19
3. Chandigarh		4.23	80.84	7.65	1.53
4. Dadra Nagar Haveli		0.07	—	—	—
5. Delhi		57.68	57.73	92.84	38.25
6. Goa, Daman, Diu		3.52	54.88	5.45	1.09
7. Lakshadweep		0.19	—	—	—
8. Mizoram		1.22	225.13	3.80	0.76
9. Pondicherry		3.16	59.41	5.13	1.03
Total UTs		70.97	—	116.73	35.04
TOTAL		1597.27	51.22	2415.44	512.28

SOURCE: Town and Country Planning Organization (TCPO), Government of India, *A Compendium on Indian Slums*, September 1985.

Appendix II

ESTIMATED URBAN POPULATION AND SLUM POPULATION IN 1990 IN
METROPOLITAN CITIES

(Persons in lakh)

Sl. No.	Name of the City/Town	Total population 1981	Identified slum population		Growth rate 1971-81	Estimated population 1990	Estimated slum population 1990
			Number	percentage to Col. (3)			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1.	Calcutta	91.94	30.280	32.9	30.35	125.33	43.86
2.	Greater Bombay	82.43	28.314	34.3	37.80	117.89	41.26
3.	Delhi	57.29	18.000	31.4	56.66	97.67	32.08
4.	Madras	42.89	13.630	32.1	34.91	60.22	21.08
5.	Bangalore	29.21	3.050	10.4	76.17	51.86	10.37
6.	Hyderabad	25.45	5.000	19.6	40.74	37.07	11.12

(Continued)

(Continued)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
7.	Ahmedabad	25.48	5.363	20.3	43.53	37.76	11.33
8.	Kanpur	16.39	6.140	37.5	32.39	22.84	8.00
9.	Pune	16.86	2.743	16.3	48.48	25.73	5.15
10.	Nagpur	13.02	4.161	31.9	39.50	18.82	5.64
11.	Lucknow	10.07	2.850	28.3	23.66	13.12	3.94
12.	Jaipur	10.15	2.960	29.1	57.78	16.34	4.90
TOTAL		421.18	122.491	29.1	—	618.65	198.73

SOURCE: TCPO, *A Compendium on Indian Slums*.

Appendix III
ESTIMATED URBAN POPULATION AND SLUM POPULATION IN 1990 IN CITIES WITH
POPULATION 5 TO 10 LAKH
(Persons in lakh)

Sl. No.	Name of the City/Town	State Union Territory	Total population 1981	Slum population 1981 as identified	Growth rate 1971-81	Estimated population 1990	Estimated slum population 1990	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
				Number	Percentage			
1.	Coimbatore	TN	9.20	—	—	24.58	12.06	2.41
2.	Patna	BHR	9.19	5.837	63.5	86.30	17.15	3.43
3.	Surat	GUJ	9.14	2.324	25.4	85.10	16.96	3.39
4.	Madurai	TN	9.08	—	—	27.11	12.08	2.42
5.	Indore	MP	8.29	1.263	15.2	47.14	12.57	2.51
6.	Varanasi	UP	7.97	2.600	32.6	30.79	10.89	3.27
7.	Agra	UP	7.47	2.240	29.9	21.39	9.58	2.87

(Continued)

(Continued)

(Continued)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
8.	Jabalpur	MP	7.57	0.618	8.2	41.67	11.09	2.22
9.	Vadodara	GUJ	7.45	1.182	15.8	59.16	12.08	2.42
10.	Cochin	KER	6.86	1.700	24.8	16.86	8.61	2.55
11.	Dhanbad	BHR	6.78	—	—	55.92	10.80	2.16
12.	Bhopal	MP	6.71	0.568	8.5	74.69	11.82	2.36
13.	Jamshedpur	BHR	6.69	—	—	46.88	10.12	2.02
14.	Ulasnagar	BHR	6.48	0.148	2.3	63.52	10.77	2.15
15.	Allahabad	UP	6.50	1.880	28.4	25.22	8.56	2.56
16.	Tiruchirapalli	TN	6.09	0.801	13.1	30.82	8.32	1.66
17.	Ludhiana	PB	6.07	3.104	51.1	51.12	9.45	3.78
18.	Srinagar	JK	6.06	2.420	39.9	43.20	8.90	2.67
19.	Vishakapatnam	AP	6.03	1.520	25.2	63.50	10.02	2.00
20.	Amritsar	PB	5.95	0.973	16.3	35.47	8.41	1.68
21.	Gwalior	MP	5.56	0.374	6.7	37.83	7.98	1.60
22.	Gauhati	AS	5.50	0.625	11.4	74.50	14.63	2.93
23.	Calicut	KRL	5.46	0.600	10.9	18.10	6.81	1.36
24.	Vijaywada	AP	5.43	1.444	26.6	58.14	8.76	1.55

25. Meerut	UP	5.36	1.800	33.6	46.42	8.08	2.42
26. Hubli Dharwar	KRN	5.27	0.413	7.8	38.86	7.59	1.52
27. Trivandrum	KRL	5.20	0.450	0.9	17.84	6.51	1.30
28. Salem	TN	5.18	0.186	3.6	23.67	6.75	1.35
29. Solapur	MHR	5.15	1.485	28.8	95.89	10.06	2.01
30. Jodhpur	RAJ	5.06	1.364	26.9	55.41	8.04	1.61
31. Ranchi	BHR	5.03	0.626	1.2	55.41	7.99	1.60
TOTAL		203.78	—	—	—	313.35	69.79

SOURCE: TCPO "A Compendium on Indian Slum", *op. cit.*

Appendix IV
INCIDENCE OF SLUMS AND SQUATTER AREAS
IN SELECTED CITIES OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES*

<i>Country</i>	<i>City</i>	<i>Slums and squatter settlements as percent- age of city population</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>		
Cameroon	Douala	80 (1970)
Ghana	Yaounde	90 (1970)
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	90 (1968)
Ghana	Accra	53 (1968)
Ivory Coast	Abidjan	60 (1964)
Kenya	Nairobi	33 (1970)
	Mombasa	66 (1970)
Liberia	Monrovia	50 (1970)
Madagascar	Tananarive	33 (1969)
Malawi	Blantyre	56 (1966)
Nigeria	Ibadan	75 (1971)
Senegal	Dakar	60 (1971)
Somalia	Magadishu	77 (1967)
Sudan	Port Sudan	55 (1971)
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	50 (1970)
Togo	Lome	75 (1970)
Upper Volta	Ouagadougou	70 (1966)
Zaire	Kinshasa	60 (1969)
Zambia	Lusaka	48 (1969)

*Definitions vary from country to country and city to city. Therefore, these data only present the roughest of impressions regarding the housing problem in these cities.

(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Middle East/Mediterranean</i>		
Iraq	Baghdad	29 (1965)
Jordan	Amman	41 (1971)
Turkey	Ankara	60 (1970)
	Istanbul	40 (1970)
	Izmir	65 (1970)
	Beirut	1.5 (1970)
Lebanon	Beirut	1.5 (1970)
Morocco	Casablanca	70 (1970)
	Rabat	60 (1971)
<i>Low Income Asia*</i>		
Afghanistan	Kabul	21 (1971)
Indonesia	Djakarta	26 (1972)
	Bandung	27 (1972)
	Makassar	33 (1972)
	Kathmandu	22 (1961)
Nepal	Kathmandu	22 (1961)
Pakistan	Karachi	23 (1970)
Sri Lanka	Colombo	43 (1968)
<i>Middle Income Asia</i>		
Hong Kong	Hong Kong	16 (1969)
Korea	Seoul	30 (1970)
	Busan	31 (1970)
	Kuala Lumpur	37 (1971)
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	37 (1971)
Philippines	Manila	35 (1972)
Singapore	Singapore	15 (1970)
<i>Latin America and Caribbean</i>		
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	30 (1970)
	Belo Horizonte	14 (1970)
	Recife	50 (1970)
	Porto Alegre	13 (1970)
	Brasilia	41 (1970)
Chile	Santiago	25 (1964)
Colombia	Bogota	60 (1969)

*India, too, comes under this category.


(1)	(2)	(3)
	Cali	30 (1969)
	Buenaventura	30 (1969)
Ecuador	Guayaquil	49 (1969)
Guatemala	Guatemala city	30 (1971)
Honduras	Tegucigalpa	25 (1970)
Mexico	Mexico city	46 (1970)
Panama	Panama city	17 (1970)
Peru	Lima	40 (1970)
	Arequipa	40 (1970)
	Chimbote	67 (1970)
Venezuela	Caracas	40 (1969)
	Maracaibo	50 (1969)
	Barquisimeto	41 (1969)
	Cludad	
	Guayana	40 (1969)

SOURCE : Orville T. Grimes, *Housing for Low Income Urban Families*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976 as presented by Johannes F. Linn, "Policies for Efficient and Equitable Growth of Cities in Developing Countries", Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1979, pp. 35-6.

AUTHOR'S NOTE :

1. It would be noticed from the Table above that the figures shown in the third column pertain to the period, 1964 to 1972, and are, therefore, somewhat out-of-date. But, in the absence of relatively recent information, I felt that I would rather rely upon this data than leave the readers totally uninformed about the state of affairs in the Third World cities.
2. I have also taken the slight liberty of excluding the Indian cities from the Table because up-to-date data with respect to the slum situation in them are made available in Appendix II.

Appendix V
**FARIDABAD COMPLEX—Shape of the Town (showing, amongst others,
 location of major slum clusters)**



Appendix VI

CHARTER OF DEMANDS

Made in the National Seminar on "Urbanisation, Growth of Slums, Social Conflict and Environmental Hazards", held on 17-19, January 1987 at New Delhi)

Assembled at this National Seminar on "Urbanisation, Growth of Slums, Social Conflict and Environmental Hazards", we the social scientists, trade union, political and voluntary organisation activists and slum dwellers, are deeply concerned about the way our urban centres have become mass breeding grounds of slums and slum-like settlements where millions upon millions of labouring people are forced to live under inhuman conditions without proper jobs, shelter, sanitation and other basic amenities for human existence, though these are the people who contribute most to the urban society and economy . . . We are deeply concerned about the way, under various pretexts, be it in the name of urban development or on the plea of environmental protection and beautification, these labouring people are being thrown out of their meagre shelters or driven out of the areas where they somehow manage to earn their living, without proper alternative arrangements for their shelter and livelihood.

Let this Charter be our humble contribution in the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, declared by the United Nations (1987).

CHARTER

1. Housing alongwith the right to work and food must be accepted as a fundamental, legal and social right of every Indian citizen.
2. Law should guarantee that employers, whether private or public, must provide housing facilities to their employees close to their places of work and at affordable rents.
3. There should be strict enforcement of the existing urban land ceiling laws and enactment of others in order to

prevent speculation and black-market in urban land.

4. Land on which slums exist, privately owned land above ceiling and vacant land must be taken by the state and utilised for shelter and service in an environment of human dignity.

5. Increased state aid supported by central contribution for self-housing and cooperative housing for the urban poor, particularly for the homeless and the slum dwellers, should be guaranteed. Municipal Corporations must mobilise resources and obtain state aid for providing healthy shelter to the self-employed poor and low-earning workers in the informal sector, at low rent.

6. Control over prices and distribution of conventional housing material are to be ensured. Research and production of suitable cheaper materials based on local resources to be made available to the poorer sections of the people.

7. Hijacking of rent of urban shelters must be prevented with the help of legal provisions in existence and to be enacted. Violation of such provisions should be made punishable by law. Dilapidated houses, dangerous to the occupants, whose owners refuse to renovate, should be renovated by the state, the expenses for which are to be charged to the owners. Laws already existing in this direction should be strictly implemented.

8. Evictions in the name of slum clearance or clearance of squatters and pavement dwellers for urban development should be stopped forthwith. No eviction be made without providing permanent alternative shelters suited to the trade and occupation of the people affected, due to any public scheme identified as essential to civic infrastructural development. Police repression on slum dwellers, squatters and pavement dwellers must cease.

9. Basic civic amenities like sanitation, health, education and recreation is the right of all citizens. It is the duty of the state and municipal bodies to take immediate measures to guarantee a healthy habitat to all within urban areas, particularly to the under-privileged.

10. Right to the safe environment must be recognised. It should be the responsibility of municipalities and local authorities to annually survey all sources of environmental hazards and to ensure safety of both workers and citizens.

11. Ration cards and the right to vote are to be guaranteed to all citizens of urban areas irrespective of their places of living. The Census should include all categories of shanty dwellers.

12. Repeal all clauses in the existing town-planning and other Acts which are aimed at curbing the rights of labouring people living and working in urban areas, and all provisions of laws which seek to make squatting and so-called unauthorised occupation a cognisable offence. Plug loopholes in laws which are utilised by vested interests, in collusion with the state, for depriving the shelterless of what was meant to be their due.

13. Developmental agencies should be democratised and planning programme widely publicised with the aim of soliciting ideas and active participation of non-official organisations in urban planning processes of the labouring city people who constitute the over-whelming majority of urban dwellers in our country.

14. The demand for housing should be integrated with other basic demands in the organised labour movement.

15. Cottage industries and self-employment should be integrated under urban community development programmes to be introduced among the city poor based on their residences.

16. Revitalisation of economic activities in urban areas with the aim to create jobs for all constitutes one of the basic pre-conditions for solving the problem of shelter for the urban poor.

17. Agrarian reform measures, abandoned in most states of the country and substituted by what goes in the name of 'green revolution strategy' have to be vigorously pursued in order to bring about basic transformation in rural economy. Immediate steps should be taken for the implementation of the ceiling, tenancy, homestead and other land reform laws after plugging the existing loopholes, for the abolition of the bonded labour system, abrogation of all usurious debts owned by the peasants, agricultural labourers and rural artisans for adequate wages to agricultural labourers and jobs for them all round the year, quick and adequate measures against natural calamities, shelter for everyone and provision of minimum

amenities for education and culture. Development programmes for the countryside should aim at the fullest use of the economic potential of our rural areas with the help of a gigantic manpower resource that our country fortunately possesses.

We are convinced that such a task calls for a massive united countrywide movement in which people living in urban areas and in the countryside, slum dwellers' organisations, trade unions, peasants and agricultural labourers' organisations and all others who share these views to join hands to eradicate from our cities this shameful manifestation of utter human degradation.

LIST OF NAMES CITED

- Abraham, A. 53
Abrams, C. 1, 13, 29, 30, 168
Abu-Lughod, J. 21, 22, 27, 28, 37
Alejandro, P. 188
Amin, S. 24

Birdi, H.D. 201
Bose, A. 40
Brown, L.D. 9
Burke, G. 1
Burgess, R. 189

Castells, M. 38
Correa, C. 10, 155, 190, 200
Cousins, W. 187

Dandekar, U.M. 40
Das, A. 22
Das, P.R. 140
Das Gupta, B. 40
Denning, L. 13
Das Santos, T. 24
Dwyer, D.J. 13

Eillott, B. 38
Engels, F. 3

Ford, J. 5
Frank, A.G. 24
Friedman, J. 23

Gandhi, M.K. 24
Gans, H. 8
Gopalan, C. 202
Goyder, C. 187
Gupta, D.B. 189

Haq, M. 202
Hansen, M.N. 23

Hardin, G. 36
Harrington, M. 4, 6
Harvey, D. 23, 38, 39
Hellnsteiner, M.R. 37
Hirschman, A.O. 23
Hoselitz, B.F. 39
Hunter, D. 7, 17
Huxley, T. 195

Iyer, Krishna V.K. 200

Keyfitz, N. 10

Lakshman, N. 22
Laisley, R. 40
Laquian, A.A. 6
Lean, G. 12, 24, 36
Lerner, D. 11
Lewis, O. 8, 17
Lloyd, P. 15, 16

Mangin, W. 31
Mao, Tse-tung 23
Marx, K. 3, 24
Mays, J.B. 184
McCrone, D. 38
McGee, T.G. 24, 27
Miller, W.B. 4, 8
Miner, H. 11
Mohan, I. 36
Monteiro, R. 199
Mumford, L. 2, 3
Myrdal, G. 20

Nandy, R. 34, 193
Newman, D. 94

Panikkar, R., VIII
Partridge, E. 5

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Perlman, J.E. 51 | Seabrook, J. VIII, 23 |
| Phillips, W.S.K. 40 | Seeley, J. 9 |
| Pickvance, C. 38 | Sen, M. 49 |
| Potter, R.B. 11, 14, 31 | Sethi, J.D. 165 |
| Prosser, P. 184 | Sharma, A.K. 40 |
| | Slater, D. 28 |
| Qadeer, M.A. 23 | Stokes, C. 9 |
| | Strole, L. 8 |
| Rao, K.R. 40 | |
| Rao, M.S.A. 40 | Turner, J.F.C. 32 |
| Richard, H (Jr.) 21, 22, 27, 28, 37 | |
| Rostow, W.W. 20 | Ward, P.M. 32 |
| | Warner, L.W. 4 |
| Schumacher, E.F. 22 | Wedge, H. 184 |
| Schorr, A.L. 184 | |

